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West Europe Report

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CVP'S INTERNAL EVOLUTION, VIEWS ON EUROPE EXAMINED

Rise in Membership

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 10/11 Jan 87 p 2

[Article: "Excursion into the Heart of the CVP [Flemish Christian Social Party]: It Is Difficult to Have a Priest on the Ticket"; first paragraph is LA LIBRE BELGIQUE introduction]

[Text] To explain Belgian politics to a foreigner, assuming that this is possible, it is essential to refer to the history, the weight, the influence of the Flemish Catholic world and of the CVP, in particular. We no longer attempt to count the studies, theses, and doctoral theses on the subject of the "CVP State." Imperceptibly, the party continues to evolve according to the influences that predominate within it. But who makes up the CVP today? Where does the CVP recruit its membership? How can a party simultaneously bring together young people who dream only of a Europe of Regions and their elders who are still feeling nostalgic for the Belgium of their fathers? We have made a little excursion into the heart of the CVP to try to see all this more clearly.

As a guide for our excursion we chose the person who probably knows the internal workings of the CVP better than anyone else: Luc Martens--no relation to Wilfried--the assistant national secretary of the party. Practically every evening, he visits a section of the party to stir up discussions, take note of criticisms, resolve differences.

His task is also to recruit new members. After a long depression, the CVP is making a slight comeback. Why?

DEBACLE. "The atmosphere changed in the party," Luc Martens explains, "after the 1981 electoral debacle (32.9 percent, one of the worst showings in the history of the CVP). "We wanted to understand the reasons for this defeat: We went into these elections with a defensive attitude on several issues without taking any original position. The missiles, for example."

Following this defeat, the party launched a huge self-analysis in order to sharpen its positions, make the militants think, and present the voter with

clear choices. These ideological debates lasted for 5 years and resulted in last November's doctrinal convention.

The self-analysis was well received, not only by party members but also by all those within the Christian Social movement. Some of them went one step further and joined the party.

"On average, we receive two to three membership applications per day," Luc Martens asserts. "Our objective is to reach 150,000 members by Easter."

RECRUITING. But who are these new members? The CVP is mostly interested in people who are already involved in cultural or sports associations. They make attractive spokesmen for the party.

According to Luc Martens, new members are coming mostly from the ranks of the Christian Workers Movement (ACW). Why? "The Christian Workers Movement has thought for a long time about its links with the CVP. Middle class people are sometimes afraid of sporting a label and refuse to consider the CVP as their only political mouthpiece."

Does this reinforcement worry the other constituencies? "Numbers are not always the main factor," Luc Martens explains. No doubt, but they are always damned important when tickets are put together: In these, the right balance between the party "standen"--the Christian Workers Movement, the middle class, the farmers, and Catholic associations and circles--is meticulously established.

DO AWAY WITH THE "STANDEN"? Anyway, the young people in the party would like to do away with these "standen". They feel that in the CVP there is no salvation outside of these groups. According to them, current society no longer corresponds to this partition. What is there still in common, they ask, between a young city doctor who has trouble making ends meet and a prosperous country doctor?

"At least," Luc Martens counters, "the influence of the "standen" is identifiable. There are also other dynamic and influential groups in the party, such as the Catholic employers' group. But still others are not so well known and are sometimes just as influential: those who support a political personality, for example. As for the young people, they also have their influence, during conventions for example. Through their interventions, they sometimes manage to manipulate the emotions of an idealistic public a little too much..."

The preservation of this "standen" structure also displeased some independents who were attempting to position themselves outside these organized groups. In the Antwerp area, for instance, the party lost some of its "eminences grises" who refused to accept the increasing influence of the Christian Democrat wing over the party.

INTELLECTUAL. An interesting trend can also be detected: Little by little, the party is winning back the young Flemish intellectuals who seem to be attracted by the internal ideological debate. In the 1950s and 1960s, the CVP

recruited a lot in these university milieus. Then, the young Flemish lost their interest in politics or else chose other parties. The umbilical cord that in the past had connected the CVP to the university was broken during the 1970s. Today, it seems partly restored.

THE CHURCH. What Church influence remains over the party and its members? "Since we renounced our church affiliation," Luc Martens tells us, "the CVP is independent from the Church hierarchy, which does not mean that we do not put its ideas into practice." The last CRISP [Center for Socio-Political Research and Information] bulletin devoted to the subject of the Flemish Catholic world (Footnote 1) ("The Flemish Catholic World." The CRISP's weekly bulletin, February 85, No 1070) thus explained: "For the last 25 years the Church has avoided taking a position on political issues, except when it concerned education and so-called ethical issues. The era is past when political postures were stated from the pulpit, though this did not prevent the bishops from giving the CVP their financial support. It is no longer explicitly expected that the Catholic faithful will vote for the CVP or that they will only be members of Catholic organizations. In this respect, the past 25 years have been characterized by an increasing openness. This does not prevent the CVP from recruiting its voters among the population of believers."

But the party, Luc Martens adds, has truly lost its church connection. The proof? It is often more difficult for the CVP than for any other party to have a priest on its ticket!

Views on European Future

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 10-11 Jan 87 p 2

[Article and Interview with Jaak Lambrecht: "Europe: A Distant Dream?"]

[Text] At the end of November, the CVP doctrinal convention approved an amendment, proposed by the Young CVP, saying that Belgium should ultimately be dissolved into Europe.... These few words have cast a chill in the political world, all the more so because nobody really knew how to interpret this text. Since then, the party hierarchy and the Young have not always been on the same wave-length.

LIVING TOGETHER. We had to wait a month before the CVP Chairman, Frank Swaelen, gave his version of the text. He made himself sound rather reassuring. Recently, he declared in Charleroi: "The CVP is clearly in favor of pursuing the goal of living together within the framework of a new State and is, therefore, against separatism (...). Europe was put forward only as a distant dream, a Europe into which all the national States would merge. The movement toward autonomy can only be made step by step because the only abrupt gesture that could occur in this process would be separatism. The price of this separatism--for Flanders as well--would be so high that this radical solution cannot be contemplated."

DIFFERENT. There is a completely different opinion among the authors of this famous amendment who are firmly entrenched in their positions. Jaak Lambrecht, the Young CVP chairman, reminds us of the meaning of this text:

"In the manifesto proposed to the convention, it was stated that power would be exercised by the regional authorities. The basic resolutions also provided that certain jurisdictions might be exercised by national authorities. The residual power would be entrusted to the Regions. Our amendment was very simple: We felt it was logical that the power reserved to national authorities be granted to European institutions as soon as the member states had set up a true democratic federal Europe. It is indeed this amendment that the Commission of the CVP convention accepted. Mr Geens himself voted for it..."

TIMETABLE.

[Question] The difference between CVP Chairman Frank Swaelen and you concerns the date when this transfer of national jurisdictions to European institutions should be carried out. In Mr Swaelen's opinion, we must wait till the other nations are also regionalized....

[Answer] We do not agree, Jaak Lambrecht points out. For us young Flemish, Europe is our final goal. If the other nations take longer than we do to reach this federal stage, that's their business. Belgian evolution can take place independently of the other countries.

[Question] In your scenario, what powers would be left to Belgium?

[Answer] In this vision: None. Today, we still live in solidarity with the French-speaking people. Tomorrow, we wish to live equally in solidarity with other peoples in the European Community, the Portuguese or the Greeks, for example.

[Question] What will you do with the Belgian frontiers?

[Answer] During the previous CVP convention we said that our goal was Belgian federalism. At Ostend, we went one step further: We now want an autonomous Flemish territory within a federal European system. If we look back in history, we can easily see that the present Belgian frontiers have been in existence only since 1830.

INTELLIGENT AND LIKEABLE.

[Question] When do you wish this new transformation to take place?

[Answer] Of course, it's not going to happen tomorrow.... In the next century, probably. But we have to start thinking now. I believe that in 2050, for example, it will no longer make any sense to still have a Belgian minister of foreign affairs, whether Walloon or Flemish. Nevertheless, we never said that we wanted to eliminate Belgium and send King Baudouin into retirement....

[Question] You do not say it, but it is the result of your scenario....

[Answer] Someday, maybe.... But there will always be a place for a man as

intelligent and likeable as the king. However, this is not our main worry, with all due respect to the monarchy and the figure of the king. Nevertheless, I consider that he currently plays an extremely important and essential role.

[Question] Professor Senelle feels the CVP "European amendment" is dangerous for Flanders.

[Answer] It is not our amendment that lessens Flanders' reputation abroad. It is the Happart affair...

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VIEWS OF PARTY LEADERS REGARDING POST-ELECTION GOALS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 Feb 87

[Article by Anneli Sundberg: "Sorsa Fears Loss of Prime Minister's Post"]

[9 Feb 87 p 11]

[Text] SDP. Finnish Social Democratic Party.

Founded in Forssa in 1903.

Kalevi Sorsa, chairman since 1975.

Erkki Liikanen, party secretary since 1981.

Members, 91,000.

The party has received seats and votes as follows (election year, seats, share of votes in percentages):

1970	52	23.4
1972	55	25.8
1975	54	24.9
1979	52	23.9
1983	57	26.7

The Social Democrats are in the government.

The country's largest workers' party cannot go into government as an insignificant minority. "This simply will not do," said Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa, leader of the Social Democrats in assessing the demands of the bourgeoisie to get the prime minister's portfolio for itself.

Otherwise, Sorsa has adopted an open attitude toward all kinds of government alternatives from a red earth government to a composition in which the Social Democrats would rule the country with the small parties.

"Let us look from ground zero for once and see what happens."

Recent opinion polls predict that the Greens will win the most in March's parliamentary elections. Sorsa sees several reasons for the popularity of the Greens here and elsewhere; The Rhine River and Chernobyl catastrophes have given substance to the Greens' statements. Young and even slightly older people are fed up with the monthly meetings of the parties. The Greens' more entertaining manner in conducting politics captivates people more.

The withering away of the Liberal Party has also made room for the Greens in Sorsa's opinion.

"The Green choice is the same kind of zero option the Liberal choice was in its time. No position is taken in it on fundamental social questions. It concerns consequences, not the internal phenomena of human society. The Green choice is an easy choice in a certain sense, especially for youth."

Sorsa has difficulty in locating the Greens on the old party map.

"Who is defining them? They do not have a party, a program, or a master. In general, they are pleasant looking young people from better families, currently quite well dressed. In my opinion, they fill the hole left by the Liberals in a somewhat more liberal manner than our Liberal People's Party -- that is, when it was in existence. The Greens react to social questions with a greater absence of prejudice and they are closer to left-wing thinking than what was the case with the LKP [Liberal People's Party]."

Many new contenders, even a new party, the pensioners, are aspiring to parliament in the March elections. In Sorsa's opinion, the present alternatives in parliament should be able to satisfy the political appetite of the Finns.

"The Rural Party and the Greens are, perhaps, justified newcomers, but the others do not, in my opinion, have the right to a political existence. For that reason, they cannot be long-term or significant."

Parliament Becoming More Right-Wing

If Sorsa's assessments of the new parliament come true, the left wing will be slightly weaker than before.

However, he does not believe that a traditional right-wing center government will succeed. In his opinion, groups, such as the Greens and the SMP [Finnish Rural Party], lying between them and the old center will be the victors along with the Social Democrats.

"Although it may be that the SMP will lose in direct proportion to the gains of the Greens."

Sorsa does not believe that the Social Democrats will be able to grab up all the votes lost by the People's Democrats.

"Even if the SMP and the Greens are taken into account, the scales will tip somewhat to the right. Curiously enough, this also means that the ruling parties will, perhaps, advance a little. At least, they will not lose."

If the ruling parties, the Social Democrats, the Center Party, the Swedish Party, and the Rural Party, hold their own in the parliamentary elections, it cannot be said that the voters, at least, will oppose the old government base. President of the Republic Mauno Koivisto has also become fond of this.

Sorsa is not, however, ready to keep the present government base as first and foremost.

"Everyone is on the same track, the Communists and the Conservatives, the Center Party and the Greens. I do not have any real strong attachments."

Even a Green Can Be a Minister

A government of the big three -- the SDP, the Center Party, and the Conservative Party -- being promoted by Paavo Vayrynen, a government of the big two -- the Social Democrats and the Conservative Party -- as well as the current composition have become the primary alternatives for a post-election government in discussions held in recent months.

In Sorsa's opinion, there are other alternatives, in principle.

"The result of the election may be that the Social Democrats and a group of small parties may have the majority, but the primary alternatives will continue to be those three combinations."

Sorsa does not consider it impossible that Green ministers will be included in the government.

"However, they must first get their decision-making system in order in such a way that even we outsiders will know of what mind they are. This is completely possible, for example, within the framework of a parliamentary group, possible and adequate."

Recently, not much has been said about a bourgeois government. The Social Democrats are included in all the projected compositions, but competitors would no longer give them the prime minister's portfolio.

Sorsa says that there has not been any particular thought given to whether we would participate in a government as a minority and without the prime minister's portfolio.

"But the largest party, which also represents the important interests of the wage earner, cannot just enter into any position. It simply will not do for it to be an insignificant minority."

Sorsa sneers when he is offered a government in which present Justice Minister Christoffer Taxell will direct Social Democratic ministers.

"It says in the Bible that everything has its time. This will be deliberated when the people have had their say."

A Caretaker Government Will Not Do

There will only be a little less than a year's time between the parliamentary elections and the presidential elections. This will make government negotiations interesting. Presidential candidates will not readily allow others into visible positions. There has been fear even in the presidential palace that the parties will field a number two team.

"I do know that the president would shy away from caretaker governments. I am quite certain that he opposes such ideas. We are still striving for a political government even though it may occur to some that a caretaker government would have an easier time of managing this short interim period. The second team idea is, indeed, quite rare. Ahti Karjalainen had one second team government in the early 1970s, but it did not work well."

Sorsa Ready for a New Career

Sorsa hopes that after the parliamentary elections it will be possible to find a government which will be able to continue even after the presidential elections, perhaps with small changes.

"What does it mean that relations between the ruling parties should not become overly burdened in the presidential elections."

He is not at all certain of the creation of a long-term government. In his opinion, the presidential elections already in and of themselves make government negotiations difficult.

When Sorsa is asked whether there is a direct path from the prime minister's house to the presidential palace, as some seem to believe, he grins.

"It does not seem to be too direct to me, but one can drop in though."

Sorsa adds that he does not believe that a few months as prime minister will help anyone to get to the presidential palace. The time is simply too short to win over the people.

Sorsa has led the government for nearly 4 years now. He is ready for a new similar career if he is asked.

"It is not a matter of if it comes up, but there is increasingly less interest in it, less adventure. It is more and more like mere work."

In government negotiations the Social Democrats want, at least, an agreement on a reduction in the cost of food and to keep problems of the capital city area off the agenda.

The prospects are not now good for easily finding partners in agreement. In Sorsa's opinion, the Conservative Party has gone even further to the right, and the Center Party is following.

The Social Democrats change cover girls in every elections. Now the new one is Chairwoman Ulla Aittokoski of the Pharmacy Union. "A gorgeous woman," says Sorsa.

When he is asked whether it would not be possible to change the men, he raises his eyebrows while pretending to be astonished.

They say his own image in the mirror has begun to become increasingly more attractive.

Cooperation Funds for Finland Immediately

The Social Democrats support the immediate establishment of cooperation funds for Finland. In answering election questions presented by HELSINGIN SANOMAT Chairman Kalevi Sorsa thought that the funds could already be included in the program of the government to be formed after the presidential elections.

There are 13 election questions and they are being answered by all party chairmen. On Tuesday, these questions will be posed to the Conservative Party's Ilkka Suominen.

[Question] What, in your opinion, is the most urgent social problem which you want to eliminate?

[Answer] The most urgent, but not the largest, is homelessness. I want to eliminate that. The largest problem is unemployment. If the Social Democrats are in the government, they must accept the responsibility to reduce it. The objective is to cut it in half.

[Question] How will you reform the taxation of wage earners in the commencing election term?

[Answer] The SDP wants an extensive tax reform which will lighten the taxation of wage earners and pensioners and increase taxation of incomes from capital, forests, and agriculture. The tax scales and marginal tax percentages must be reduced, and the sales tax must be reformed. The equal taxation of all incomes is an idea.

[Question] Do you want to change the taxation of capital?

[Answer] The taxation of wage earners cannot be lightened unless capital incomes are taxed on the same basis as earned incomes.

[Question] What state-owned companies would you sell to the private sector?

[Answer] I do not know of any state-owned company that would require being sold to the private sector, and I do not know that the people would demand this.

[Question] What, in your opinion, is a reasonable price for a liter of milk? (A liter of low-fat milk costs 3.37 markkas.)

[Answer] It should not cost much more than 2 markkas for those who need it the most, families with children and senior citizens who have become accustomed to drinking milk.

[Question] Is your party ready to push through constitutional reform as it now stands? (The method of electing a president will change, economic compulsory laws will be put into effect.)

[Answer] We are even if not with great enthusiasm. It is not according to our thinking, especially with respect to the presidential elections, but it is a step forward and it must thus be pushed through as it is.

[Question] Do you support the establishment of wage earner funds?

[Answer] We do. We call them cooperation funds. The work of the committee will be completed at the end of the year so that there will be time to include the funds in the program of the post-presidential election government.

[Question] Should the automobiles of drunken drivers be confiscated as is being considered in Sweden?

[Answer] Something more effective than what it is being done now is needed, but a drunken maniac does not ask whether the car is his own when he is feeling intoxicated. Confiscation will not solve the whole problem, but even it may become a consideration.

[Question] Do you want more nuclear power for Finland?

[Answer] I would like cheap and clean power. I am not particularly urging the use of nuclear power. I have tried to adopt a rather neutral attitude toward this question. For me it is not an emotional question one way or the other.

[Question] Do you support the isolation of AIDS patients?

[Answer] I have not thought about that question. Isolation is, in my opinion, an exceptionally strong measure, even criminal. Like lepers in the Middle Ages. Indeed, it would seem to be an unmerciful idea.

[Question] Has Finland's defense capability been weakened on the basis of appropriations?

[Answer] No, it has not.

[Question] Should Finland cut off all relations with South Africa as an answer to the oppression of Blacks?

[Answer] If international society breaks off relations, it goes without saying that Finland must do this. We have adhered quite strictly to policy according to the UN. Finland has had no desire to go out on its own and then as if give the right for larger countries to act in the same manner.

[Question] Have you ever, at least privately, used the nickname, neukku, for the Soviets?

[Answer] Yes. To me it sounds friendly. It is not an abusive word in my ears. For me it combines to pleasant words, namely nekku [sugar candy] and naukku [swig].

[Article by Pekka Ervasti: "Suomiren Would Depose Social Democrats from Prime Minister's Post"]

[10 Feb 87 p 8]

[Text] National Conservative Party.

Founded in Helsinki in 1918.

Ilkka Suominen, chairman since 1979.

Jussi Isotalo, party secretary since 1980.

Members, 80,000.

The party has received seats and votes as follows (election year, seats, share of votes in percentages).

1970	37	18
1972	34	17.6
1975	35	18.4
1979	47	21.7
1983	44	22.1

The Conservative Party has been in opposition since 1966.

Inasmuch as it depends on Ilkka Suominen, chairman of the Conservative Party, the prime minister of the next government will not be Kalevi Sorsa or any other Social Democrat.

In the opinion of the chairman of the largest opposition party, the idea that one cannot think of a government in Finland without Kalevi Sorsa in its leadership has spread dangerously far.

"Even perfectly respectable members of the bourgeoisie are keeping this illusion alive. In my opinion, it is, on the contrary, increasingly difficult to see a Social Democrat continuing as prime minister of a bourgeois Finland in spite of the fact that he is as nice a person as Kalevi Sorsa."

Thus having excluded one prime ministerial candidate worthy of consideration, Suominen does not, however, consent to naming anyone in his place. "One should adopt a grateful attitude toward all friendly proposals," says the chairman of the Conservative Party in acknowledging Speaker Erkki Pystynen's (Conservative) proposal that Suominen himself be placed in the leadership of the post-election government.

The first phase of Suominen's entry into government is an election victory. "The greater the election victory, the more difficult it will be to push us aside even though in Finland that is still possible," he says from experience which only working in a party that has been in opposition for more than 20 years can give.

According to Suominen, strong forces continue to sit on top of the Conservative Party's ministerial portfolios. These are the Center Party's "second team" led by Chairman Kauko Juhantalo of the Center Party Parliamentary Group and the whole Social Democratic Party.

A Happy Voter

According to Suominen, a victory is not in any shape or form a certainty for the Conservative Party. "We do not believe in Gallup polls. We believe in a happy voter and the vote count," he says.

He suspects that political opponents are attempting to convince voters that the Conservative Party will be in the government whatever may happen in the elections.

"This will not happen. We will be immediately driven into the dark night of opposition if the Conservative Party suffers an election defeat," warns Suominen.

Suominen's cautiousness is explained by the bitter experiences of the last elections. The mediation of ministerial top hats begun in bourgeois circles in good time before the elections was interrupted in a gruff manner when it became clear that the party's MP positions decreased even though the number of votes had increased.

Now the Conservative leadership is advancing along the election trail with quiet and intense concentration. However, it has not kept its mouth shut in anybody's name. Suominen has already proposed, among other things, that Sorssa become the rector of a theatrical school. Admonitions about the improper use of language came in the return mail from Social Democratic Party Secretary Erkki Liikanen.

"It is amazing how power has gone to the head of the Social Democrats so that they think they are gurus in all issues. When a lively Savoite begins to tell a slow Satakuntaite how language should be used, it demonstrates the condescending attitude that is typical of the Social Democrats," retorts Suominen.

He is preparing Liikanen for the duration, there will be more broadsides in the future -- probably directed at Suominen also. "This is rapid fire at point-blank, but this is the essence of an election campaign for all parties," he says.

Greens Will Win

Even though Suominen adopts a cautious attitude toward the Gallups, he, however, consents to compiling his own prediction: the Greens will win just as surely as the Communists will lose. Nothing certain can be said of the other parties.

"The Greens will win since there are many such people who will vote for them without knowing what the Greens actually want. This is a result of the fact that they do not want to vote for political parties," analyzes Suominen.

He points out that in spite of a victory the Greens will, however, still remain a small and marginal faction.

He even places the Greens on papa's knee and pats them understandingly on their blond straggly haired heads. The significance of the Greens is primarily that of raising consciousness and introducing ideas. The old, stable parties will then know how to put the best ideas to beneficial use.

"The Greens know what they should do, but they do not seem to know what should be done. They have, indeed, proposed a kind of Albanian-style economy in which wood is burned and not exported abroad. Indeed, I do have the right to say that this is not a feasible policy in Finland. If this is fatherly, it is, at least, friendly."

Father Suominen does not exactly dare to allow the Greens into government -- at least not in a situation in which the government's support in parliament would depend on the Greens.

Three Big Parties

Suominen confesses to be a supporter of a government of the big three since this is what the majority of the Finnish people wants according to him. Also, according to him, an extensive tax reform cannot be accomplished without a joint government of the Social Democrats, the Conservative Party, and the Center Party.

The important points of emphasis in the Conservative Party's tax program are confining marginal taxation to 50 percent and expanding the tax base. Revenue shortages resulting from this would be covered by increasing the sales tax.

According to Suominen, a government which would include the Conservatives would put housing and employment policy in a new order also.

"For example, additional ARAVA [State Housing Construction Commission]-funded rental units and duplexes should be built in the capital city area," enumerates Suominen.

He would not be a chairman making preparations for the elections if he were to forget young families with children. In the opinion of the Conservative Party, they should be supported by all possible means. Suominen points out that the right to a tax deduction for the social payments of child care approved in connection with the parliamentary debate on the budget became a reality because of the Conservative Party's proposal.

Nuclear Power Plant in Back Pocket?

And what about nuclear power? The Conservative Party has revolved around this question like the blades of a turbine. A couple years ago Suominen was in an urgent rush to make certain that the Conservative Party was the first party which had a position demanding a fifth nuclear power plant. He made fun of the fact that the power plant decision had become bogged down in the quaking pants of the government.

Then Chernobyl exploded and the quaking was felt most forcefully in Conservative Party headquarters.

Last summer the the party council went back on its own solemn word and it was considered best to postpone the nuclear power plant decision until the middle of the next decade.

Is Ilkka Suominen still of the opinion that only nuclear power will secure the interests of well-being, employment, and the environment, as was the case before Chernobyl?

"Ilkka Suominen's opinion is of no significance in this. If the majority of citizens does not trust in nuclear power, then a democrat says that there will be no nuclear power. There is no nuclear power plant in the Conservative Party's back pocket any more than in its side or inside breast pocket," he says.

However, he does not want to sign an energy program that would require the abandonment of nuclear power. "We must not tie the hands of future decision-makers."

Training for Television

Suominen also does not want to tie the hands of the Conservative Party's government negotiators. The party leader does not intend to kill the party's chances because of a poll conducted at one time in the party's membership, which indicated that the Center Party was more favorable than the Social Democrats as a ruling partner for the rank and file Conservatives.

"The party leadership does not consider itself to be bound to any unambiguous opinion of the rank and file. This is a representative democracy and after the election results become apparent, we will see from where cooperative partners will be found."

But the elections will be considered first.

Last time the Conservatives were disappointed with Suominen's performance on television in the great election debate.

"There were problems in that," Suominen admits.

Now the situation is different according to Suominen: "I have been training."

Wage Earners' Taxes To Be Lightened

In the opinion of the Conservatives, taxes must be collected from a broader base, for example, the non-tax status of capital incomes can be addressed, thinks Ilkka Suominen. His party would, however, like to lighten the tax burden of wage earners by evening out the progression, among other things.

There are 13 election questions and they are being answered by all party chairmen. On Wednesday, these questions will be posed to the Center Party's Paavo Vayrynen.

[Question] What, in your opinion, is the most urgent social problem which you want to eliminate?

[Answer] Homelessness and unemployment.

[Question] How will you reform the taxation of wage-earners in the commencing election term?

[Answer] By evening out the progression and by reducing as well as clarifying deductions.

[Question] Do you want to change the taxation of capital?

[Answer] There are capital incomes whose non-tax status can be addressed -- as long as bank savings are not touched.

[Question] What state-owned companies would you sell to the private sector?

[Answer] I wonder who would buy, but Sisu and Valvilla. In fact, all companies which are not monopolies prescribed by law.

[Question] What, in your opinion, is a reasonable price for a liter of milk? (A liter of low-fat milk costs 3.37 markkas.)

[Answer] The present price is quite reasonable.

[Question] Is your party ready to push through constitutional reform as it now stands? (The method of electing a president will change, economic compulsory laws will be put into effect.)

[Answer] This issue will be decided after the elections. It contains many very different issues that lead in many directions. There is no reason to

keep the package as it is. We want the presidential elections to be a direct election by the people.

[Question] Do you support the establishment of wage earner funds?

[Answer] Voluntary, company-centered, and personal funds would, perhaps, be worth trying.

[Question] Should the automobiles of drunken drivers be confiscated as is being considered in Sweden?

[Answer] The majority of them drives with someone else's car. Revoking their driver's license and directing them to treatment would be more appropriate steps. Also imprisonment in certain cases is ok.

[Question] Do you want more nuclear power for Finland?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Do you support the isolation of AIDS patients?

[Answer] Not isolation, but general testing for AIDS if the disease begins to spread extensively.

[Question] Has Finland's defense capability been weakened on the basis of appropriations?

[Answer] We now have a better crisis readiness than before. The government has, in fact, slid backwards on its jointly agreed goals.

[Question] Should Finland cut off all relations with South Africa as an answer to the oppression of Blacks?

[Answer] Diplomatic relations should not be broken off, trade relations, yes, and trade is already at a standstill.

[Question] Have you ever, at least privately, used the nickname, neukku, for the Soviets?

[Answer] Yes, I have. Indeed, it is a nickname coined by the Taistoites [Stalinists].

[Article by Arto Astikainen: "Vayrynen's Election Platform: Power Away from the SDP!"]

[11 Feb 87 p 9]

[Text] Center Party. Name until 1965 was Rural League.

Founded in Oulu in 1906.

Paavo Vayrynen, chairman since 1980.

Seppo Kaariainen, party secretary since 1980.

Members, 300,000.

The party has received seats and votes in elections as follows (election year, seats, share of votes in percentages):

1970	36	17.1
1972	35	16.4
1975	39	17.6
1979	36	17.3
1983	38	16.6

The Center Party is in government.

Paavo Vayrynen, the chairman of the Center Party, has a clear, but not completely new goal in the elections: excessive power must be taken away from the Social Democrats.

"The Social Democrats now have a prime minister, the support of the trade union movement, and sympathies in the mass media and even the president is a Social Democrat. Their power is excessive when one considers their support among the people."

By strengthening the Center Party, the SDP will become weaker. This is Vayrynen's argument for why citizens should now vote for the Center Party.

Since the presidency, the trade union movement, and the mass media cannot be directly influenced in the parliamentary elections, the Center Party intends to cut back the power of the Social Democrats in the government with the help of voters.

Vayrynen has had clear ideas since last spring already about how the new government will be built: the Conservative Party will be brought along side of the Center Party and the SDP and the prime minister's post will be transferred from the SDP to the Center Party.

Election Results To Be Taken Into Account

Vayrynen will not consent to talk about any other government alternative than the "big three" even though one party, the SDP, has already almost turned down the plan.

Why are you promoting such a government like driving a snake into the barrel of a gun?

"It goes without saying, it is to the country's benefit that cooperation between the Center Party and the SDP continue, but when the anticipated election results are taken into consideration, expanding the base to the right is

quite justified. The opinions of citizens and the election results will be taken into consideration in a government solution. It will go best if a base of the big three is formed.

"The situation is a mirror image of the 1960s: at that time under different conditions a red earth base was expanded to the left, the Communists were included, and a people's front government was formed.

"A broad-based government would be quite necessary since there is a structural change in progress in industry. This will cause many problems. In addition, passage of the tax reform and a reallocation of state expenditures are predicated on a two-thirds majority in parliament.

"An expansion would be beneficial from the point of view of the Center Party also. Our position would become easier if we could get the support of the Conservative Party in many important questions."

Conservative Party Will Win

An election victory for the Conservative Party appears to be self-evident to Vayrynen. Does not the prediction of a victory for the competing party work on behalf of the enemy?

"No. It is a clear reality that all the large factions, the Center Party, the SDP, and the Conservative Party, will do well since the number of seats for the Communists will drop by a total of approximately ten. One does not need the gift of a great prophet to predict the election results.

"According to my understanding, a clear stand that the Conservative Party will be in the government after the elections eliminates from the election debate one question which could have a detrimental effect on the election results from the point of view of the Center Party."

The government negotiating tactics of the Center Party do not yet contain any strict conditions and threshold questions.

"The overall policy line of the government must be acceptable and the composition of the government equitable; it must reflect the power relationships in parliament. Also the most important ministerial posts should be divided equitably," says Vayrynen in describing the Center Party's conditions.

An equitable division does not mean that the prime minister's post should be given to the largest victor in the elections:

"Since we have had a left-wing prime minister almost continuously for 20 years, since the president is a Social Democrat, and since left-wing support appears to be diminishing in the elections, it is already time to change the leader. For that reason we have proposed that a government led by the Center Party be formed. This is natural and is justified from the point of view of the predicted election results."

Not A Woman, But Capable

Vayrynen does not answer the question whether he himself wants to be prime minister.

The same fate befalls the question as to whether it is possible that the Center Party will be in the new government, but not Paavo Vayrynen.

"We will return to questions regarding personalities after the elections."

In Vayrynen's opinion, such a system in which prime ministerial candidates are named before the elections is not suitable for Finland.

"It is suitable for a bipartisan system in which the election results directly resolve the base of government. In Finland the composition of government is always the result of negotiations."

Vayrynen also does not agree with the group that thinks the next prime minister should be a woman, for example, Eeva Kuuskoski-Vikatmaa from the Center Party.

"In an era of equality especially, should we not proceed from the fact that sex must not be a determining factor, but competency and suitability."

In the opinion of the Center Party chairman, negotiations on the program of the new government must be conducted with an objective in mind so that the negotiations will not go on endlessly. The new government should be in place around May Day, and it cannot be any kind of 10-month wonder.

"The unconditional premise must be that a government will be formed for the entire election term. It will, of course, formally leave a position to be filled after the presidential elections, but then it will continue. Individuals may be changed at that time if the outcome of the presidential elections so requires, but the program and distribution of posts would remain as before."

Green Fascists

Vayrynen's prophecy of the election success of his own party is moderately cautious: the Center Party will receive a few additional seats. There were 38 in the last elections. There should be a total of 55-60 MPs for the centrist factions (Center Party, RKP [Swedish People's Party], LKP [Liberal People's Party], and the SKL [Finnish Christian League]).

The Center Party leader does not believe in an assault by the Greens. "Their number of seats will increase, but it will not be enormous. In fact, we have a rather high vote threshold.

"The Greens are a difficult group from the point of view of the voters. No one knows what effect a vote given to the Greens will have. There are many different types of people among the Greens, from Fascists to Communists in

their opinions. Then there are those who would want to turn back the wheel of development hundreds of years and others who adopt a very positive attitude toward new technology.

"One cannot talk about any kind of a Green policy line, they have as many policy lines as there are people. If the Greens are voted in, the voice of a Fascist could be to the benefit of a Communist. It is a game of chance."

The Greens do not cause any concern for Vayrynen since he thinks that the Greens will take more votes away from other parties than from the Center Party.

The party leader also adopts an attitude of unconcern toward his own election success. He intends to campaign in his own election district of Lapland for only a few days even though he has lived in Helsinki for years already.

"They will vote for me as they have before. The situation was much worse the last time. At that time, many bets were placed in Helsinki that Vayrynen would lose his seat in parliament. That did not happen," says the former owner of a summer cabin.

Vayrynen To Be Speaker?

Recently, a fuss has been made because of Vayrynen's intended resignation from the chairmanship and group leader Kauko Juhantalo's other statements. A definite plan to resign cannot be extracted from Vayrynen in any shape or form, perhaps no such plan yet exists:

"I have said in many connections that I will resign from the chairmanship as soon as it becomes feasible. I do not want to take a stand on when this change will possibly occur. I will willingly leave this job when the time is right as far as the party's interests are concerned."

In addition to the prime minister's post, the position of speaker of parliament, the nation's number two spot, will be up for grabs after the parliamentary elections. A presidential election campaign can be conducted very well from that position also. Does this interest Paavo Vayrynen?

"I cannot say. After the elections we will know what the situation will be with respect to people and positions.

No Sense to Reduce Price of Milk

Reducing the price of milk makes no sense since tax revenue would have to be used for that. This is the answer Center Party Chairman Paavo Vayrynen gives to the milk question in the election test conducted by HELSINGIN SANOMAT.

After Vayrynen, SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] Chairman Esko Helle will answer the 13 election questions on Thursday.

[Question] What, in your opinion, is the most urgent social problem which you want to eliminate?

[Answer] The disunity of basic security and its excessively low level. The lower sickness and maternity allowances, the lowest unemployment compensation, and the minimum financial aid to students should be increased perceptibly so that a unified basic security, approximately 1,800 markkas per month, can be achieved. In addition, compensation for the lag in the level of payments to people on social security should be made by an extraordinary parity increase.

[Question] How will you reform the taxation of wage earners in the commencing election term?

[Answer] The emphasis within the framework of the present tax scale should be transferred from direct taxation to an indirect trend, especially by lowering the higher marginal taxes. Income tax must thus be reduced, in general, especially in the case of middle-income people.

[Question] Do you want to change the taxation of capital?

[Answer] Yes. Normal savings accounts, however, should be kept tax-free, and the present tax exemptions for dividend and rental incomes must also be retained. Changes can be considered as far as other sources of income are concerned, the taxation of bonds, among other things.

[Question] What state-owned companies would you sell to the private sector?

[Answer] No entire company, but in certain companies there are such subsidiaries which could very well be sold to private individuals just as large private companies now sell off less important sections to outsiders. In addition, several of the state-owned companies should go on the stock exchange and obtain part of their capital stock through it, but in such a way that the state keeps the decision-making power in its own hands.

[Question] What, in your opinion, is a reasonable price for a liter of milk? (A liter of low-fat milk costs 3.37 markkas.)

[Answer] Indeed, the present consumer price is about right compared with the level of other countries. If there is a desire to have less expensive milk, then tax revenue will have to be used to lower the price and that does not seem to make much sense.

[Question] Is your party ready to push through constitutional reform as it now stands? (The method of electing a president will change, economic compulsory laws will be put into effect.)

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Do you support the establishment of wage earner funds?

[Answer] Not the establishment of collective funds, but company-centered and funds based on voluntary savings.

[Question] Should the automobiles of drunken drivers be confiscated as is being considered in Sweden?

[Answer] This possibility should, at least, be given serious consideration. Certain problems are connected with it.

[Question] Do you want more nuclear power for Finland?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Do you support the isolation of AIDS patients?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Has Finland's defense capability been weakened on the basis of appropriations?

[Answer] It has not been weakened, but a slightly higher level of appropriations would be justified compared with international development.

[Question] Should Finland cut off all relations with South Africa as an answer to the oppression of Blacks?

[Answer] We must observe a joint Nordic policy. However, we should not consider breaking off diplomatic relations or closing the embassy.

[Question] Have you ever, at least privately, used the nickname, neukku, for the Soviets?

[Answer] Yes.

[Article by Anneli Sundberg: "Helle Wants Humaneness in Policy"]

[12 Feb 87 p 6]

[Text] SKDL, Finnish People's Democratic League.

Founded in Helsinki in 1944.

Esko Helle, chairman since 1985.

Reijo Kakela, general secretary since 1984. Members, 34,000.

The party has received seats and votes in the elections as follows (election year, seats, share of votes in percentages).

1970	36	16.6
1972	37	17.0
1975	40	18.9
1979	35	17.9
1983	27	14.0

The party is in opposition. During the election term, 10 MPs transferred to the Democratic Alternative's parliamentary group.

Chairman Esko Helle of the Finnish People's Democratic League, who is tired of aristocratic statesmen, wants a woman as prime minister. "A woman's way of conducting politics is more humane, that is what we as a movement are seeking."

Helle will not consent to say which political woman he has in mind. There are suitable prime ministerial candidates in several groups.

Several men have been proposed as prime minister of the post-election government.

Helle does not like them.

"The same faces have been in the same jobs for quite a long time. On the one hand, continuity is, of course, good, but, on the other hand, it has in my opinion resulted in a position of looking at things from on high. A change of teams could invigorate the management of affairs. It is, indeed, worthwhile considering women. Their point of view is more humane."

Helle does not believe that a woman's humaneness is mere prejudice against men.

"Perhaps, I am looking at this matter a little through rose-colored glasses, but a woman's difference can, indeed, be seen in the daily management of affairs."

The discussion of post-election government alternatives is rather stupid in Helle's opinion even though he does admit that even the Communists have been compelled to participate in this stupidity.

In principle, Helle does not have anything against participating in government. So far there have been very few suitors.

"The government is an essential place from which to influence the development of society. We are ready to participate, but not just for the reason that we could be in the government. Participation presupposes that political control changes. The basic security of citizens must be improved, a factor which would also stimulate economic life. It would bring money into normal circulation, which now moves in the stock exchanges and beyond the country's borders."

Helle does not feel that he can be in the government with the Conservative Party.

"It would not be credible."

Sleepers, The Worst Opponent

Helle considers it shameful if a political government is not created after the elections. In his opinion, the large parties have then deceived their constituencies, have abandoned their responsibility.

"Indeed," he says delightedly, "we could form a government alone and take in an adopted son."

March's parliamentary elections will be the first in which the Communists will run separately. The Taistoites [Stalinists] have organized into the Democratic Alternative, which is led by the actress Kristiina Halkola. Aalto's Communist followers are in Helle's People's Democratic League.

The prediction is approximately 10-percent support for the SKDL. In Helle's opinion, it would not be a catastrophe even if the magic 10-percent mark is not achieved. He considers the party of sleepers to be the SKDL's worst competitor.

The Taistoite Communists, the Social Democrats, and the Greens are fishing for the same votes along with the SKDL.

Helle admits that the Greens have a social order; in the 1970s, especially in the early part of it, the left wing concentrated too much on economic policy and forgot the environment, in which people live.

Bjorklund's Glasses Are Too Rose-Colored

Helle refuses to believe in the chances of the Social Democrats to take additional votes away from the People's Democrats.

"We have the chance of regaining what we lost. Within the Social Democrats there is a more radical and traditional wing, which has recently not been able to make its voice heard, at least, in the decision-making process. The dissatisfaction is real and in that we have an opportunity."

Helle's optimism is not exactly supported by the fact that the formerly visible People's Democrat Ilkka-Christian Bjorklund became a candidate of the Social Democratic Party after returning from his official duties in Stockholm.

"Bjorklund became a little estranged from Finnish reality while he was in Sweden. I think that he is looking at his opportunities to have an influence in the Social Democratic Party through glasses that are a little too rose-colored. I would argue that he would have better chances with us than there."

Tradition and also, according to Helle, degree of adaptation separate the Social Democrats and People's Democrats from each other.

"The Social Democrats are more willing to adapt to the game rules of the prevailing system. Their program radicalism becomes diluted more than ours in a corresponding situation. I would consider that the People's Democratic movement plays the role of the voice of conscience in society. We emphasize the human values of those who are the least well-off."

Helle does not recognize the SKDL as any kind of party of the poor.

"Our membership is not particularly poor."

However, Helle considers that those who are very well-off have received too much in recent years.

"The grocery bag has become smaller even though the national income has risen continuously and corporate profits have increased relatively well."

Helle considers the social situation to be favorable for the People's Democrats even though their support has deteriorated.

"It is more favorable now than it has been in many previous elections."

Helle Trusts in EVA [Commission on Commerce and Industry] Studies

Helle justifies his opinion by the study conducted by the Commission on Commerce and Industry, the Communists' old enemy.

"A full half of those interviewed were of the opinion that the banks have too much power, and approximately the same number complained about the concentration of capital. We have harped about this for years."

On the other hand, there are phenomena in present society which would be detrimental to the success of the People's Democrats according to Helle. The worst is unemployment. Misery does not increase support for Communists, argues Helle.

"We would have much better opportunities to increase support if there were about 40,000-50,000 unemployed. Uncertainty about a job makes a person silent. One does not dare to take a stand or participate because of the fear of losing one's job. The activists are quieter and there are fewer of them. Their influence is not reflected in quiet and passive people nor does it pull them in to join."

Helle himself is a quiet type dentist, who is now for the first time responsible for something other than his own position in parliament. He is a symbol of the whole movement. An even younger party leader, actress Kristiina Halkola, is on the cover picture of the competing Democratic Alternative. Halkola is much better known than Helle.

However, Helle does not believe that the personal appeal of a leader will have a decisive effect on the election results -- unless he commits a real blunder.

Rauma-Repola to the State at Taxable Value

The state could buy Rauma-Repola at a price in accordance with its taxable value. Chairman Esko Helle of the Finnish People's Democratic League was of this opinion in answering the election questions posed by HELSINGIN SANOMAT.

There are 13 election questions and they are being answered by all party chairmen. On Friday, these questions will be posed to Rural Party Chairman Pekka Venamo.

[Question] What, in your opinion, is the most urgent social problem which you want to eliminate?

[Answer] Insecurity with respect to a basic livelihood.

[Question] How will you reform the taxation of wage earners in the commencing election term?

[Answer] The taxation of wage earners could be reduced inasmuch as the same graduated scale that is applied to the incomes of wage earners is applied to capital incomes. The legislation of a wealth or property tax would also be in order. A wealth tax is a much more used form of tax in many comparable countries than in Finland. The municipal tax problem should also be addressed in tax reform.

[Question] Do you want to change the taxation of capital?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] What state-owned companies would you sell to the private sector?

[Answer] None, would there not, to the contrary, be reason to buy some. For example, Rauma-Repola could be purchased at a price in accordance with its taxable value. The taxable value should be the going price.

[Question] What, in your opinion, is a reasonable price for a liter of milk? (A liter of low-fat milk costs 3.37 markkas.)

[Answer] If milk consumption increases by a price reduction, that would not be healthy, but in the name of reasonableness milk should be obtainable at a cheaper price than gasoline or less than 3 markkas per liter.

[Question] Is your party ready to push through constitutional reform as it now stands? (The method of electing a president will change, economic compulsory laws will be put into effect.)

[Answer] No. It must be dismembered. Moreover, the obtainment of a basic civil rights law in accordance with our initiative is more important than this reform.

[Question] Do you support the establishment of wage earner funds?

[Answer] We have nothing against the establishment of funds, but it must be predicated on the fact that workers have a real opportunity to influence their management.

[Question] Should the automobiles of drunken drivers be confiscated as is being considered in Sweden?

[Answer] That is not possible even in practice since drunk drivers are frequently not the owners of the automobile. It could be more effective to take repeat offenders to the intensive care units of hospitals for a little while.

[Question] Do you want more nuclear power for Finland?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Do you support the isolation of AIDS patients?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Has Finland's defense capability been weakened on the basis of appropriations?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Should Finland cut off all relations with South Africa as an answer to the oppression of Blacks?

[Answer] That would be completely relevant.

[Question] Have you ever, at least privately, used the nickname, neukku, for the Soviets?

[Answer] I may have, but very seldom. Generally speaking, I do not use such expressions.

[Article by Martti Backman: "Vennamo Wanted in Pivotal Role, Not as Guarantor"]

[13 Feb 87 p 17]

[Text] Finnish Rural Party.

Established in Pieksamaki in 1959 (Finnish Small Peasants Party). Name change in 1966.

Pekka Venhamo, chairman since 1979.

Aaro Niiranen, party secretary since 1984. Members, 21,000.

The party has received seats and votes in the elections as follows (election year, seats, share of votes in percentages).

1970	18	10.5
1972	18	9.2
1975	2	3.6
1979	7	4.6
1983	17	9.7

The Finnish Rural Party is in the government.

The Rural Party, which has become accustomed to the sweetness of being in a pivotal position, is not ready to be satisfied with playing the role of a prop in a future government.

"If we go into the government, it must clearly have a bourgeois wing as well as a left wing. We will not consent to being a guarantor for the left wing any more than the right wing," says SMP [Finnish Rural Party] Chairman Pekka Venhamo.

Venhamo means that if it is expected that the SMP will replace either principle block in the government, it must also have significantly more ministerial posts than presently. On the other hand, this is not a realistic expectation even in Venhamo's opinion.

Thus Venhamo rejects, among other things, SDP Chairman and Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa's idea of a government which would include all the small parties and the Greens in addition to the Social Democrats.

"If Sorsa's idea is based on the fact that the SDP would be stronger than before with the help of the small parties, then we will not join that government as an errand boy for the Social Democrats," assures Venhamo.

Venhamo is just as categorically opposed to SKDL General Secretary Esko Vai-nionpaa's idea of a government which would be made up of the SMP and the Greens in addition to the left wing. "I believe that in that situation it would be difficult for the SMP to accept government responsibility as the only non-socialist party."

Pekka Venhamo led his group into government 4 years ago with many doubts. The thinking was that the two ministers of a forgotten people would not be able to withstand the responsibility for power more than 6 months.

Since, however, participation in government only continued, predictions were heard that the Venhamoite movement would dissolve because of internal pressures. That was close to becoming a reality last summer when Pekka Venhamo

finally became fed up with the opposition activity led by his father, Veikko Veniamo. The son won the battle, and father-Veniamo had to withdraw.

In the government the SMP has conducted a skillful balancing act as the pivot man between eight Social Democratic ministers and seven ministers of the traditional bourgeois parties. It has taken turns in aligning itself with both sides in a "matter-of-fact" policy.

"Voters Have Stayed With Them"

Pekka Veniamo is not afraid that a long government term has fatefully burned out the appeal of a traditional protest party.

"At the time that we went into government, I thought that we would completely lose the so-called protest voters, who made up, perhaps, one-fourth of the SMP's voters in the last elections. The feeling among the rank and file, however, now indicates that this fear is, for the most part, unfounded."

Veniamo believes that his party has exceptionally good opportunities to retain its present power, for the most part, and, perhaps, even increase it slightly.

Whether the SMP wants to be in the next government also will depend on the will of the voters, says Veniamo; whether they give a sufficient vote of confidence in the accomplishment of government work. The party leader himself is satisfied with the results. "The experience from this government term is such that much more can be done on the part of the government on behalf of those people for whom we are making an effort."

Veniamo points out relevantly that participation in government depends on the program in the final count.

"We are prepared to negotiate our inclusion in the government if we can agree on how the position of those people who are in the weakest position can be improved. Improving the minimum level of social security and raising the minimum level of health insurance, unemployment security, and pensions come to the forefront."

In Veniamo's opinion, we should be able to arrange a roof over the heads of the homeless within the current year. In his opinion, 50,000 rental units should be built during the next election term.

Large Government Is Worst Alternative

Pekka Veniamo does not want to directly identify the government schemes most acceptable to him, but it begins to become apparent on the basis of the rejection of unacceptable government models.

Veniamo considers as the worst possible alternative a government comprised of the three large parties, the SDP, the Center Party, and the Conservative Party. In Veniamo's opinion, the government scheme being energetically promoted

by Paavo Vayrynen would be especially harmful from the point of view of people in a poor economic position, the unemployed and low-income pensioners.

"There one would find the Social Democrats who are promoting the cause of the well-off skilled worker population, the Conservative Party which is increasingly entrenching itself as the supporter of the well-to-do with its marginal tax demand, and the Center Party which is also promoting the interests of well-to-do farmers with its agricultural policy."

Vennamo does not see any room for the SMP at the feet of the bigger parties: "It is all the same whether the SMP is included or not since we would not, in fact, have any power at all in that situation. Of these three, two would always have a majority by forming an alliance, and the SMP would have very little influence in it.

"At least not from this position am I even ready to think that the SMP would join in such a large government."

The schemes and shapes of Vennamo's ideal government begin to be few after this. The old, familiar Sorsa's four, or the present government base, becomes visible.

"I definitely consider a government of the Center Party and the Social Democrats, which would naturally include the RKP and in addition either the SMP or the SKDL, or both, as a more probable alternative," bets Vennamo. The alternative does not seem to be at all unacceptable to him.

Conservative Party Will Continue To Be Excluded

Pekka Vennamo reiterates his old understanding that the Conservative Party will remain outside of the government this time also. In Vennamo's opinion, the SDP and the Center Party, which are wooing the Conservative Party, are only showing each other that they are raising their own price in the future government negotiations.

The prime minister's post has already been offered to Swedish People's Party Chairman and Justice Minister Christoffer Taxell. He has been considered as an alternative worthy of consideration in a situation in which the Social Democrats and the Center Party will be casting sullen glances at each other prior to the presidential elections.

Pekka Vennamo is not enthusiastic about a Swedish gentleman as prime minister. "During this last 4 years, I have looked at Taxell's economic and income distribution policy, and on that basis Taxell would not be acceptable to me."

However, Vennamo is careful not to exclude himself unconditionally from a government which would be led by Taxell. "I think, however, that a prime minister must be found from the RKP, then it is possible to find one who would be more suitable than Taxell from the point of view of the SMP," he says.

Even otherwise, Venhamo does not consider the Taxell alternative to be realistic since he will in all likelihood be the RKP's presidential candidate. "A presidential candidate is not suitable as a prime minister. Generally speaking, presidential candidates should not even be in the government," says Venhamo.

A Portion of Corporate Profits Should Be Distributed to Workers

A portion of corporate profits should be distributed to workers as a special bonus in the same way that they are now distributed to owners. This was the answer given by Finnish Rural Party Chairman Pekka Venhamo to the question on wage earner funds posed by HELSINGIN SANOMAT.

Swedish People's Party Chairman Christoffer Taxell will answer the election questions on Saturday.

[Question] What, in your opinion, is the most urgent social problem which you want to eliminate?

[Answer] It goes without saying, poverty is the most urgent and shameful social problem. In this country there are hundreds of thousands of people who are forced to get by on less than 2,000 markkas per month.

[Question] How will you reform the taxation of wage earners in the commencing election term?

[Answer] It must include three central principles: 1) taxation must be simplified from the present system, 2) factors which do not belong must be eliminated from taxation; various deductions intended as support. They should be transferred to direct income transfers, and 3) the state tax on low- and middle-income people must be reduced.

[Question] Do you want to change the taxation of capital?

[Answer] Yes, it is, in fact, the weakest area of income tax at the present time. In principle, capital incomes should be taxed in the same manner as other incomes. However, stock savings must be kept competitive with other capital investments. The tax-free status of conventional savings must be retained.

[Question] What state-owned companies would you sell to the private sector?

[Answer] I would not sell any in their entirety. On the other hand, except for Alko and Neste, state-owned companies should be allowed on the stock exchange.

[Question] What, in your opinion, is a reasonable price for a liter of milk? (A liter of low-fat milk costs 3.37 markkas.)

[Answer] The current price is quite reasonable.

[Question] Is your party ready to push through constitutional reform as it now stands? (The method of electing a president will change, economic compulsory laws will be put into effect.)

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Do you support the establishment of wage earner funds?

[Answer] No. The correct way to increase enterprise democracy is to oblige companies to accept employee representatives into its management organs. A portion of corporate profits should be distributed to the workers in the same manner as they are now distributed to shareholders.

[Question] Should the automobiles of drunken drivers be confiscated as is being considered in Sweden?

[Answer] That is not the correct way. It would place people in an economically very unequal position.

[Question] Do you want more nuclear power for Finland?

[Answer] No. Even the present ones should be dismantled by the year 2000.

[Question] Do you support the isolation of AIDS patients?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Has Finland's defense capability been weakened on the basis of appropriations?

[Answer] No. In my opinion, Finland's defense capability is sufficient at this time.

[Question] Should Finland cut off all relations with South Africa as an answer to the oppression of Blacks?

[Answer] We have, in fact, cut off our relations with South Africa. Even the little trade that remains should be stopped. On the other hand, not all diplomatic relations should be broken since they help the oppressed.

[Question] Have you ever, at least privately, used the nickname, neukku, for the Soviets?

[Answer] It has not exactly become a part of my vocabulary even though I have probably used it from time to time.

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PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY, OTHERS ON REFUGEE POLICY PROBLEMS

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 6 Feb 87 pp 16-21

[Interview of Parliamentary Undersecretary Virginie Korte-van Hemel and of Roef Fernhout of the Council of Churches' task force for refugees, by Gard Driehuis and Jet Kunkeler; date and place not specified.]

[Excerpts] A few questions: What is the real reason why the Netherlands takes in political refugees? And why are there fewer of them in the Netherlands than in any other developed country? What are the actual criteria for admission? Are there really any? And who is in charge, Parliamentary Undersecretary Virginia Korte-van Hemel or Minister Hans van den Broek? What about the narrow-minded policy of a country that considers itself hospitable to outsiders? "The choices I make are painful ones."

Parliamentary undersecretary, Mrs Virginia Korte-van Hemel, friendly and urbane as always, receives us in her work room in a nondescript Hague building that makes it clear that one need not go beyond our borders to find evidence of bureaucracy. That fact many a seeker of asylum has indeed long since discovered. She looks at us with some bewilderment as we ask: "Do you make a case for not accepting any more asylum-seekers?" That suggestion is seldom proposed to her. It is perhaps a crazy idea, but it seems as least as sensible as its alternatives. This narrow-minded policy suggests that we are somewhat concerned about the refugee problem, but that is of course not true at all.

[Answer] Pensively: Well, that is a crazy idea. But it would at least be a logical crazy idea if you were then to spend the money you would be saving on caring for refugees in the country where they now live.

[Question] That makes sense, then, because, with the amount of money that is needed to care for and integrate a single refugee in the Netherlands, you could help 25 refugees who remain where they are. All the more reason to accept our suggestion.

[Answer] But that can simply not be done. We are bound to the terms of the Geneva Agreement! And besides, the Netherlands is an open country. If they do not come in as refugees, they will try to do so as ordinary foreigners.

[Question] So they pose as migrant workers?

[Answer] Yes, or some such thing. Our policy on foreign immigrants has already been restrictive for years, yet the Netherlands remains an open country.

Restrictive versus generous. Just look at those terms. At the moment both government and House are pouncing upon an alteration in the law that is to establish more precise regulations with regard to the policy on foreign immigrants, and those terms come up for discussion rather frequently. Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek introduced a bill in October, one that is to be the harbinger of a new law. The chief reasons for introducing the bill were that the House found that the number of refugees invited in by the Netherlands should be doubled; thus from 250 to 500. And that the chaos of regulations and red-tape that now characterizes the policy on the admission of foreigners has to be streamlined into a new law. But a thorough preparation must definitely precede the writing of a new law. And so a bill was proposed--with a year's delay, naturally--and there was a public hearing (this week) in which everyone got the chance to expose his already known point of view; so now comes a House debate in which all of that will be rehashed once more.

If all of this sounds somewhat cynical to you, you're right! It is, alas! So, first a few facts:

In 1984 there were 10,785,000 refugees in the world--and since then all kinds of wars and conflicts have doubtless considerably increased that statistic. The figure comes from the UNHCR, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. That enormous figure can, of course, be broken down into all kinds of different groups. For every refugee has his own reason for leaving hearth and home, and often family as well. There are political dissidents, entire peoples in flight before the ravages of war, ethnic minorities in countries where minorities are treated even less courteously than in nations such as ours, and all the other variations on the theme of "persecution."

Most of the people languish in camps, rather hopelessly awaiting better times, which for most of them will never dawn. Those are the world figures.

Now compare to that the Dutch contribution to the solution of this immeasurable and inhuman problem. The Netherlands categorizes two kinds of asylum-seekers. First of all, there are the refugees who are invited to settle in the Netherlands. The High Commission selects a group each year to be welcomed into the Netherlands. Until now the size of this group amounted to 250 people each year. That number will, as mentioned above, be doubled to 500 (apart from this, special groups such as boat people and Tamils are not included in that figure).

Next, there are refugees who, on their own initiative, see an opportunity of reaching the border of the Netherlands. Their number is increasing rapidly under pressure of the growing number of world conflicts in recent years. In 1985 5,644 refugees made an effort to obtain asylum in the Netherlands.

Juggling with the figures of individual refugees is a rather perilous business because, over the years, the definition of whom to include in the count has changed. Earlier, only heads of families counted as spontaneous refugees; now everyone counts who is over 15 years of age. That makes any comparison with the figures of past years difficult to effect. But be that as it may, it is a

well-established fact that the number of asylum-seekers who arrive spontaneously has grown rapidly. That all sounds very nice if they had also been admitted into the country, but in 1985 only 19.8 percent (as compared to 57 percent in 1982) actually succeeded in getting past the military police. The rest ended up in a juridical fog, were endlessly sent from pillar to post, or else, more typically, were "returned to sender." (often with the expected result: they were persecuted) Thus the Netherlands took in only the 0.0001499th part of the total number of refugees in the world. (At this rate, it would take 6,671 years for all existing refugees to be admitted into the Netherlands!)

Fourteen and a half million people live in the Netherlands. Four percent of them, or 550,000, are of foreign origin. The vast majority of these, however, are looking for jobs rather than for asylum. There is a good deal of confusion just now about the difference between foreigners and refugees. Foreigners are non-Netherlands who, generally for economic reasons and not just temporarily, exchange their own country for our country. Refugees have other reasons (And there, too, a distinction is made between asylum-seekers and refugees; namely, in the case of foreigners who want to come to the Netherlands for other than economic reasons, where a distinction is made between types of refugees. In bureaucratic terms, a distinction exists between refugees who obtain A-status and those who are given B-status. In order not to multiply confusion, let us leave that distinction out of our considerations for the present; although for individuals who are admitted into the Netherlands it is an important one. For A-status confers substantially greater rights than B-status.)

Actually it should not be so difficult to determine whether someone is a refugee. The Netherlands is a cosignatory of the Geneva Agreement, in which are defined the criteria that must be satisfied, to enable a person to be classified as a refugee or one entitled to asylum. That agreement of 1951 states that anyone with a "well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality or membership in a specific social group or political persuasion" must be considered a refugee.

Although the Netherlands did indeed sign the agreement, in practice it maintains much stiffer regulations. One should preferably have suffered bodily injury, and an actual scar gives one a nice advantage. Only 0.1 percent of the population (15,000 people) consists of foreigners who have been exiled by their own governments or admitted into the Netherlands since the war for political reasons.

To put it mildly, that number looks rather meager compared to the admission policy of other countries, although they are not all that great, either. A total of 36,000 refugees live in Belgium, 126,000 in West Germany and 170,000 in France.

The reasoning then runs as follows: Those countries are larger and/or less densely populated. But alas, as far as that is concerned, the facts do not jibe, either. For every 270 Belgians there is one refugee. In Denmark it is one for every 600. The Netherlands believes that one refugee for every 950 inhabitants is the limit.

That cannot be said of the bill submitted by Minister Van den Broek. "The pursuit of the preservation of human rights lies at the foundation of every refu-

gee policy. It is, to be sure, not only a goal in itself, and as such a cornerstone of the foreign policy of the Netherlands, but it may also contribute to the prevention of new streams of refugees and the fostering of voluntary repatriation." A cornerstone of 0.0001499!

Now is it really all so dreadful?

As a lawyer, Mr Pieter Boeles has specialized in the juridical promotion of the interests of foreigners. That he has been doing for years, and he sees a steady deterioration of matters year after year. "To put it mildly, I find this a very sobering thought. You are aware that on all fronts the borders are tightly closed. The policy is becoming more and more restrictive. The great agitation, which goes on and on, began last year with the arrival of large numbers of Iranians and Tamils. I still remember well that in the beginning, with the Tamils in particular, a campaign was carried on by the ministry of justice in an effort to create a Tamil image, suggesting that they were coming here to get on welfare, by pointing to the fact that it was above all young men who were coming here for economic reasons. In a way, an image was conjured up of a huge group of profiteers.

That also fitted into the pattern of refugees being sent back to Schiphol, including Iranians, who certainly come from a country where no one doubts that people's lives are in danger. That I found rather shocking, and since then nothing has actually happened that could make me forget the fear evoked by these events. The situation did improve somewhat, but the tendency is still for us to express our policy thus: 'Insofar as possible, we try to send refugees back.' So I find that quite clearly the refugee policy has markedly deteriorated."

[Answer (Korte-van Hemel)] The reasons given by refugees are more and more of an economic nature. That makes food for thought. Therefore the percentage of foreigners who are admitted has sharply declined.

[Question] How do you know that they are more frequently giving reasons based on economic problems? Can you see that in a refugee?

[Answer] More and more often these are young men with a relatively good education and with decent financial means. In a sharp voice: And I am strongly against giving this group a better chance than the others.

[Question] Not so illogical. An 18-year-old illiterate in the bush will be slower to grasp the notion that in the Netherlands his lot in life might be better than under the local general. So he doesn't come.

[Answer] That is true. Therefore we must also do everything to help people where they are right now, to achieve an existence worthy of human beings, within their own culture and climate. That still leaves unhampered the right of others to try to obtain asylum here.

[Question] And thereby, according to your own calculations, to disadvantage 24 fellow-sufferers in the region?

[Answer] That is also true, but we hold ourselves to the stipulations of Article I of the Geneva Agreement.

[Question] Thus that is the reason for our present policy, that we have signed an agreement?

[Answer] No, not that alone; it is also related to our mutual solidarity.

[Question] But this form of admission is expensive and inefficient.

[Answer] But it is a good thing for the Netherlands to admit people who satisfy the criteria. The international policy is that people should remain in their own region, or even more preferably that they return to the country from which they have fled; but if that is impossible, then resettlement in the West sometimes provides a solution.

[Question] You know the figures better than we do; and that is no solution at all. That you know quite well, too.

[Answer] You must make a distinction between the different kinds of asylum-seekers. There are those from countries where in the long run the political climate has made it possible for them to return. That you now see in the case of many South Americans. There are those who remain in a hopeless situation. In Vietnam, things will not improve very much in the near future. And then there are those who as refugees are aspiring to found their own nation, such as the Kurds. And you must keep all of these separate in your mind.

[Question] That may very well be true, but it does not take away from the fact that with that contingent of 500 a year, the Netherlands offers no shadow of a solution for ten thousands of Cambodians on the Thai borders.

[Answer] Right enough. The Americans, for example, select preferentially from the camp refugees that they can take care of themselves in the United States. What remains--and we take that residue--are often people who have something the matter with them, the sick, the aged, mothers with fatherless children. There we can indeed play a role. Besides, your figures are too gloomy. Along with the group of invited refugees come also family members quite often who belong in that group of 500 annually to be brought to the Netherlands. We do more than is apparent simply from the statistics.

[Question] Yet still nothing compared to the magnitude of the problem and far less than comparable countries.

[Answer] Indignantly: Yes, but do you know how those statistics are compiled?

[Question] They come from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.

[Answer] Yes, but you would have to know precisely on what basis those figures are compiled.

(We opt to remain silent in the theoretical possibility that all countries, unhampered by the chairman of the commission, are handling these figures in some

bizarre fashion, except for the Netherlands. And that therefore the Netherlands is not after all to be found dangling forlornly at the bottom of the list of countries with policies for admitting asylum-seekers.)

[Question] But in this matter no difference of opinion can exist, as we see from the fact that the policy is becoming more restrictive.

[Answer] I totally disagree with that.

[Question] But the percentage of asylum-seekers being admitted has been cut in half.

[Answer] But the absolute number has markedly risen.

[Question] But at the same time, so has the number of people who are being sent back to their country of first reception.

[Answer] That is not so. There has been no tightening of policy. True, we have seen a tendency for groups of asylum-seekers to land here on charter flights. And that did indeed lead to a certain amount of mistrust. It aroused suspicions that people might be sent back to the country from which they came. But that trend has again been brought to a halt. The reception-center at Schiphol East can accommodate 40 people who wish to wait there to see whether they have been admitted as yet. This morning seven were sitting there.

This is the latest dodge, calculated to turn "restrictive" into "liberal." The premise that an individual asylum-seeker should in the first instance settle in the country where he first turned up after the ordeals to which he had been exposed is not so crazy after all. Otherwise one might envision, in extreme cases, great hordes of refugees roaming about the world, all in search of a pleasant country with a warm welcome and an agreeable climate of acceptance.

But the reality, of course, is something else altogether. For what, as a rule, constitutes the country of first reception? The neighboring country to which the refugee had to flee. And what, as a rule, is the country to which he was forced to flee? Some poor, Third-World country. Consequently, where does the greatest concentration of refugees turn up? Of course, in countries that already have nothing to give them. The wealthier countries have managed to maintain a rather stringent refugee policy, too, effectively keeping refugees outside the bailiwick of the rich West. Of all the refugees in the world, 13 percent are to be found in the United States and Canada, (Canada is a relatively humane nation), three percent in Australia, six percent in Europe and the remaining 78 percent in Third-World countries.

On behalf of the Council of Churches, Roef Fernhout occupies himself with what passes for a Dutch refugee policy. He is a leading senior professor at the juridical institute of the University of Nijmegen and a member of the refugees' task force of the Council of Churches and of the juridical commission of the Netherlands Association for Working among Refugees.

[Answer (Fernhout)] That argument of country of first reception is beginning to play an ever greater role; in countries outside the Netherlands, of course,

but certainly here as well. We determine the country of first reception by means of visa regulations, and we have even set up a visa requirement for transit flights. That means that one must have a visa even for a stopover at Schiphol. Responsibility for control lies with the airlines, and they will not lightly take people aboard without the required visa, for it is they who are financially committed to furnishing the return transportation.

The tighter visa requirements also affect those refugees who come directly. They are our chief concern. Among the countries of Europe, Denmark preceded us in imposing fines on airlines that emplane passengers without the required visa. America also enforces somewhat similar regulations. If that system of fines goes into effect for all of Europe, then the wall around Europe will be secure.

[Question] A refugee who, en route from Iran to the Netherlands, must stop over in Karachi is very soon made aware that his country of first reception is Pakistan--even though he was on the airfield there for a half-hour at the most. Technically correct, perhaps, but would that have been the intent of the concept, "country of first reception"?

[Answer] That is how a restrictive policy works. Those are the hard facts that enable us to say: "There is a much more restrictive policy now than in the past."

[Question] Does that hold true for all of Western society? It is not something at which the Netherlands excels in a negative way?

[Answer] No, we are following the general trend. We are equally rigorous. In fact, in Europe we are the most rigorous at the present time on the matter of interpreting the country of first reception. In this we are very, very strict. In this we are clearly leading the way.

[Question] The role of Van den Broek and the personality of Korte-van Hemel. Who is actually now determining the policy?

[Answer] Cautiously: A joint responsibility is always shared by justice and foreign affairs. This minister, as a member of the House, has always been interested in the refugee issue. He was a very faithful epigone of Haars. And as minister, he has clearly brought this knowledge with him. As minister, he has set his stamp on the policy. And he is clearly stronger than Mrs Korte.

A clear subject for criticism in this document is that precisely on this crucial point of sending people back to countries of first debarkation, we are clearly protected by this statement: "In this matter, we reached an agreement in 1985 with the executive committee of the High Commission," namely that people who come here "uncoordinated"--and that is a key word--must go back. That is the leitmotiv of this bill. "Back to the country of first reception," even though you were scarcely ever there. One protects oneself by international agreement in this matter. That is almost deceitful. The international agreement was not even evident at first. West Germany opposed it because it wanted more guarantees about the requirements that would have to be satisfied by such a country of first reception. On that score, West Germany

had much more onerous demands than the other countries. And moreover, as far as reaching an agreement, this dealt exclusively with the possibility of sending asylum-seekers back to a country where they had already found asylum and not to countries where they were only in transit.

[Question] Is the House too easy on the minister of foreign affairs and the parliamentary undersecretary for justice?

[Answer] Yes. It is also a very complicated issue, with which House members have difficulties, and that, too, is understandable. The debate over the question of what is the country of first reception remains absolutely up in the air. The House is treating its obligations rather cavalierly, with one or two exceptions, Mrs Van Es, for example. In the case of the large parties, there is not exactly an overabundance of clarity. Korte-van Hemel keeps saying: We are very liberal, there is nothing the matter, we have not become any more stringent. That is pure deception. In particular, why are these problems not mentioned in the document? Why are no real, conscious choices being made--painful ones if need be?

[Answer (Korte-van Hemel)] The choices that I make are indeed painful. And not only in those cases where I have to make a decision not to admit people. Very often I worry more about refugees that I actually do admit. Will they ultimately make good in the society of the Netherlands, will their integration succeed? Some time ago, a new group of Cambodians arrived, a group that we had expressly invited, because the Cambodians who were here were not getting along very well. With the new group, we hope to reach a point where the first group will feel more sure of themselves.

In the media, emphasis is always placed on people who were refused, but there are also very great problems concerning refugees who are admitted. There is a psychiatric institution one wing of which is filled with Vietnamese who are simply not making it here.

[Question] The impression does exist that Minister Van den Broek has more influence over your policy than you do yourself.

[Answer] Stiffly: That is simply unfair.

[Question] Why did you actually take on this job? In this refugee policy there is no honor to be gained, given the insanely low number of refugees that the Netherlands is prepared to admit. It could not be otherwise even if you were depicted as an out-and-out monster. On that score, Mrs Haars can tell you all about it. Would you not have been better off to remain serenely in Bussum as a lawyer?

[Answer] Indignantly: Before I became a government official, I spent five years as a member of the House. No, I get an amazing amount of satisfaction from this work. It attracts attention in the media, of course. It is simpler to make a story about a single pathetic refugee than one about "those" four-year-olds or "those" welfare mothers as conglomerates. Be that as it may, I believe that this work is important.

DISCORD ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AT WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 3 Feb 87 p 12

[Article by Ernst-Otto Maetzke: "The Situation Has Become More Serious--An Occasional Ruckus at the Wehrkunde Conference in Munich"]

[Text] Two events of the past year determined the arguments and climate of this year's Wehrkunde conference. The meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik and the American November elections with the resulting close, but perceptible balance in favor of the Democrat Party in the Senate. Presumably because of the first event, more defense ministers than ever before came to Munich, and certainly because of the second, the American participants were much more belligerent than is the norm for these conferences. It did not help that the NATO General Secretary Carrington as well as the European NATO Supreme Commander Rogers distinguished themselves by their absence: Carrington's predecessor, Luns, did indeed occasionally doze off, but when awakened, he always found the fitting, appropriate word. This was missing this time.

The new American Senate majority has much less understanding for the [NATO] alliance than the old majority and the Administration did, even though the European allies occasionally complained about their point of view, too. President Carter's former National Security Advisor, Brzezinski, threw out the catch-phrase "100,000 men" to the new one: the armed forces stationed in Europe can and must be thinned out by that much so that the American instrument of defense would be stronger where it is needed the most, for example in the Middle East. There is no chance for the counter-argument that the relative peace and security in Central Europe depends on the current available strength of the NATO armed forces. Apparently the American Senate also doesn't recall how pathetically a similar troop-reduction plan ended in South Korea during the Carter presidency. The plan to nibble away at the reinforced division stationed there did not work. The only good thing was that they backed off from the attempt before greater damage was done.

It was interesting how the Social Democrat disarmaments expert Bahr addressed the "100,000 man" theme. It seemed "foolish" indeed to him to begin troop pullouts on the eve of negotiations, but he did not see any danger in that. With a sarcastic voice, he stated, "if I tremble, I must make up for the two (pulled out) divisions. If I don't tremble, than I don't feel endangered."

West German Defense Minister Woerner sounded different as he spelled out the certain results of a troop reduction: the concept of forward defense would no longer be possible. That doesn't concern Bahr, for whom an almost completely demilitarized 300 km corridor between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be enough security. This is even though the name "corridor" already has "bad press in European history," as a French participant pointedly noted.

The most alarming thing was that American participants defended the troop pullout not so much with security policy but much more with internal political and foreign trade arguments. Suddenly the European agricultural market was the subject, the closing of which supposedly drove 200,000 American farmers out of business. According to the new American train of thought, if the Common Market would end agricultural subsidies and overproduction, then there would be a lot of money available for sufficient conventional armaments. The same went for the European space and telecommunications industry. Indeed, the former "Chicken War" has occasionally played a roll in earlier Wehrkunde conferences, but it all sounds rougher now. Apparently the American government will no longer refrain from these tendencies. Their ambassador in Bonn, Burt, who is inclined to exaggerate anyway, saw economics and trade closely related to security policy and also saw that the economic course of the Common Market endangered the alliance's ability to defend itself. It did not help any when Woerner declared that the weakening of the alliance being due to economic grounds was "absurd," or when he justified the promotion of the European aviation industry on the grounds of avoiding letting Europe become strictly a license-manufacturer of American advanced technology. Accusations from across the Atlantic are growing, and rhetoric within the alliance is becoming more inflammatory. More revealing were American administration complaints that the European allies gave them little political support when it came to East-West matters. Undersecretary Perle related a number of examples in a provocative and caustic manner to show that the Europeans in the alliance always took the Russian side. Every American disarmament proposal, especially when it concerned reliable treaty verification, was immediately watered down to make it more appealing to the Soviet Union. The allies also always shy away from backing up American complaints, when appropriate, about continuous Soviet cheating.

All of that was correct, and it led to sober and self-criticizing consideration despite Perle's overly sharp manner. Public opinion in the European partner states is strongly influenced by the fact that in discussions on national defense, many things are never mentioned by name. It was above all the participants from France who managed to plainly say where it would lead to in the end: first to shocking phrases which pretend the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe are an economic community--"a common house" and other things--and finally to a frame of mind which is no longer prepared to sacrifice young people, "while the Russians could send hundreds of thousands to death." The French proved to be the staunchest. Could that have anything to do with their possession of atomic weapons?

Ever since the meeting in Reykjavik, it has been remarked all over Europe that the old disarmament rhetoric about the "Zero Option" and a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests cannot be used as thoughtlessly as before. It could be stated in Munich without contradiction that atomic weapons cannot be

eliminated from the face of the earth: the clock cannot be turned back. The number of these weapons could be greatly reduced, but a few should remain because otherwise it would be too easy for them to be made somewhere else. In addition, a Zero Option for medium-range weapons in Europe would be a questionable peace guarantee if Soviet short-range missiles insured that there was nothing to stop a conventional attack by the Warsaw pact other than a conventional defense which was inferior from the start. But how to get out from under the Zero Option now? The CDU Presidium Member Kiep does not see any way out. "The concept was introduced in a national election and it cannot be abandoned without a loss of trust." The Bavarian Minister President Strauss sees it differently. He would prefer to just leave 100 medium-range missiles on each side at first: If the Russians want to attain their goal of making any threat to their country impossible, they should have to accept an entire package--the short-range missiles would have to be eliminated, too.

It was clear in Munich how far the Europeans--with only the intent of gaining votes--have run with disarmament possibilities which were not thought out. They were advised by the American side to be more careful with that in the future so as not to force the alliance's predominant power to accept poorly-founded proposals and ideas. They occasionally admitted in Munich in self-criticism that they are partially guilty for not being consulted as much as before (by the Americans). In fact, their security was not considered enough in Reykjavik. So much so that a French participant used the alarm word "Yalta." The situation has become more serious, and the Wehrkunde conference proved it as none of its predecessors has.

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DANISH DEFENSE SITUATION WORRIES NORWAY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Jan 87 p 14

[Article by Thorkild Dahl under the rubric "The North in the West-East Balance": "Danish Defense Worries Norway"]

[Text] The Folketing's provisional security policy committee is going to Norway in two weeks to hear Norway's views on the Nordic security policy balance. BERLINGSKE TIDENDE talked in Oslo with the politicians who are drafting Norway's foreign and security policy.

Oslo. "It is obvious that the defense of Denmark plays a great role for the defense of Norway, with the emphasis we are placing on North Norway and the time it takes to get mobilized in South Norway."

Norwegian social democratic Foreign Affairs Minister Knut Frydenlund accentuates the close interlinking of Denmark's and Norway's situation in the NATO alliance and points out that there is broad agreement between the political parties in Norway that Norway place its main emphasis on the defense of North Norway. At the same time, the politicians are ready for real growth in defense appropriations.

"The Labor Party felt obligated by NATO's Washington Resolution regarding three-percent real growth in defense expenditures. A credible national defense will be ensured through 3- to 3.5-percent annual growth, although the military leaders have expressed the desire for more. It is also not a bad outcome politically either, at a time when there is otherwise zero growth in other budgets, and when many other NATO members are not living up to the obligation. It is also a signal to the other allies we are expecting reinforcements from that we ourselves take defense seriously," Foreign Affairs Minister Knut Frydenlund says, who adds, however, that his criticism is not directed at any particular country.

Norway's inhabitants pay a good 3100 kroner each for defense, while in Denmark it is about 2000 kroner. The Norwegian social democratic party, the Labor Party, is now advocating a further increase, while its sister party, the Social Democratic Party, is setting the stage for a zero solution for the coming Danish defense compromise.

The linking of the defense of Norway with Denmark's strength also came forth from Norwegian Conservative Ex-Defense-Minister Anders Sjaastad, and here the criticism is direct:

"There is no inexpensive solution to an individual country's defense problems, in the situation NATO is in. True, there is modern weapons technology available which can strengthen a defender against a conventional attack, but unfortunately these weapons cost a lot."

"For this reason I cannot see that Denmark can allow itself to have a lower defense budget than the average of the others in the alliance. There is no doubt that we are worried about many of the ideas current in Denmark. The whole notion of a non-aggressive defense--although it sounds plausible--is an absurdity when one belongs to a defensive alliance and is faced with the duty, together with allies, of defending important areas," Anders Sjaastad says.

Norwegian Agreement

The deep split which characterizes Danish foreign and security policy is a finished chapter in Norway. Agreement was reached after lengthy committee work, and the Labor Party's leader, Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, voted with Foreign Affairs Minister Knut Frydenlund and Defense Minister Johan Jørgen Holst again to emphasize the security policy line which has been developed by the Labor Party itself since the war. The Labor Party calls attention to the value of cross-party agreement in foreign policy, but Denmark's footnotes, with its failing influence in NATO, aroused concern in leading political circles and are a contributing reason for Norway's not taking the same way out.

The Norwegian security policy debate is strongly marked by the strategic interest which the Nordic region acquired with the Soviet buildup on the Kola Peninsula and in the ice-free Norwegian Sea.

"When the North is mentioned as a quiet corner, then it is a question of a Nordic attempt to idylize a delusion. Our area is of great and growing importance naval-strategically."

"We cannot disregard the fact that we have the world's strongest military power in our corner. The Soviet Union would have a colossal upper hand in an opening phase," says Ex-Prime-Minister Kare Willoch (Conservative Party). He is now chairman of the Storting's powerful foreign affairs committee.

Foreign Affairs Minister Knut Frydenlund also stresses developments in the strategically more important north as decisive for Norway's security policy line.

Soviet Buildup

"The Soviet military buildup on the Kola Peninsula since the 1960's is an element of the Soviet Union's global strategy. It is not particularly aimed at Norway, but it is obvious that the increased military presence by the Soviet Union has created new problems for the defense of Norway. One way of

seeking to solve them in the 1970's was through agreements regarding the stocking of heavy equipment from the USA in Trondelag for reinforcements. This has taken place out of recognition of the fact that with the Soviet Union's naval buildup it can become difficult to receive reinforcements from the USA by sea," Knut Frydenlund says.

Anders Sjaastad says that "Norway's job defensewise is to defend ourselves as much as possible until reinforcements can reach us. There is the risk that an occupation can take place with a weak defense."

A prerequisite for the success of such a Norwegian tactic, with the greatest defense effort in North Norway, is, according to Kare Willoch, that Sweden and Denmark will be able to block the Soviet Union.

Norwegian armed forces courses now feature a map on which either Denmark or Sweden is completely missing, and this is to show Norway's situation if other countries' armed forces do not block a Soviet attack capability from the Baltic. At the same time, it is plainly being said that Sweden is fulfilling its obligations, while Denmark does have a good defense system, but there is too little of one.

"It is paradoxical that it is affluent Denmark with its heavy consumption which is paying for so little of the joint insurance in NATO. It seems as though Denmark expects that the armed forces' duties can be covered by others," Kare Willoch says.

In case of a conflict, Norway will receive reinforcements, just as Denmark, American and, for the present, also Canadian special forces will come to Norway. But it is the arms of precisely these forces which bear on the whole debate regarding the North as a nuclear-free zone--in conflict with NATO's present strategy, which includes the possibility of the first use of nuclear weapons. But we are now living at a time when the place of nuclear weapons in defense is up for debate. Proposals were on the table at the meeting in Reykjavik between the USA's President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet Union's leader, Mikhail Gorbachev.

Dramatic Change

Anders Sjaastad says that if "Denmark and Norway say no to reinforcements and their possible arming with nuclear weapons in a war, then we have actually withdrawn from NATO."

Foreign Affairs Minister Knut Frydenlund also goes into nuclear weapons and NATO:

"The establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the North will be [words missing]."

"It is our assessment that the establishment of a zone is first and foremost confidence-building. A zone must bring about confidence--which is in short supply--between the East and West. Therefore, it must not be an isolated

Nordic zone, and it must happen after a discussion with the other Nordic countries and within our NATO alliance."

"I must admit that several of our most important alliance partners view the zone with skepticism, but this will not prevent our working for achieving an understanding," Knut Frydenlund says, and adds that the requirement for a zone is that it "create greater confidence and more security than the present situation. And this assumes that the necessary time will be taken."

The chairman of the Storting Foreign Affairs Committee, Ex-Prime-Minister Kare Willoch, does not at all regard the ideas concerning a nuclear-free zone as a realistic way toward relaxation of tension:

"The social democratic position on reinforcements without nuclear weapons means a stronger risk of conflict and a risk of the use of nuclear weapons."

"A nuclear-free zone in the North will assure the Soviet Union that it will not encounter nuclear weapons. The social democratic parties' position entails a logically incorrect conclusion. An agreement with the Soviet Union is naive. It will increase the risk," says Kare Willoch, and he points out that "if there is to be sense in a zone idea, then it must be between equals, that is, between nuclear powers."

"The proportion between the Great Powers is far more important--with agreements between them concerning the removal of nuclear weapons--than agreements concerning where nuclear weapons are to be sited. The Soviet Union can hit all of Norway from other places," Kare Willoch says, and he stresses alliance solidarity as the small NATO countries' contribution to negotiated settlements between the superpowers in the Nordic area too.

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CIVIL EQUIPMENT MOBILIZATION FOR FIELD FORTIFICATION ANALYZED

Vienna TRUPPENDIENST in German Dec 86 pp 598-601

[Article by Hubert Flachberger: "Fortification for the Protection of Combat Troops--Auxiliary Use of Earth Moving Machinery Belonging to Civilian Enterprises"]

[Text] [Editor's note concerning the author:] The author is a regional director of mountain stream and avalanche control and has in the past written several studies on this subject under contract with the Defense Ministry. This paper has resulted from a number of recent military scientific publications which indicate increasing concern about the protection of combat troops, particularly during enemy preparation fire.

Introduction

The following is quoted from a textbook of the Imperial War Academy, published in 1912:

"...On the other hand, special importance must be accorded to improvised fortifications in supplementing the defensive installations of permanent fortifications. Even border fortification cannot, in peacetime, be equipped to the level required for repelling a siege-type attack, for reasons of economy. Important additional work, such as the reinforcement of interval areas, cannot occur until mobilization. However, inasmuch as in peacetime extensive preparations are made concerning the protection of workers, materiel and equipment, we can count on quick implementation of supplementary work..."

This comes from the chapter on fortification facilities and is still valid today for efforts designed to maintain military combat capabilities--especially in the defense mode.

Have the requisite preparations really been made? Can we truly count on quick implementation of "supplementary work?"

Under the heading "Go Out There and Practice," an article in MILIZ-IMPULS (issue 5/1984) contained the following:

"...However, many militia soldiers doubted that these companies were truly capable of surviving the anticipated enemy fire. This was perhaps the negative result of peace-time restrictions on building fortifications..."

The question contained in the foregoing statement is valid: the building of fortifications is permitted in too few cases, and not often enough!

In the INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW (issue 7/1984), British Major J.B.A. Bailey writes the following on the subject "Advantages of Prepared Field Fortifications":

"...one opportunity for reducing Eastern superiority would consist of a buildup of conventional forces; however, the latter are increasingly vulnerable on the modern battlefield..."

These strategic and technological developments support the arguments in favor of prepared field fortifications, even though the concept of reinforced defensive positions along a threatened European border has been out of favor for more than 40 years. The NATO ground forces have so far preferred to rely, in case of emergency, upon the modest fortifying potential of their own troops ... however, there certainly is no guarantee that the NATO troops would survive an initial assault by the Warsaw Pact in sufficient numbers to mount a decisive counterattack. A delaying battle can be conducted much more effectively and friendly troops can be much better protected if adequate field fortifications were to be installed prior to deployment of these troops. Such fortifications consist of shelters...as well as obstacles..."

This too is an indication of the procrastination used in this problem area to date, except on a much larger scale than in Austria.

The following objectives are excerpted from H. Adam's textbook of the GDR's People's Army concerning field fortifications--and it must be noted that the GDR's defense doctrine cannot generally be considered "very defensive" in nature:

"...Despite full use being made of all terrain features, the troops can never be fully protected. Because of this, the terrain must in any case be fortified for the protection of men and equipment, to maintain combat readiness and unimpeded supply operations..."

Further, the sequence of all field fortifications to be established must be coordinated with a view to the availability of machinery for that purpose. The availability of suitable earth moving machinery can, in the presence of limited time and extensive digging requirements, be the deciding factor in particularly large-scale fortifications..."

In considering the order of magnitude of required earth moving operations, especially after reading the following chapters, we come to three conclusions:

1. Earth-moving operations cannot possibly be accomplished by the troops themselves. According to Adam, construction machinery must therefore be used, such as hydraulic power shovels of all types, tracked pushing or loading equipment and wheeled loading vehicles.
2. The number of construction machines available in the Bundesheer [Federal Army] is much too limited in the engineer machine companies; besides, those that are available are needed for special purposes. Earth-moving projects required for terrain enhancement can therefore be accomplished only with the use of auxiliary construction equipment.
3. In a highly industrialized country such as Austria, with its high-performance construction industry, much construction machinery is owned by private firms. The use of this potential should be considered.

Herewith a final quotation, from the article "Opportunities for Preparation for Combat With Engineer Equipment" (TRUPPENDIENST, issue 1/1985):

"...a responsible leadership must keep aware of any resources which might serve to accomplish the mission..."

What measures are then required, and to what extent, to fulfill these requirements? Can we count on quick implementation?

Work Requirements/Types of Construction

We shall try to deal with the above questions by using as an example a motorized infantry battalion and a brigade artillery battalion--what action must be taken to protect the personnel and what heavy weapon emplacements should be constructed with the aid of construction machinery. The following are under consideration:

- squad shelter (Fig 1);
- half-platoon shelter/company command post (Fig 2);
- connecting trench (Fig 3);
- firing emplacement/medium grenade launcher or heavy grenade launcher (Fig 4);
- firing emplacement/recoilless antitank gun (Fig 5);
- firing emplacement/light field howitzer (Fig 6);
- firing emplacement/infantry antiaircraft gun.

The minimum effort was determined to be the establishment of digging squad shelters with requisite connecting trenches to the covered combat positions or the firing emplacements of the heavy weapons. A uniform 100 meters of

connecting trench was assumed per shelter, which is probably near the lower limit of actual requirements.

The diagrams shown in Figures 1 through 6 were taken from various Austrian and foreign regulations, textbooks and military science publications and constitute the base for calculating requirements in this study. Built-in features are only hinted at, because the sketches are required solely to determine cubic footage of required digging operations.

Using the Tables of Organization to determine the number of required shelters, and the volume calculations for the types of construction represented in the diagrams, we arrived at the following figures for excavation volume to be accomplished:

Motorized Infantry Battalion...14,990 m³

Brigade Artillery Battalion.... 4,980 m³

Time Requirements

Time requirement calculations were based on many years' experience by mountain stream control services and civilian construction companies. These values appear valid, because the building locations bear comparison with conditions found in terrain enhancement as to size and location (forest) and their dispersal—which also takes into account the travel between points. This also avoids specifying the performance capabilities of individual power shovel types; The result represents a median value of performances by power shovels of widely varying sizes. It should be mentioned also that for the calculation soil conditions were assumed which are suitable for the operation of power shovels, i.e., which do not require additional treatment such as use of high explosives.

In addition, the calculation of time requirements for shelters includes the time required for excavation as well as covering after the interior is finished, but not the time for interior work (e.g., carpentry) itself. In combat emplacements for heavy weapons only the main position, but not alternate or auxiliary positions were used in the calculations, which however amounts to only a multiplication problem. Additional time requirements for materiel procurement and especially for subsequent camouflage, should also be calculated. In accordance with the foregoing considerations, the following excavation times are required to accomplish this task:

Motorized Infantry Battalion...740 hours
Brigade Artillery Battalion....256 hours

Equipment Required

The following considerations are intended to provide a practical field application:

The available time is estimated to be 1 week (5 days). Two days are deducted from this for preparations (e.g., bringing in the equipment). This leaves

3 days. Assuming a 10-hour day (any other figure is possible; overly ambitious variations should however be avoided), this results in 30 working hours per power shovel (excavator).

From this we can calculate the following requirements:

Motorized Infantry Battalion...25 excavators
Brigade Artillery Battalion.... 9 excavators

In considering the tasks which are not described in greater detail here, we find that for firing emplacements for heavy weapons, which can be produced also with track-mounted pushing and loading devices, only a very small portion of the time calculated is required; thus the number of required excavators is not noticeably affected.

On the other hand, almost one-half of the available time is needed for digging the connecting trenches.

This fact does not appear to have great significance in considering the equipment requirements for a motorized infantry battalion out of context, because the 25 required power shovels are easy to come by. However, actual troop concentrations occurring in some areas create a problem. A solution to this can solely be seen in the procurement of trench digging tools. By using a single trench digger for 37 hours, the excavator requirements of a motorized infantry battalion could be reduced to 12 excavators working 30 hours each, i.e., a reduction of 50 percent.

Equipment of this kind is available not only to the armed forces of the NATO states, but also to the armies of the Warsaw Pact (as shown in TRUPPENDIENST handbooks), even though their primarily mechanized forces and offensive combat doctrine would appear to make the digging of connecting trenches hardly necessary.

Trench diggers could either be purchased externally or developed by heavy industry in this country. This could even represent a desirable transition to nonmilitary products, because such trench diggers could be used not only for military trenches, but also for digging drainage, water pipes, telephone and other utility conduits.

Procurement of the Required Civilian Construction Machinery

Assuming that even with the lowest possible number of excavators, i.e., if trench diggers are used simultaneously, a pretty hefty number of construction machinery would be needed, we would have to make certain that the machines would be available for military purposes at the time of need. The equipment belonging to the engineer machine companies are left out of consideration here, for reasons cited above. The following options exists for guaranteeing availability:

Procurement in Accordance With the Military Draft Law

At present, only construction machinery bearing police-issued license plates are registered; they could cover only a fraction of the requirements. The actual inventory of construction machinery in Austria is many times larger, except that few construction machines carry license plates. An additional problem consists of the fact that the machines are turned over to the armed forces without an operator. The armed forces themselves do not however have the required number of military-trained and mobilization-assigned construction machinery operators.

The Use of Lease Contracts

This procedure is already being followed in other areas and would have the advantage that the operator would be "part of the package." However, it could happen that this operator has already been ordered to duty elsewhere as a radio operator, machinegunner, driver, etc.

In this area we will thus require measures to be taken to ensure that personnel resources for maintaining combat capability are provided.

Summary

The foregoing indicates that the important personnel protection can become possible with the use of available construction machinery and possibly trench digging tools to be procured, and that it must be facilitated, even though a change of heart will be needed for this in many areas.

Even though some thoughts on this have already been expressed in the foregoing, the following are a few final additional observations:

--To ensure the availability and use of construction machinery, such machinery must always be accompanied by an operator, which will no doubt cause some individual changes in mobilization assignments. We should add here that up to now we have dealt only with excavators, while for the preparation of anti-tank trenches and other earth barriers usually an almost equal number of track-mounted push or loading vehicles would be required, depending on the local situation;

--Assignment of operator personnel and supervision of tasks involving construction machinery cannot be entrusted to the local tactical commanders; they have other duties and seldom derive any requisite experience from their civilian occupations. It has therefore been proposed that special staffs for earth moving tasks be established. (According to Adam, "...a maximum of planning and work organization is required.");

--Fuel supply and repair facilities for the civilian construction equipment must be provided also;

--Provision must be made that, for the construction of the shelters, sufficient quantities of wood in the required lengths and thicknesses be procured in a timely manner, as well as (if applicable) concrete modules and such other construction supplies as nails, staples, appropriate tools, and that these items be available at the location where needed;






--camouflage in the traditional sense can almost be forgotten with the use of such equipment. However, deceptive measures, such as the construction of decoy positions, can become important;

--The legal status, and especially the international legal status, of the construction machine operators must be unequivocal;

--In the course of ongoing exercises, every unit should be ordered to construct at least one shelter and/or one combat emplacement for heavy weapons in accordance with instructions. For this purpose, every commander should be issued an easy to understand set of instructions, similar to that produced by II Corps Headquarters entitled "Suggestions for Terrain Enhancement."

This paper is a summary of studies by the author, which represent a time-requirement calculation for terrain enhancement based on experience in mountain stream and avalanche control. The author would be grateful for information on actual results obtained under field conditions.

The basic question, whether rapid implementation of comprehensive measures for terrain enhancement is possible, can be positively answered only if certain conditions are fulfilled which have been enumerated in this paper, but which have not to date been given the attention they deserve.






Abbildung 6 Kampfdeckung IFH.

Key:

1. Fig 1: Squad Shelters (upper left); Fig 2: Half-platoon Shelter (left center); Fig 3: Connecting Trench (lower left); Fig 4: Grenade Launcher Emplacement (upper left); Fig 5: Combat Cover Emplacement, Antitank Gun bottom left; cover not illustrated); Fig 6 [p 601]: Combat Shelter IFH
2. Squad shelter, walls reinforced with wooden planks
3. Squad shelter without walls
4. Open connecting trench
5. Side entrance
6. Stove
7. Entrance opposite the direction of the enemy location
8. Open connecting trench
9. Enemy
10. Trench width at top
11. Arm rest
12. Parapet
13. Top of parapet
14. +50-+60 Parapet elevation
15. Adversary
16. Bottom of parapet
17. Protective thickness of parapet
18. Width of parapet
19. Front trench slope
20. Trench bottom
21. Rear trench slope
22. Thickness of rear cover
23. Bottom of rear cover
24. Height of rear cover

25. Total protective depth
26. Depth of trench
27. All figures in centimeters
28. Lower parapet cover
29. Launcher base
30. Steps
31. Ammunition recess
32. Ramp (only for 120mm launcher with undercarriage)
33. Cross section A-B
34. Plan view
35. Drainage pit
36. Recesses for grenades
37. Running board
38. Unit commander
39. Gunner
40. Ammunition
41. Loader
42. Plan view C-D
43. Covered ammunition recess
44. Drainage hole
45. Ammunition readying space
46. Cover
47. Ramp
48. Slope
49. Earth embankment
50. All figures in meters

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CSO: 3620/152

TERRAIN ENHANCEMENT MULTIPLIES INFANTRY'S DENIAL CAPABILITY

Vienna TRUPPENDIENST in German Dec 86 pp 606-612

[Article by Colonel Manfred Floedl: "Some Thoughts on Infantry Defense--Selection of the Forward Edge of Battle Area (FEBA)"]

[Text] The Terrain--Our Most Important Ally

The range and effectiveness of the defender exert considerable influence over the selection of the Forward Edge of Battle Area [FEBA].




Figure 1

Should the defender get a view of an attacking reinforced armored infantry company as shown in Figure 1, he is certain to have made a poor choice of FEBA. His probability of being able to make effective use of his weapons and to survive is small. We must be aware of the fact that the defender is liable to be destroyed by artillery, aircraft, helicopter gunships, grenade launchers and armored personnel carriers (APC's). Something needs to be done about this. Our most important ally for this is the terrain. The point of departure for all further considerations are the characteristics of the terrain, familiarity with an aggressor's methods of attack, as well as the performance capability of friendly weapons.

We must:

--position ourselves in such a way that the gunners of the helicopter gunships and the pilots of the fighter-bombers cannot find the well-camouflaged defender;

--shorten the field of fire of enemy armor to such an extent that their superior range loses its impact;

--make optimum use of our own weapons.

Use of the Reverse Slope

We can, for instance, choose our position by using covered terrain on a reverse slope and thereby interfere with the enemy's attack procedure (Fig 2).




Figure 2

To be able to attack the aggressor in time with high-angle fire, the observers for the grenade launchers and the artillery would then have to choose positions in front of the FEBA, in the area of the crest, or to use terrain features which provide an insight into the attack area from a flank angle.

Defense Inside of and Behind Inhabited Areas

Inhabited areas can also provide the effects of a reverse slope position:

--While avoiding the edge of the locality, its center is used for defense, thus decisively restricting the field of fire of enemy direct-fire weapons;

--The area behind a community is chosen for the defense. The built-up area then becomes a mask, i.e., protection against ground-level observation and direct fire. A secondary effect of this is that the enemy is being channeled through the built-up area. By being forced to advance only along fixed lines, his assault thrust is being diluted (Fig 3). However, this effect can be achieved only if the area surrounding the inhabited area or specific barriers make it impossible to move around the locality.




Figure 3

Positions in Wooded Areas

Of the FEBA runs through a wooded area, it is not enough to hide by choosing positions which are somewhat removed from the edge of the woods ("tactical forest edge"). While observing the fire from guns aboard the APC's and the tank guns, the FEBA must be placed in the center of the forest. The distance from its edge depends upon the density of the vegetation and the diameter of the trees. In any case, between the edge of the forest and the defensive position there must be sufficient vegetation to detonate fuzed ammunition before it can reach the position and to diffuse its fragmentation effect (Fig 4).




Figure 4

The Stronghold

While accepting the presence of gaps, the defense is conducted from strongholds. To preserve continuity, three, rather than only two strongholds should coordinate their fire.

The diagram in Figure 5 demonstrates that even if one stronghold falls, continuity remains intact. A prerequisite for this is the optimum use of the range of friendly weapons, especially in flank fire, and the choice of terrain appropriate to this.



Figure 5

The tactical grouping determines the strength and thus the size of the strongholds. When it is possible to establish strongholds with only 3-4 squads, this automatically increases the number of strongholds. This also increases the number of targets for the enemy to attack, which makes his battle plan more complex and more difficult to implement.

Using ground cover (vegetation, communities), the stronghold is made invisible to the enemy. An aggressor doubtless has good reconnaissance equipment; we must however keep reminding ourselves that there aren't any battlefield surveillance radars hiding behind every tree and that the sky is not full of spy satellites, sensors and infrared cameras.

The important thing is that artillery observers, tank and APC gunners, helicopter gunship gunners and fighter-bomber pilots are unable to recognize our positions, vehicles, supply points, etc., and that they are thus unable to attack them.

The Squad Nest

Among other things, the squad nest serves as a position to those soldiers whose main task consists of destroying attacking infantrymen or dismounted armored infantry with defensive assault fire. The objective is therefore to gain maximum effectiveness from the use of the squad's light infantry weapons. (Fig 6).




Figure 6

Using primarily his artillery and aircraft weapons, the attacker will attempt to eliminate the infantry soldiers. It is therefore important to protect oneself from the effects of those weapons. Fortification of the squad nest is therefore a vital part of the squad mission.

Combat Cover

Combat cover positions must be fortified in such a way that they escape detection by the enemy. They must permit opening of fire as a surprise to the enemy, without letting the gun layers of the supporting enemy tanks and APC's recognize the friendly forces as targets.

Combat cover positions are oriented toward the infantry soldiers' main direction of fire; in other words, the forward edge of the cover position will as a rule form a right angle with the main direction of fire.

Fire zones should be kept as large as possible. The right-hand and left-hand limits of individual fire zones should not be primarily safety limits for the benefit of neighboring fellow-infantrymen or neighboring squads or platoons. The rifleman initially fires at targets within his main direction of fire, then chooses additional targets within the fire zone assigned to him on his own initiative.

This relieves the squad leader to the point where he can better monitor the squad during the firefight and to give his primary attention to directing machinegun fire and the use of light antitank guns.

Wire obstacles, which will be dealt with later on in greater detail, are not just any old kind of fence, but rather barriers, which must be adapted to enemy attack procedures, the terrain and the use of friendly weapons, particularly the light infantry weapons.

Protective Cover Positions

Prior to fortifying protective cover positions we must estimate the density of anticipated enemy preparatory fire:

--are two-man combat cover positions with shelters sufficient?

--or must we construct a squad shelter, or even a half-platoon shelter?

To help us decide, we must estimate whether or not the friendly forces are positioned in the anticipated main direction of attack, meaning whether they will be facing the main thrust of the aggressor. Should this be the case, we can count on extensive artillery fire and concomitant air attacks, which makes the construction of shelters mandatory.

Half-platoon shelters are as a rule undesirable because of the large amount of work required in their construction. Squad shelters too will be the exception, because the distance between them and the various squad nests of the platoon is too large and occupying the positions would thus take too long. The decision is therefore required normally between construction of squad or half-platoon shelters (Figs 7 and 8).




Figure 7




Figure 8

Preparatory enemy fire can cause the collapse of a shelter entrance. Thus every shelter requires two exits, to facilitate quick occupation of the position in a worst-case scenario. To shorten the time-consuming fortification of connecting trenches, the shelter can replace a part of the trench system. Terrain cover must be used in this.

Another possible decision is to build shelters only, and no combat cover positions. Justification for this decision could be as follows:

The construction of shelters will be required because of expected preparatory enemy fire by artillery and airpower. However, the time available prior to the expected start of the attack may not be sufficient for the fortification of both combat and protective cover positions. The heavy preparatory fire will however cause a sufficient number of grenade and bomb craters to create covered positions suitable for positioning friendly weapons.

The decision to forego the fortification of combat cover positions and to concentrate on shelter cover is a prerogative of the battalion or brigade level.

From a training standpoint, this option dictates that the soldiers must be capable, within a few seconds of the command "Position!", to find cover appropriate for positioning their weapons.

If sufficient time is available, combat and shelter cover positions should be built and connected by trenches.

Connecting Trenches

Crawling trenches are not a good solution, because they make quick occupation of combat cover positions impossible. They must therefore be the exception to the rule.

Connecting trenches must be constructed in such a way that they permit easy occupation of combat cover positions as well as resupply activities and transport of wounded personnel. As an example, the ammunition carrier of an antitank rifle squad, carrying two double containers, or the Number 2 machine-gunner with four ammunition boxes, must easily be able to move inside the trench.

The depth of these connecting trenches depends upon the deployment of friendly weapons. Some trench sectors may also be used as alternate or auxiliary positions.

If weapons must be used along the entire length of the trench, which occurs relatively often, the trench must have the depth of a combat cover position, i.e., chest height; a weapon support surface must also be provided.

Should weapon use be required in only a few locations, the trench may be deeper. Wherever weapons are to be fired, step platforms must be provided. The trenches must not be laid out in a straight line.

Individual trench sectors should not exceed 10 meters in length and should form angles of no less than 90° to each other (the smaller the angle, the more danger there is of the trench collapsing. This reduces the effects of artillery or bomb hits. It also facilitates the conduct of combat against enemy penetration and counterattack (Fig 9).




Figure 9

Lining of the trench walls protects trenches against weather damage. However, connecting trenches should not in all cases be lined in case of combat action, since after artillery hits, wooden posts and stakes can shift and thereby create obstacles to quick occupation of the positions and the evacuation of wounded personnel.

However, trenches in squad nests which are intended to serve for training purposes over extended periods of time should be lined (Fig 10).




Figure 10

Wood used for this purpose should be treated. The posts are anchored with tin-plated 5-mm steel wire. Posts and stakes do not have to be wooden; 50x50-mm angle irons are suitable as well. Good use can be made for this purpose of angle irons from discarded bedsteads which no longer serve their original purpose.

All trenches must be dug with close attention being paid to drainage. For this purpose, a drainage pipe is placed inside the gravel lining at the bottom of the trench, which should be 30-50 cm in depth, or drainage should be facilitated by other means (Fig 11). An appropriate slope of the trench bottom is important for proper drainage. Water should be channeled to the outside. Should this be impossible, drainage pits of appropriate depth must be dug and filled with gravel. Engineer power tools should be used for digging whenever possible.

The Platoon Observation Post

Even if enemy preparatory fire has forced the platoon to seek full cover, observation in the battle sector must continue. One prerequisite for this is an observation post which affords protection against high-angle and direct fire.




Figure 11

A well-protected combat position, possibly the use of a trench mirror, is a prerequisite for maintaining battlefield observation even under these conditions, so as to obtain timely information of a shift in preparatory fire and the dismounting of the attacking armored infantry. Only then can the subsequent barrage fire and alerting of the platoon be initiated in time.

The observer must be fully familiar with the aggressor's attack procedures if he is to take appropriate action at the right time. Because of this, the squad leader or his deputy will need to perform observer duties themselves during an attack. Should the observable area from the platoon observation post be insufficient to view an adequate portion of the battle sector, more covered observation posts must be set up on one or more additional squad nests, to be manned by the squad leaders or, exceptionally, by their deputies. In the platoon observation post there are, among others, a messenger, the radio operator and, if possible, a field telephone. This will ensure the capability, upon a shift in the artillery fire, of immediately alerting the platoon, initiating the barrage fire and at the same time transmitting a situation report to the company commander. The survival of the observer is essential for the fate of the infantry platoon and its success in repelling an assault.

Some suggestions for the physical establishment of an observation post (Fig 12):

--solid construction;

--do not pile up a mound, which would attract tank and APC fire;

--the narrowest possible observation slit, so as to keep the target as small as possible;

--protection for the observer's forehead, unless a trench mirror is in use.




Figure 12

Barrier Construction

Infantry barriers

Infantry barriers should be built in front of the position, beyond hand-grenade throwing range. This statement, though repeated over and over again, is incomplete and is proof for the fact that the aggressor's attack procedures have been insufficiently analyzed.

The following must be observed in constructing infantry barriers:

--the defender must have no firing blind spots between the barrier and the position;

--the attacker must not be able to find any cover in front of the barrier which he could use to destroy the barrier;

--the enemy should discover the barrier late, preferably too late; it should therefore be constructed in conjunction with the terrain and the vegetation and be camouflaged;

--the barrier should be immune from direct enemy fire. Slopes and depressions should therefore be used;

--the defender's light infantry weapons, especially machineguns, should be able to have an effect in front of the barrier and from the flank, so that infantry attacks can be destroyed even before reaching the barrier, i.e., in the retaining zone (Fig 13).




Figure 13

Road Barriers

The situation is similar for road barriers. If a security squad deployed there can have impact only on that location, this is not enough. We would then wrongly assume that the enemy would direct his combat vehicles straight at our barrier. He would never do that!

A stake barrier is an impediment to firing; it creates a blind spot (Fig 14). This type of position is justified only if no blind spot is created, as for instance in an explosive barrier.




Figure 14

It is a similar situation for a multiple-row tank barrier, anchored with steel cables. It too restricts the field of fire and requires a choice of position which permits firing at targets in front of the barrier (Fig 15). It can be useful when two squads work together, especially if they are able to use light antitank guns from the flank against enemy armor.




Figure 15

There is an overlap of the fire zones of the two squads shown in Figure 16 in the defense of an explosive barrier. At the same time, the neighboring squad can have flank impact. In this type of use, adherence to assigned fire zones is particularly essential for the sake of the neighbor's safety.




Figure 16

A prepared, well camouflaged explosive barrier can be detonated immediately prior to the enemy's traversing it; it provides surprise better than any other type of barrier.

If the barrier and the defending forces are very well camouflaged and strict fire discipline is enforced, this type of barrier also permits the passage of advanced enemy reconnaissance personnel; the barrier is detonated and the firefight initiated only when the main attack forces arrive.

When tree barriers (Fig 17) are used, it must be noted that previously activated tree barriers cannot be camouflaged and are thus vulnerable to ground and air observation. This discloses the location of the FEBA. The only way to counteract this is by establishing a tree barrier by using explosives to blow up the trees. However, engineer troops must be used for this purpose.

In preparation, the explosive charges are attached to the trees, the fuzes prepared and everything camouflaged. Detonation occurs at the tactically most appropriate time. However, consideration must be given to the effects of enemy preparatory fire, which could disrupt the fuze arrangement and thus prevent or delay the detonation until the fuze line can be repaired—if there is time left for this. The order to detonate should therefore be delegated to the local commander or, if the course of the attack dictates, detonation should be ordered at the proper time.




Figure 17

However, tree barriers constructed by hand are more effective, because the direction of the fall of individual trees can be better controlled and the barrier can be reinforced by additional measures. Ideally, three trees will be made to fall so as to form a triangle, one on the right and one on the left side of the road across one another, with their tops pointing toward the enemy, and a third tree as the base of the triangle straight across the road.

The trees are cut about 1.5 meters above the ground and cut across only deep enough to let the tree remain attached to the stump, if possible.

Where such "anchoring" is impossible, a connection is made by forming a rope out of 5-10 pieces of barbed wire. Also, all places where the fallen trees cross one another must be tied together with barbed wire; the trees themselves are laced together with barbed wire containing booby traps. A depth of about 100 meters should be used for tank barriers.

Mines

The use of horizontal antipersonnel mines requires special considerations. It can be aimed like a weapon (Fig 18) and is extremely suitable in harassment operations for ambushes, to barricade fire blind spots, but also to reinforce or supplement the assault defense fire of a squad. However, in its use in conjunction with assault defense fire, the use of the horizontal antipersonnel mine is possible and makes sense only if the mine is safe from enemy preparatory fire. For this purpose it must be planted in a specially

prepared "covered position." For operations in inhabited areas it can be deployed in a cellar or in a corridor, with the mine's detonation effect directed toward the outside. In open terrain suitable cover must first be prepared. As an example, a drain pipe could be placed horizontally, facing the direction of the attack, and camouflaged; or a covered deployment site could be created with auxiliary equipment.




Figure 18

The method of detonation too can be adapted to existing requirements. Detonation can be caused by the enemy crossing a trip wire and/or in the form of an observation mine (Fig 19).




Figure 19

For laying antitank minefields and armor blocking positions similar principles must be observed. The mines will fulfill their purpose only if properly camouflaged and if appropriate use is made of the terrain. Should the enemy detect the mines in time, he will either circumvent them or take mine clearing action.

Laying of antitank minefields by the step method and of armor blocking positions is strictly an infantry function. Engineer troops should be used for more specialized tasks and deployed as indicated. Except in the use of mines for

close protection, which are again removed by the personnel which placed them, close attention must be paid to the maintenance of the requisite barrier documents (mine plan).

In laying armor blocking positions, it must be borne in mind that these must not be merely placed across the line of movement. To obtain an effective density, i.e., a small distance between mines along the line of travel, they must be placed at a slant to the direction of movement. To avoid triggering a chain detonation, a distance of 2 meters is required between individual antitank mines (Fig 20).




Figure 20

9273/8309
CSO: 3620/152

WARTIME CIVIL DEFENSE WOULD BE CONDUCTED FROM BUNKER HQ

Copenhagen AKTUELIT in Danish 22 Jan 87 pp 18-19

[Article by Peter Bergen: "They Will Rescue Us from Here During a Nuclear War"]

[Text] Just 500 meters from the main road between Hillerød and Copenhagen there is a gigantic bunker which will be decisive for the population's survival in a war.

In this underground national command center the Civil Defense's leadership will receive reports on damage and lead assistance operations.

"The weighty decisions will be made here," as Column Commander Klaus Vogt Andersen puts it.

In addition to work areas and communications electronics, including for communications with the civil defense systems of our neighboring countries, the little underground town contains a kitchen, dormitory, canteen, provisions storeroom, clothing storeroom, refrigerating plant, oil tank, water supply system with its own well, sewer system, power plant, and, last but not least, a filtering system which removes radioactive dust and gas from the air drawn in. Thick concrete can withstand, if not an atom bomb, then ordinary bombs; more specifically, a load of 25 tons per square meter. Heavy airtight steel doors protect the entrance. Those arriving can be rid of gas and radioactivity in an air lock before they are let in.

Seventy-five to 150 people can get by without coming up to the surface of the ground for at least one month. The philosophy is that if the air is still lethal after a month most people in Denmark will be dead anyway, and there will be nothing more for the command center to do.

Not Secret

Similar bomb-, nuclear- and gas-proof bunkers elsewhere in Denmark are for the armed forces' top leadership, the royal family and the government, as well as the central administration's top people. The CF's [Civil Defense's] national command center differs decisively in that its location is not secret and the bunker is not militarily guarded. Not in time of war either. Only a

chainlink fence with barbed wire stands between the bunker's steel door and intruders.

"We rely on the Geneva Convention, which forbids attacks on the Civil Defense's personnel and institutions," says Brigade Commander N.B. Hansen.

Reminded that the Civil Defense will not be spared in a war, because it seeks to save the buildings and machines which the enemy runs risks for in trying hard to destroy, the brigade commander finally says: "We will certainly approach the police for protection."

Dormitory

In peace time the bunker is manned only during exercises. The key personnel--5 to 10 people--live in the vicinity and can get the bunker running in a few hours. But in order to really function the center must be manned by 75 people, and it can be in less than 24 hours. The air cleaning system, etc., is designed for 150 people, if it becomes necessary to close the doors in the middle of a change of guard. But there are beds for just one shift. Only individual top people have their own little bedroom. The rest are divided between two dormitories, one for men and one for women, where they sleep in bunkbeds.

Reserve a Place


The national command center differs from the other "key bunkers" also by the fact that everyone between 16 and 60 years old has an opportunity to get a place in it. For the majority of the personnel are voluntary CF'ers, who, as is the Home Guard, are trained in their spare time. Two groups have been trained today, and the CF is recruiting volunteers for a third group. So if you are the right age, have a reasonable physique and live in North Zealand, you can now secure yourself a place in one of Denmark's safest residences during a nuclear war.

With its bare concrete walls, painted concrete floors and Spartan canteen and dormitory, the bunker certainly does not seem to be a place one would be happy in. But both the volunteers and leaders assure us that they are actually fine when they are under the ground for several days. The 2000-square-meter labyrinth provides lots of room for the 75 people. Only one has had to resign his post because of claustrophobia.


Some CF'ers have tried to live in the bunker for 12 days running.

Lose Sense of Time

Klaus Vogt Andersen: "One loses a sense of time. Without looking at the clock you have no idea whether it is morning or evening. And you have to keep count of how many days you have been down. When you come up you are surprised that the air is not the same as when you went down."



Developments around Denmark, radioactive clouds, for example, will be followed in this room. The three telephones provide direct communication with the Civil Defense leaderships in West Germany, Norway and Sweden.



One of the communications rooms, where contact can be maintained with the police, hospitals, local civil defense groups, etc.



Column Commander Klaus Vogt Andersen shows filters which can prevent gas and radioactivity from slipping through the bunker's air intake system. The dirty filter on the left has just been removed.

8831
CSO: 3613/45

SDP DEPUTY CHAIRMAN AUKEN PREDICTS DIFFICULT PROGRAM TALKS

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 31 Jan - 1 Feb 87 p 1

[Article by Jens Holme: "New Defense Compromise Scarcely Likely"]

[Text] The government seems to be bound by its own rhetoric and does not dare tell the truth, Svend Auken says.

"After the parties in power have tried for the last couple of years to depict us as almost a gang of KGB agents, they will hardly be able to hold to entering a compromise with us on foreign and security policy."

"Therefore I have difficulty in believing in both a renewal of the defense compromise and in agreement between the Social Democratic Party and the Folketing's so-called Østergaard Committee regarding Denmark's security policy."

The Social Democratic Party's deputy chairman and political spokesman, Svend Auken, said this in an interview with INFORMATION.

Regarding the coming negotiations between the government and Social Democratic Party concerning defense, Svend Auken says that the Social Democratic Party will allow itself to be pressured neither for increases nor reductions in appropriations.

"And if a new defense compromise does not come, the defense budget will still continue unchanged in the annual Budget," Svend Auken says.

The Truth

"The government quite simply does not dare to tell the truth to its own defense friends and the Reagan administration--that we cannot afford to increase defense appropriations when we look at the many other Budget items which need to be adjusted. If defense is to be improved, the existing appropriations will have to be utilized more efficiently and intelligently."

Svend Auken says regarding the Østergaard Committee, which according to the plan is to issue a report in the spring, that broad agreement could possibly

be reached on some standpoints on the basis of the model outlined at the summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik.

"But I think that the parties in power are bound by their own rhetoric. For years they have depicted the Social Democrats almost as paid KGB agents. This illusion would be exposed if the government entered into a compromise with us," Auken says.

Incidentally, Svend Auken thinks that a new defense compromise with the non-socialist parties will not be an impediment to an S-SF [Social Democratic Party - Socialist People's Party] coalition after an election. On the contrary:

"The SF will hardly renounce a government coalition with the Social Democratic Party for this reason. On the contrary, a defense compromise can contribute to bringing peace to a coalition between the Social Democratic Party and the SF. For then the benchmark will be that defense cannot be touched."

"If there is no new defense compromise when a new government comes into power, every time we lack money for some social improvement the SF will be able to demand that a bit be snatched from the defense budget. Here a defense compromise will act as a shield for the Social Democratic Party."

8831

CSO: 3613/45

ADVANCED TANK MUNITION DEVELOPMENTS SURVEYED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Jan 87 pp 24-29

[Article by Herbert Graff: "Battle Tank Main Armament Today and Tomorrow--Is the Liquid-Propelled or Electromagnetic Gun on the Way?"; first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction]

[Text] At present, the LEOPARD 2 and the M-1A1 ABRAMS, introduced in the West, are equipped with a high-capacity 120-mm gun. It may, therefore, be surprising that performance increases or new weapons concepts are the subjects of consideration today. But in the area of armor-plating technology, improvements in protective armor are being worked on, so-called active armor is being mentioned, so that, in the future, it must be figured that requirements for increased effect at the target will arise. The possibilities which are presented are introduced by graduate engineer Herbert Graff, construction director of the Munitions Department of the Federal Office for Military Technology and Procurement. He attempts, in particular, to list the effects of various performance increase possibilities upon the battle tank weapons system. It turns out that a liquid-propelled combat tank gun should receive special attention on the basis of the advantages it provides from the systems point of view. This weapon is also best suited to counter the disadvantages presented by an increase in projectile caliber. The principle of electromagnetic acceleration of masses, which could prove to be an interesting alternative combat tank armament in the distant future, provided that, among others, the combat tank-based requirements with respect to weight and volume of such a weapons system can be fulfilled, is also introduced.

A combat tank is assigned very specific missions. In an army with a defensive mission, such as that represented by the Bundeswehr, this means defending against numerically superior tank formations. In order to be able to master this mission, a combat tank must precisely fulfill very specific requirements in the following areas which determine the combat effectiveness:

- i. firepower,
- ii. protection,
- iii. mobility,
- iv. controllability.

This sequence does not represent an evaluation. Balance within the framework of what is doable is required. The area of firepower can be further subdivided as follows:

- i. reconnaissance capability,
- ii. reaction time,
- iii. hit probability,
- iv. effect at the target.

This sequence corresponds to the course of a combat action. It involves comprehensive procedures in the interplay between the most varied participating technology areas such as optics, optronics, electrical devices, electronics, hydraulics, and weapons and munitions. The latter two categories--weapons and munitions technology--are the subject of the following detailed presentation, with an emphasis upon weapons technology.

Current Armament of Combat Tanks

The armament of virtually all combat tanks of the armies of the this world consists of conventional guns of the most varied calibers. Conventional in this context means a tube weapon with a drawn or smooth bore, which fires projectiles which follow a ballistic trajectory. The munitions can be of the cartridge type--in other words, one-piece--or can be separate--propellant charge and projectile.

As a weapons-based reaction to advances in armaments technology in the past, the calibers of tank guns have increased significantly in recent decades; in the West, they rose from 90 mm through 105 mm to 120 mm (smooth bore and rifled), in the East the increase was from 100 mm, through 115 mm (smooth bore) to 125 mm (smooth bore). In the West, Great Britain was an exception, in that its CHIEFTAIN combat tank has been equipped with a 120-mm gun (rifled barrel) for more than 20 years.

With the introduction of the LEOPARD 2 in the Bundeswehr, German armored troops now also have a 120-mm tank gun with a smooth bore. This weapon, which turns in an excellent performance, found rapid acceptance. It is manufactured, on license, in the United States and is the armament for the M-1A1 ABRAMS combat tank which is currently being delivered to the United States for tank troops. Furthermore, it has been, or will be, introduced in the Netherlands and in Switzerland through the acceptance of the LEOPARD 2 by these two European countries. Also, France will have a 120-mm smooth-bore gun with the introduction of the LECLERC combat tank at the beginning of the 1990's; this is a French development. The ammunition available for the German and French 120-mm gun will be extensively interchangeable, which represents an additional fortuitous step with respect to standardization within the NATO alliance. A still more extensive spread has been experienced by the 105-mm combat tank gun with a rifled barrel, developed in Great Britain, which is found in all 10 NATO countries installed in the M-48, M-60, and LEOPARD 1 combat tanks.

The armament of a tank has a serious influence upon its conception; it represents one of the so-called "concept-determining characteristics." Of similar gravity with respect to a combat tank concept is the problem of increasing projectile calibers. Weapon weight and volume increase, which means that, particularly with respect to current turret design, the area to be protected increases, which, in turn, is expressed in increases of weight and volume of the turret with all appropriate consequences for the chassis. Similarly, increases in weight and volume of munitions have an effect on design but are more serious in their effect upon the crew. To make a rough estimate of the weight increase pertaining to munitions, given an increase in caliber, one can use a rule-of-thumb formula according to which weights, like calibers, increase by a factor of 3. In making the transition from 105-mm caliber to 120-mm caliber, this would mean a weight increase of barely 50 percent if the ammunition design, that is to say, cartridge-cased munitions and metal propellant charge cartridge are retained. In the given example, this would mean approximately 30 kg per round. Since an increase in caliber can also result in a longer cartridge case, this could, in turn, result in handling difficulties, particularly during weapons loading operations, in view of the limited space available in a combat tank. These problems can be avoided by other ammunition designs; one could, for example, divide the individual rounds into projectiles and propellant charges. This would drastically reduce the weight and volume of the individual components and would have the following additional advantages:

- i. easier stowability aboard the combat tank,
- ii. the opportunity to stow explosive projectiles in specially protected locations in the combat compartment.

However, one could also list the following diverse disadvantages:

- i. for one round, two components must be loaded, which is reflected in reaction time;
- ii. an inserted round can only be unloaded with difficulty;
- iii. the possibility of mixups in assigning propellant charges to specific rounds is possible;
- iv. the logistics environment is considerably impacted, beginning with the storage in depots, through transport all the way to a greater time requirement for supplying the combat tank with ammunition;
- v. finally, separate munitions are less suitable for use in automatic loading devices.

Another possibility to at least keep the weight increment given increases in caliber within limitations is presented by the use of combustible or partially combustible propellant charge containers. Whereas with combustible propellant charge containers, a special obturation system must be provided in the breech of the weapon, obturation for partially combustible propellant charge containers is handled by a short metal casing--the cartridge case base. Combustible

or partially combustible casings present the additional advantage of being less sensitive to shrapnel penetration and that, additionally, no large cartridge casings are ejected into the combat compartment, which has a positive effect upon the crew, which is otherwise stressed by the presence of gases. The disadvantage of low mechanical strength, particularly with respect to cartridge-cased munitions having a combustible casing, needs to be listed.

The above-discussed possibilities were consistently utilized in the introduction of large-caliber tank guns. With its 120-mm weapon, Great Britain opted for separated ammunition and, at the same time, chose fully combustible casing material (much like the artillery). A similar path was taken by the USSR with its 125-mm weapon for the T-64 and T-72 combat tanks, although they chose partially combustible casings and an automatic loading device.

In the FRG, cartridge-cased ammunition with a partially combustible propellant charge casing is utilized for the 120-mm gun of the LEOPARD 2 tank. It was, thus, possible to approximately retain the weight and length dimensions of the 105-mm ammunition of the LEOPARD 1 tank, which permits handling characteristics to remain at an adequately good level.

Possibilities for Increasing the Firepower of Current Combat Tanks

The purpose of every weapon or weapons system is the achievement of effects against designated targets. Almost always, the carrier of this effect is a munition of some type. In order to propel the munition to the target, a special carrier or acceleration system is required. The fact that first a target must be recognized and identified is self-evident. A target, on its part, particularly, for example, a combat tank, can react and become an active threat so that minimum reaction times for target recognition and target impact are to be striven for. This is a brief verbal description of the parameters of firepower as applicable to a combat tank.

The possibilities for fulfilling a requirement for a higher effect at the target and the resulting consequences applicable to current combat tanks are discussed below.

Progress in armor technology over the past decades has already been referred to. In recent times, so-called active armor is mentioned increasingly in military technical journals in the West and in the East. The effective mechanisms of such armor are not the subject of this article; suffice it to say that they represent a sizable improvement in the protection possibilities of armored vehicles. This factor can be utilized in two ways: either to lower the weight and volume of an armored vehicle while retaining the level of protection or by increasing protection given the original weight and volume.

The utilization of the second possibility by a potential adversary requires a higher effect in the target area as a response from the munitions side.

Munitions effect in the target is produced by the conversion of chemical energy (CE) or through kinetic energy (KE). With respect to CE projectiles, the effect can be multiplied by using more capable explosives or by projectile

design (for example, by using hollow charges); the weapon itself can hardly make a contribution if an increase in caliber is excluded. The hitting of the target is, naturally, assumed. In other words, the effect mechanism of using chemical energy is munitions-immanent.

The picture is completely different with respect to munitions which exert their effect through kinetic energy. But first, a few general remarks on the altogether break-neck pace of development of KE munitions over the past 2 decades and the significance of this type of ammunition for the combat tank. Once more, armor technology needs to be referred to. Through the development of new armor, the armor-piercing capabilities of APDS (armor-piercing discarding sabot) ammunition, which was at one time designed primarily for penetrating armor, has been considerably reduced. This type of ammunition consists of spin-stabilized subcaliber projectiles having a relatively small relationship between length and diameter of the projectile (L/D ratio). To adapt to the gun caliber and to facilitate its passage through the tube, these projectiles possess a propellant cage which separates from the projectile after it leaves the tube.

Munitions technology responded to the above-named armor progress by developing so-called high-performance arrow projectiles. These are characterized by small diameters, that is to say, they are heavily subcalibrated, and by great length, in other words have a high L/D ratio, and are also equipped with a discarding sabot but of a different design than that of APDS ammunition. On the basis of the geometry of these projectiles, spin stabilization is not possible and they are, therefore, wing stabilized. For purposes of completeness, it should be said that arrow projectiles were already being worked on during World War II but for artillery purposes (Roechling projectile, Peenemuende arrow projectile).

The improvements and further developments with respect to effect at the target of this type of ammunition since its introduction are a good example of how deliberate measures can result in improving the firepower of available combat tanks without any noteworthy repercussions upon the system as a whole.

Thus, for example, the previously mentioned 105-mm combat tank gun can thank this new munitions technology for its still broad acceptance today.

The effect on targets by this type of projectile, briefly dubbed KE projectiles, is dependent on the following parameters:

- i. material and mass of the projectile penetrator,
- ii. characteristics of the penetrator material,
- iii. geometry and design of projectile and penetrator,
- iv. content of kinetic energy at the target.

The first three parameters of this listing are, once more, essentially munitions-immanent. And so, kinetic energy at the target remains as the parameter

for the influence of this weapon and is based on mass and target velocity of the projectile.

The following interrelationships exist: the kinetic energy of the projectile available at the target results from the kinetic energy of the projectile in the gun tube as it leaves the muzzle less the kinetic energy of the ballast such as the discarding sabot and the accelerated propulsion gases and the losses of kinetic energy of the projectile during the distance-dependent flight time as a result of air resistance. If the effect of a projectile in the target area is to be increased while maintaining projectile parameters, kinetic muzzle energy of the projectile in the gun tube must be raised by suitable means.

These measures can be illustrated (heavily simplified for purposes of depiction) on the basis of the following interrelationships, whereby these considerations could be equally applicable for purposes of developing a new conventional combat tank gun.

The energy content which can be made available by a weapon results from the following formula:

$$E_c = A \int p_x dx,$$

where E_c --muzzle energy of the projectile mass which has been accelerated in the tube;

A --effective area in the caliber section of the tube, in other words, caliber-dependent;


p_x --gas pressure along the projectile path in the tube;
 x --projectile path within the tube, in other words, a function of tube length.

This lists the parameters which can be varied. First, the caliber should remain constant.

With respect to the gas pressure parameter, the following interrelationships must be considered (as shown in the schematic of tube strength and gas pressure).

The areas beneath curves 1 through 4, in other words, the integral of $p_x dx$, represent a measure of the energy content under the listed conditions and are, thus, quite roughly said, also a yardstick for attainable muzzle velocity given the same projectile mass and the same caliber under varying conditions.

The area beneath curve 1 represents the maximum value that can be delivered by the weapon--in other words, primarily by the gun tube. However, this is without significance since a gas pressure course of this type is not producible. The curve represents the weapons-side top limit for gas pressures, the exceeding of which can lead to destruction of the gun tube. Curves 2 through 4 show typical gas pressure courses for a type of ammunition given different ammunition temperatures. In other words, there is a dependency with respect to the area beneath the curves and, thus, the muzzle velocity and the temperature of the ammunition.



Schematic diagram of gun tube strength and gas pressure courses of munition, given varying munition temperatures along the projectile path: 1--permissible pressure on the basis of tube length; 2--gas pressure at maximum munition temperature; 3--gas pressure at average munition temperature; 4--gas pressure at lowest munition temperature.

If a weapon and its KE ammunition are laid out with respect to the required effect at the target given the most frequently occurring temperature range as curve 3 (for purposes of consistency it should be curve 4) then the level of curve 2 represents a performance increase.

This results in two possibilities for increasing performance:

- i. raising the temperature of the ammunition to the highest permissible value. Prerequisites for this are closed ammunition compartments and appropriately designed heating and cooling facilities within the combat tank. This means additional weight and volume because masses of approximately 1,000 kg must be tempered. Also, the additional energy requirements are not insignificant, particularly if one considers that such tempering facilities in a fully munitioned combat tank must operate constantly. Consequently, the resupply operation would have to provide already tempered ammunition; possibly a temperature-controlled facility would be required at the depot. The cost of such measures is, thus, significant;
- ii. development of a propellant charge which would produce gas pressure courses which are essentially independent of temperature. In this case, the gas pressure must also be close to the permissible upper limit of the gun tube. A prerequisite here is that the propellant charge can produce an appropriate gas pressure on the basis of the available charge volume--in other words, without increases in the charge mass.

Both of these measures are, once more, not weapons-specific. Thus, we are left with the parameter "projectile path within the gun tube." To increase it means installing a longer tube. This is possible if the existing weapon is not fully utilizing the maximum characteristics of the stabilization facility and the mobility of the vehicle. For example, the gun tubes of the LEOPARD 1 (105 mm) and LEOPARD 2 (120 mm) are relatively short so that such a measure to increase performance is possible. From a systems point of view, because of

altered external ballistics, incursions into the fire control system and possibly into the regulator system of the stabilization facility are the result. What must also be considered is the load capacity of the recoil mechanism.

The final and not yet touched weapons-side parameter is the caliber. Here, two possibilities present themselves again: installation of an already available larger-caliber gun or development of a new weapon. The latter possibility is to be treated in the next segment. The possibility of raising the firepower of an existing combat tank by rearming it with a larger-caliber weapon was utilized generally with success in the past. An example is the rearming of the American M-48 combat tank from 90 mm to 105 mm, as well as the installation of the 120-mm gun in the M-1 ABRAMS. In the latter case, one cannot speak of a direct rearming: beginning with a specific date, the combat tank is being delivered with a 120-mm gun. While such a step results in the largest performance increment with respect to firepower and is not limited to improving the effect through KE ammunition, CE ammunition effect also benefits from increases in caliber. However, such a step represents a sizable incursion into the overall system. Because of the volume and scope, details are not the subject of this work but reference is made to the extreme case which would invoke the possibility of having to design a new turret.

New Armament--Conventional

The necessity to undertake new development of a combat tank gun arises if the listed possibilities to achieve performance increments in existing weapons as a response to an increased threat are not adequate. This can be the case both for an available combat tank as well as for a new combat vehicle, with the opportunities at the disposal of a weapons designer being considerably greater in the latter case, since he need not respect any extremely limiting given parameters. A new development can adapt completely to the required performance capabilities and should include adequate reserves for future performance increases.

The performance-determining parameters can, thus, be more strongly varied, with caliber being the primary consideration. The consequences of an increase in caliber have already been illustrated, but they become significantly more serious as a caliber of 120 mm is exceeded and result in certain inevitabilities. The use of cartridge-cased ammunition becomes barely possible, even in the presence of an automatic loader because the influence of length and volume of the ammunition has a detrimental effect on the overall design of a combat tank. In other words, the ammunition is to be separated. Since the individual components, in other words, the projectile and the propellant charge, also become heavy and unwieldy as a result of increases in caliber, relatively high reaction times for a second shot must be anticipated when a loader is loading the weapon. The opportunity, thus, offers itself to replace the loader with an automatic loading device, a move which offers the further advantage that the space in which the loader works and which must be particularly well protected, is eliminated and at least a portion of the additional volume requirements for weapon and munitions can be compensated for. Given the appropriate design of an automatic loading device, the problem of the correct allocation of propellant charge and projectile is also eliminated. On the other hand,

the need to quickly bring together two different ammunition components within the weapon places extremely high demands on a loading device which can result in great complexity, naturally making the reliability of this component of decisive significance.

This elaboration could suffice to indicate the difficulties which tank designers encounter as a result of increasing weapons caliber.

Combat Tank Gun Using Liquid as a Projectile Propellant

The turret of a combat tank or its hull contain numerous unutilized hollow spaces. If an arbitrarily deformable charge substance could be developed for a combat tank gun, the dilemma of requiring more volume as a result of an increase in caliber could be countered. For this purpose, dustlike or liquid charges would be suitable. Liquid charges are already known as missile propellants so that the investigation of the possibilities of their use in a gun is obvious. One can see from the international specialized literature that this has already occurred or is currently occurring. Basically, two different types of propellant charges offer themselves--namely, monergol propellants and diergol propellants. Monergols consist of one or more substances which are storable together and which convert themselves exothermically into gases upon ignition which can be used as propellant gases; for example, to propel a projectile through a gun tube. The diergols are two propellants--a fuel and an oxidizer--which are stored separately and are brought together, for example, inside a weapon. They can be hypergolic, that is to say, they can react on contact spontaneously, which can eliminate the need for an ignition system, or they must also be ignited.

Liquid propellants--the ability to utilize them in combat tank guns is assumed--offer a multitude of advantages in comparison to available solid propellants. The favorable stowability and the resulting volume reduction in terms of combat tanks has already been referred to. A higher charge density can be attained and they can, in terms of mass, be more than 30 percent richer in energy, at least in theory. Let us leave aside the extent to which this can be utilized. Various liquid propellants have a lower burning temperature, which can exert a positive influence upon gun tube wear and tear. Furthermore, they are said to be simpler and cheaper to manufacture than solid propellants.

The utilization of a liquid propellant assumes the completely new design of at least the breech of a weapon. Two differing technologies show promise as being usable--the normal or compact loading system and the regenerative injection system, as shown in the following sketches. In the compact loading system the propellant is fed into a load space behind the projectile and then ignited, whereas with the regenerative injection process, a differential piston injects the propellant or propellants from a charge space into a combustion chamber which expands during firing. The latter procedure would seem to be particularly well-suited, theoretically, for hypergolic diergol fuels. Once the conversion process in the combustion chamber has been initiated by ignition or hypergolity of the fuels, the resulting pressure difference in front of and in back of the differential piston can be utilized to propel it.

Through suitable design of the system, it could become possible to better utilize the gas pressure opportunities given by the gun tube--in other words, to bring the gas pressure curve generally closer to the gun tube strength curve, something which would mean higher muzzle velocities or it could mean building the same muzzle velocities more easily through a more uniform gas pressure course. This possibility results from feeding the propellant during firing--in other words, by giving the energy carrier a push from behind. This is not possible with solid fuels because, after the given propellant mass has been converted, no resupply can occur. Consequently, the gas pressure is reduced significantly, as of that instant, as a result of the growing combustion chamber which is caused by the movement of the projectile through the gun tube.

Specialized literature has provided proof of the feasibility of such a liquid propellant system for various calibers, but its successful conversion into a weapons system is not yet known. Also, with respect to the overall concept of a combat tank, some advantages can be noted through the use of liquid propellants:

- i. the design of an automatic loading device for projectiles is considerably simplified, since only one component of relatively light weight and small volume must be accommodated, as opposed to separate or even cartridge-cased conventional munitions;
- ii. liquid propellants can reduce the vulnerability of a combat tank, not only because of their better stowability but also because they are less vulnerable to enemy fire, particularly the diergol fuels which are stored far apart from each other;
- iii. in the combat compartment no cartridge cases accumulate;
- iv. if the volume diminution made possible by the use of liquid propellants is not completely utilized in the concept, the ammunition supply--that is to say, the number of projectiles--carried on board the vehicle can be increased;
- v. the dependence of the projectile muzzle velocity resulting from various propellant temperatures can be compensated for by proper dosing of propellant quantities--in other words, simplification of fire control.

The logistics environment also appears to be more favorable at first glance. However, a definitive answer in this regard can only be provided by a deeper analysis.

This slightly euphorically appearing account of the advantages in using liquid propellants must not lead to minimizing the problems which could result from the introduction of this system. Such a weapon will be considerably more complicated than the well-known conventional combat tank guns. In this regard, particular consideration must be given to the overall propellant feed from some kind of tanks, possibly using rotary fluid clutches, from the hull to the weapon. Additional lines, pumps, or intermediate containers, valves, etc., would have to be mounted in the combat tank. The pumps themselves can be a problem since, in order to achieve short second-round times, the propellant

must be fed to the weapon in the shortest possible time. Gasketing and possibly corrosion problems would have to be solved. Dosing must occur with extreme precision. The compatibility of the propellants with the most varied work materials remains to be examined, as does the question of the behavior of the propellants in the event of pollution or contamination. Particularly, the selection of suitable propellants having the least possible side effects can be of decisive significance.

Electromagnetic Acceleration as a Principle for a Combat Tank Gun?

Thus far, we have dealt with the givens of the most recent past, the present, and the doable of the immediate future. Development of a gun using liquid propulsion should be possible in the remaining years of this century. The extent to which, after weighing all advantages and disadvantages, it can, in the final analysis, be considered to be suitable for use in a combat tank is another question. Now, let us look far into the future and assume that, in order to combat future targets with kinetic energy munitions, extremely high muzzle velocities will be required. It is known that, on the basis of gas dynamics, there are limitations to the attainable muzzle velocity of the projectile, although these values vary considerably according to the theory on which they are based. But in practice, particularly in the environment of a combat tank gun, these values probably lie between 2,000 and 2,500 meters per second. If values in this range or greater are sought, one must seek other technologies to promote projectile acceleration.

One rule in electrotechnology states that a force is exerted on a current-carrying conductor within a magnetic field which is a function of current strength, conductor length, and magnetic induction. Attempts were made to utilize this fact as early as the beginning of this century to accelerate masses. From the 1940's, serious investigations are known with regard to trying to convert this principle to weapons technology use.

On the basis of an admittedly very strongly simplified calculation which is, however, adequate to provide a rough estimate, the following is an attempt to illustrate how this problem would be applicable to a combat tank gun.

A projectile having a mass of 8 kg and a caliber of 120 mm is to be accelerated in an accelerator which is 6.25 meters long to a muzzle velocity of 2,500 meters per second.


From these givens, the necessary acceleration force to sustain constant acceleration, the resulting necessary current strength, as well as the required energy and performance can be estimated. The following physical interrelationships are to be respected: acceleration force is mass times acceleration, in other words, $F = M \times a$, and acceleration time is derived from the acceleration distance (in other words, tube or acceleration length) divided by one-half the muzzle velocity which, in the present example, turns out to be 5 milliseconds. This means that the acceleration force along the acceleration path amounts to 4×10^6 newtons. The connection between force F and the parameters of current strength I , conductor length l , and magnetic induction B is roughly $F = I \times l \times B$. This can lead to calculations of the necessary current strength. The

projectile to be accelerated is represented by the conductor length, in other words, 0.12 meter and, in regard to the future, a magnetic induction of 20 T (Tesla) is assumed. If these values are worked through, a current strength of approximately 1.7 MA is derived. Muzzle energy amounts to 25 MJ, the performance per round is approximately 4.2×10^6 kw, with the degree of effect thus far not taken into consideration. The numerical values speak for themselves and the size of the error caused by the simplified assumptions is no longer significant.


The main problem is the provision of this enormous quantity of energy within the available time. The question arises whether it will ever be possible to produce the necessary energy directly within the short span of use time and within the environment of a combat tank interior, or whether stored energy will have to be resorted to. Can the energy requirement for a rapid second shot be stored or must the storage facility be newly charged in the interim which, compared to the actual firing time, is greater by a factor of 10^3 but, at 4 to 6 seconds, is still relatively short.

Very high current strength must be switched in extremely short time intervals, which constitutes a challenge to the switch designer. How do things look in this environment with respect to electromagnetic compatibility? In other words, there are many problem areas requiring solution before such a principle can be considered for use in a combat tank gun. The usability and doability of such a system as an acceleration system for projectilelike masses is beyond doubt, but the application area is surely still unclear and, for a combat tank, this means small volume and light weight for the accelerator and the energy supply. The extent to which these requirements are feasible must be shown by the future. For the combat tank designer, such a system would offer a whole series of advantages: the key words would be: no endangerment of the crew by propellants; no special protection requirement for this purpose; strong simplification of fire control on the basis of high muzzle velocities; no recoil forces of 40 to 60 tons to be transmitted, etc. In a further view, a combat vehicle becomes feasible which operates only with an electric energy supply.

To consider the possible application of technologies more closely--for example, is the catapult system as a type of accelerator better suited than an induction coil accelerator, can the necessary energy be provided by a battery or would better homopolar generators be used--would mean, given the current status of things, the undertaking of speculation. The specialized literature provides no indications in this area that anything usable is already available which could find application in a combat vehicle.



Principal sketch of a combat tank gun with liquid propellant drive--normal and compact loading system: T--propellant tank; P--feed pump; V--valve; Z--ignition system.



Principal sketch of a combat tank gun with liquid propulsion--regenerative injection system.

5911
CSO: 3620/148

MILITARY, CIVIL DEFENSE MEDICAL CARE DEFICIENCIES DEBATED

Bonn DIE BUNDESWEHR in German Nov 86 p 28

[Article: "Deficiencies in Medical Care"]

[Text] On September 25, the SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG published an interview with the Bundeswehr's former chief of staff in charge of medical and health care, chief general staff physician, Hansjoachim Linde, M.D. Alexander Szandar, Bonn correspondent for the SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, conducted the interview.

The statements in the SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG dealt first of all with the possible medical care situation in the event of war, a topic which the German Bundeswehr association (DBwV) had intentionally not included in comments to date in its own criticism. The statements by the former chief of staff on the then current medical care situation in peacetime confirm in part the criticism of the DBwV, particularly when he addresses the problems of "aggravation among the troops" and the still critical situation with regard to personnel, as well as the lack of "military experience" on the part of young physician draftees. This also applies to the long distances (up to 300 km) to Bundeswehr hospitals criticized by the DBwV. The new chief of staff in charge of medical and health care, chief general staff physician Dr Voss, and the DBwV agree that these recognized deficiencies in medical care can only be eliminated through joint efforts and that this requires the support of those in positions of political responsibility. Below, in its entirety, is the article entitled, "Armaments Enjoyed Priority--Care of Wounded During Wartime Was Long Neglected."

When chief general staff physician, Hansjoachim Linde, described the situation to the defense committee shortly after taking office as Bundeswehr chief of staff for medical and health care in 1982, committee chairman Alfred Biehle spoke of the "most frightening report ever presented to me." For years medical services have been treated like a stepchild in the military. Weapons systems--tanks, aircraft, ships--had priority.

Bundeswehr ambulances were sometimes older than the drivers and medics. The other equipment was also in large part outdated. Reserves of medicines for wartime use--as Linde recalled--had been "depleted by 40 percent" because there was no money to purchase new medicine. The Bundeswehr's economic plan for the period up to 1997, which was drawn up in the fall of 1984, observed

dryly that medical service was "currently not in a position to provide wartime wounded with adequate care."

In the meantime, says Linde, who is relinquishing his post on October 1 to Claus Voss who has been his deputy up to now, thanks to the support of legislators from the coalition and the SPD opposition party "the stepchild has been helped to his feet." Budgetary appropriations for medicines and medical equipment have doubled since 1982; 100 percent of the requests for materiel by the medical service were included in Bundeswehr planning, while not all the wishes of the army, air force and navy were met. Nevertheless, according to Linde, it will still take some years before all "necessary items" are acquired for ensuring that in the event of a war, 194,000 military hospital beds--as planned--will be available. Currently, the equipment for about 50,000 beds for the wounded is still lacking.

Aggravation Among the Troops

Compared to the protection offered the civilian population, however, the armed forces are in a relatively good position. In the area of civil defense, complained Linde, things were still at the level of the early 1970's. This means that there are only sufficient supplies to care for 400,000 patients for just two weeks. "Experiences in all hostile actions in the recent past have taught us, however, that the numbers of civilian wounded are more seriously affected than the military wounded," the military doctor warned. "But the soldier will not fight if he knows that his family is unprotected" [published in boldface].

Therefore Linde reinforced his appeal to the legislature to finally adopt a civil defense law which would govern civilian/military cooperation in the health sector, permit improved care and--for the armed forces as well--produce binding planning principles. There is already an agreement with the interior, social and family ministries whereby 11 percent of all German (male) doctors can be called up to the Bundeswehr during wartime. However, there are no provisions for "compiling" in files--let alone "planning for"--the operating room, anesthesia or x-ray nurses, without which a military hospital cannot function.

But personnel problems create difficulty for the medical service even in peacetime. In some of the 12 Bundeswehr hospitals the intensive care wards cannot be fully utilized because there are not enough nurses. At the new hospital in Ulm, where each of the 630 beds cost half a million marks, three complete wards have been closed for years for this very reason. However, the lack of nurses, according to Linde, is "not a question of supply." There are enough new nurses, but the budgetary funds are lacking to fill all of the planned positions which exist "on paper." The medical service is nearly as large as the West German navy. It has--on paper--34,100 employees, about 8,500 of them civilians--nurses, female medical assistants, nurses aides. In the event of war, 128,000 soldiers and 48,000 civil servants (18,000 of them registered nurses) will care for the wounded.

Linde referred to "aggravation among the troops" with regard to the care provided by physicians. The Bundeswehr has over 2,260 physicians. Of that

number just under 70 are "female medical officers" (up to now the only "women in uniform"). At present 60 percent of the physicians are draftees serving a 15-month tour of duty who are sent--following a brief orientation--to military bases without any kind of "military experience." The rapid turnover led to a situation where a trusting relationship between doctor and patient was scarcely possible and continuity of treatment was not always ensured.

Medical Tourism

Uncertainty among the young doctors in (a captain's) uniform led to a situation--denounced by SPD delegate Walter Kolbow in the spring--in which the doctors are sometimes thought of as mere "consultants" and the troop commanders made the decisions as to "fit for duty or not." The result was complaints to the defense deputy and massive criticism by the Bundeswehr association. The association--in the most recent edition of its official publication--expressed doubt as to whether the military department would fulfill its promise to decrease the percentage of physician draftees to 10 percent by 1990. Experiences to date were not encouraging.

Linde, on the other hand, is optimistic. According to him there are currently 1,130 cadets who, following regular officer's training, have obligated themselves for military careers or at least 16 years of service in the Bundeswehr and who are completing "their studies as medical students being well paid by the taxpayer." This made it possible, he went on, to increase the number of long-term and career soldiers in medical service by 160 doctors per year. In the meantime, the physician draftees would be given "command assistance" to help them to deal with troop commanders.

Linde also reported "understanding" for complaints about "medical service tourism." What is meant is a directive that soldiers be transported to Bundeswehr hospitals up to 300 km from their duty station for in-patient treatment as long as their stay is expected to last less than three weeks. Only in the case of longer hospital stays or in emergency cases may soldiers "for reasons of social hardship" be sent to the nearest "civilian" hospital. Linde understands the hardship which a long, often inconvenient trip can mean for family members; therefore he is urging a "generous" reserve of travel aid for visiting the sick. On the other hand, however, the minister of finance and the federal auditor general are demanding adequate "utilization" of Bundeswehr "facilities."

Malpractice Suits

Overall the medical service of the Bundeswehr is better than its reputation would indicate, said Linde. After all, approximately two million soldiers are examined by troop doctors annually, 450,000 receive dental treatment and 80,000 in-patient treatment. Compared to those figures--as in 1985--223 reports to the defense deputy and a dozen "malpractice suits" were a negligible percentage, "although any such case is one case too many."

12552
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ARMED FORCES CHIEF COMMENTS ON LAPLAND BUILDUP

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Jan 87 pp 12-13

[Article by Thorkild Dahl: "Finland Strengthening Defense in Lapland"]

[Text] Finland's foreign policy is characterized first and foremost by the desire to stay outside the Great Powers' conflicts of interests. But its determination for self-defense is strong. The center of gravity is in Lapland, where both Soviet and American interests come into play.

"It is obvious that the Nordic region is the object of greater strategic interest now than previously. Tensions are relatively low in the area, however, compared with other parts of Europe, and there is no reason to think that this situation will change in the foreseeable future."

Finland's Foreign Affairs Minister Paavo Vayrynen of the liberal Center Party outlines the external circumstances for his country's neutrality policy. The political debate concerning the changed circumstances, with the Soviet Union's increased military buildup in the north and the USA's increased interest in being present in the area, has only just begun in Finland, but Finland has adopted a new strategy militarily.

"In order for the North to remain stable, Lapland can no more than the rest of Finland be cut off in its entirety from the military. Therefore, we would be wise to maintain in North Finland, for example, by and large just as large forces as our neighbors in Sweden and Norway have in the north," the foreign affairs minister believes.

Friends and Foes

Finland's foreign policy is still based to a large extent on the lines the late President Urho Kekkonen marked out over decades as the head of his country. Kekkonen's guide for Finland's foreign policy was that "it is not good foreign policy to be an enemy of your neighbors and a friend of far-off countries."

Foreign Affairs Minister Paavo Vayrynen points out that Finland's foreign policy today is characterized first and foremost by "our desire to remain outside the Great Powers' conflicts of interests."

"Finland came out of the world war a disabled nation, but its political institutions remained unaffected, and its democratic foundation was never in danger," Foreign Affairs Minister Paavo Vayrynen believes.

Finland's policy of neutrality is to be viewed in light of its experiences in 1939-40 and its relations with the Soviet Union, with, among other things, the VSB [not further identified] cooperation agreement of 1948. Finland is a little country with a big neighbor. They are two different systems, but it is possible to live together.

Strong Fighting Spirit

The concept of Finlandization is often used derogatorily internationally, but the concept is placed in another framework by a source in the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

"Finlandization--we get furious, for it means that a country has given up its own to a big neighbor. Finland has completely changed in 1987. We are not only free, but have also gotten a foreign policy developed and a Scandinavian democratic model," the source says.

A prominent foreign policy expert in the Social Democratic Party, Abo University Professor Allan Rosas, also calls attention to Finland's neutrality policy and fighting spirit.

"There is a strong fighting spirit in Finland; a fight for our neutrality and independence. Finland's armed forces must be strong, through compulsory military service, among other things; but we cannot advocate an arms level like Sweden's."

"It is not a Social Democratic desire to have strongly increased defense expenditures. We could do more, but would not get so much out of it. Therefore, we want to concentrate more on the political," says Professor Allan Rosas, who is a prominent adviser to the Social Democratic chairman and Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa.

"We have a strong Lapland because the center of gravity is up there. We are familiar with the Soviet buildup on the Kola Peninsula and with the submarines, and we are familiar with the USA's offensive strategy of fighting the Soviet Union's submarines as close to the Soviet Union as possible. It is a development we do not like. It is important to reverse it," the professor says.

Disturbing Development

Attempts in political quarters to get something going was the general subject of President Mauno Kaoivisto's speech in the fall to the Paasikivi Society in Helsinki.

The president went into both the Soviet buildup on the Kola Peninsula and the USA's naval buildup and accordingly suggested that "confidence-building steps,

which first and foremost relate to the ocean areas and the airspace above, as well as naval activity, ought to be discussed in the Nordic countries above all."

Member of Parliament Esko Aho of the liberal Center Party says that "we are very troubled by developments in the Norwegian Sea," and accentuates the president's initiative regarding new proposals for the ocean areas in the north, while at the same time calling attention to the efforts to establish a nuclear-free zone in the North.

"We think that the entire North can do something about the security policy situation. We have lived with Kekkonen's zone proposal since 1963. In the beginning it was just Finland that supported the idea. Interest was low in the other countries. Sweden is actively involved now, and the debate is going in a positive direction in Denmark and Norway. But we accept the fact that Denmark's and Norway's governments are critical and have not yet joined in," says Esko Aho, who adds, however, that "it should not be so hard for Denmark and Norway to join us."

Professor Rosas of the Social Democratic Party says that a Nordic nuclear-free zone is not an all or nothing.

"It has been an ongoing debate, and now it is being debated some more. In the 60's Sweden itself debated whether it should have nuclear weapons," Allan Rosas says.

Lapland in Strong Hands

There is broad political support for Finland's having a strong defense as an element of its neutrality policy. A diplomat expresses it thus: that the Finns are neutral but certainly not neutralist.

The armed forces chief of staff, Vice-Admiral Jan Klenberg, points out that Finland comes into contact with world strategy systems in the north and that "Finland lies between the Soviet Union and the NATO country of Norway in the North Cap."

"If Finland does not look after its territory, it can be used. Therefore we must show with strength that we hold our part of Lapland in our hands," the vice-admiral says.

"There is a clear distinction between the south and north. Historically, the forces have been in the south, where the people are. In recent years we have had to buildup defenses in the north. We now have forces in the north. There are new bases with Draken [Dragon] planes and a relatively strong border guard, which here in Finland comes under the Ministry of the Interior," Jan Klenberg says, and adds that "we can move quickly from south to north."

Ninety percent of a year group's young men are called up, and determination for defense is tops. But a draftee's pay is not, and the quartering can only be called Spartan. But Finland's armed forces are not built up from the barracks either, but from small units which, should the situation arise, will

disperse into guerilla groups where, for one thing, dogs will be messengers between groups.

Finland can mobilize 700,000 ablebodied men, and, in comparison, Denmark, with a larger population, can muster about 162,000 men with the Home Guard included.

Finland's military expenditures are lower than Denmark's on a per inhabitant basis, but its economic growth rate has now been placed at 3.8 percent after inflation. And Vice-Admiral Jan Klenberg points out that Finland with its low pay for draftees receives considerably more than other countries for the procurement of materiel.

"Finland functions very well militarily between East and West. We take our job seriously. Finland will defend itself against an enemy wherever he comes from," says Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Vice-Admiral Jan Klenberg.

8831
CSO: 3613/45

GOVERNMENT DENIES DIFFICULTIES ON ARTEMIS SYSTEM

Athens I AVGI in Greek 19 Feb 87 p 5

[Text] The government has not met with any difficulties regarding the "Artemis-30" and is creating a totally different image of the development and progress of this air defense system than the one emerging from the events of the last few days.

This was the meaning of the statements made yesterday by the deputy prime minister and minister of defense, G. Kharalambopoulos, who maintained that "the program is progressing according to schedule" and that "the EVO [Greek Arms Industry] will fulfill the obligations toward the government on the basis of the agreements."

Abandoning the silence maintained by the government for some days, the deputy prime minister assured that the information concerning the abandonment of the "Artemis" in favor of the Swiss-made "Erlicon" "is untrue" and said: "In our view, the issue has been settled. We are not choosing foreign systems. In the future, our air defense system will be produced in our country on the basis of the "Artemis."

Nevertheless, even the manufacture of the first series of the "Artemis" must not be awaited in the immediate future, before the tests of the prototype are completed for delivery to the armed forces at the end of April. These systems, which will not be completed, will be tested by the army and only then will the procedure for their mass production begin, when all the tests are completed.

In answer to a question by our reporter regarding the nature of those tests to be carried out by the army, Mr Kharalambopoulos clarified that the tests aim at defining the level at which the system will fulfill the requirements that have been set. At the same time, however, he did not specify the course of action that will be taken if these requirements are not fulfilled, and he did not mention whether EVO representatives will be present during those tests, as is normally the case.

/12913
CSO: 3521/95

BRIEFS

PYRKAL ARMS EXPORTS ALLEGED--In spite of its repeated denials, the government is massively exporting up-to-date weapons systems and ammunition to Iraq and Iran through the PYRKAL company. This denunciation was made in an interpellation by ND deputies V. Stathopoulos, Kh. Katsigiannis, D. Khondrokoukis and Th. Anagnostopoulos, and is supported by press reports. The interpellation also mentions that tens of large trucks loaded with 105-mm grenades manufactured by the PYRKAL are put aboard commercial ships at an isolated location in Pakhi, with Iraq the final destination. Also, 20,000 anti-tank rockets and their launchers, manufactured according to the latest technology, are imported from Norway, assembled by the PYRKAL and then sent to North Korea, from where they end up in the hands of the Iranians. The ND deputies are expressing surprise at the motives for such transactions and at the criteria used by the government for such decisions, considering that the two sides in the conflict have turned it into a kind of genocide. [Excerpts] [Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 7 Mar 87 p 2] /12913

CSO: 3521/95

TANK BATTALION TESTS NEW COMBINED GROUND ARMS TEAM CONCEPT

The Hague LEGERKOERIER in Dutch Jan 87 pp 4-7

[Article by Ineke Hooiveld: "Eifelstag III [Eifel Battle III]: 59th Tank Battalion Tests New Doctrine"]

[Text] "Hey, this is the enemy!" In sleepy surprise the soldier realizes that it is indeed the enemy standing at the rear door of his vehicle. He blinks as a fierce beam of light crisscrosses the small space. It is pitch dark outside, and it slowly penetrates his brain that the war does not stop at dusk. A scene from Eifelstag III at the end of last year. A tank serving as temporary housing, night reconnaissance, and hours of waiting. It is all part of it.

Clearly still savoring the memory, Major H. R. Noordhoek, commander of the enemy units, recounts the opponent's surprise. Such incidents are in fact a welcome diversion for him and his men, because for them the course of the "third battle" in the Eifel Region has already been determined. "The exercise command keeps us on a pretty tight leash. They want to see to it that we don't fight a little war of our own. After all, we're really only here for the sake of the battalion that's on exercise. It's all got to be as realistic as possible," Noordhoek explains.

In November a large portion of the 12th Mechanized Infantry Brigade was in the Federal Republic of Germany. It was there that the exercise Eifelstag III was held, in an area roughly 25 km east of the point where Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany meet, and about 70 km south of Cologne.

The main objective was to train the 59th Tank Battalion. Worked in with this were several smaller exercises for logistical and support units. In addition, parts of the brigade acted as the enemy.

Peacetime Restrictions

The presence of Netherlands soldiers strikes a dissonant note in the magnificent Eifel landscape. The leaves are still at the height of their color, and appear even brighter in the autumn sun. No wonder this area is very popular with tourists. However, it also seems to be a favorite with military units of various nationalities: Eifelstag III is the 77th exercise

this year in this area. The villagers appear to realize the necessity of exercises, however, and turn out to be very friendly.

Because this part of Germany is the scene of so many exercises, peacetime restrictions are very carefully observed. Consequently, the exercise takes place primarily on the roads. So as not to wake the German civilians up too much, no operations take place at night. We have seen, however, that the phrase "night operations" is interpreted in various ways.

Hibernation

We come upon a platoon of the 59th Tank Battalion camped close to the village of Fleringen. The men have been searching for hours for enemy units in the hills opposite. Suddenly, everything seems to come at once. "Gas-gas-gas," comes the alert through tank commander G. W. Hasselbach's head phone. He calmly takes a last look around and slides quickly down into his tank. The hatches close with a dull groan. From outside it looks as though the crew is preparing for hibernation. In reality, the crew is hard at work inside the cramped quarters of the tank. Through the head phone an unceasing stream of codes, commands, and phrases attacks the eardrum. The sudden warning of an enemy vehicle is almost lost in the crackle and noise. It is a royal tumult, and having to talk with a gas mask on just makes it that much more complicated. The driver pays no heed to the uproar and attempts to take a nap. The hussar, who has been given the job of loader, also has nothing to do. The gunner and the tank commander have thrown themselves completely into the battle, however.

Hussar H. Mannesen tells us what it is like to serve temporarily in a Leopard I-V. First, however, he wants to clear up a small misunderstanding: "Everybody always thinks that we sleep in a tent, but that's not right at all. We sleep on top of the tank here. On the flat part where the motor is. That stays warm 24 hours a day, so... [Ellipses as in original.] If it rains, of course, we rig up a canvas." The weather conditions, by the way, are exceptionally good. Other years there has been a deep layer of snow, but now it is dry, and the sun even appears from time to time. "We got here yesterday," Mannesen goes on. "First we scouted the place from house to house. After that we camped in the woods but didn't have anything to do there. The enemy didn't show up. But now...," he says carelessly and points to the wall of the tank, on the other side of which he supposes is the enemy. I really don't have anything to do here. I do cook for the men though, and that's something to keep me busy." The tank crew has to provide its own food. A supply of food, pans, and a stove all go along with them. What kinds of things are on the menu? Fried rice, beans with applesauce, and, of course, hamburgers. Sergeant Hasselbach later describes the "cook" as "the king of the kitchen," which says it all.

New Approach

In Eifelstag III the 59th Tank Battalion's performance attracts the most attention. At the 12th Mechanized Infantry Brigade's command post, Lieutenant Colonel C. P. P. Donia describes the relatively new approach: "We now work with four teams. Each team consists of two tank platoons, an infantry

platoon, and a mechanized antitank platoon. The various units are much closely involved with one another than in the past." According to Brigadier General A. K. Van der Vlis, brigade commander and exercise leader, this structure demands a heavy dose of organizational talent. For that matter, the participants themselves find it takes some getting used to. In order to get the cooperation between the various platoons of each team off to as good a start as possible, the units of each team spent a weekend together in the field. Exercise leader Van der Vlis: "They didn't know each other, so we chose this method to let them get acquainted in advance. With this new approach it's absolutely necessary for the men to work well together and learn from one another. That's why we hoped they would start to get to know each other over the weekend."

Later, in the field, nobody has a bad word to say about that get-acquainted period. Some bon vivants do wonder, however, why that weekend had to be spent in the middle of the forest, so far from (the bright lights of) civilization.

Rivalry

The commanders of the various teams found things very different. An unmistakable cavalry captain, for instance, said that he had suddenly been called upon to command infantry. An infantry captain had the opposite experience: he had cavalry under him.

Even so, one team commander, Cavalry Captain A. J. Petter, did not have much problem adjusting. "I really liked this form of organization. Naturally, it demands a much broader knowledge of what each of us does. We're a bit more used to tanks, but I have to be able to think equally well how to make the best use of the infantry. I just talk it over with my men," Petter admits frankly. The captain says that the team approach has clear advantages: "It makes a much more well-rounded unit. Before, you were rather limited in your movements, but now I have the resources to do something about that." And what about the age-old "rivalry" between cavalry and infantry? Petter: "In the past I think that was mainly due to the fact that we weren't aware of what each of us did. Now we realize that we're both equally valuable."

Infantry Captain P. G. H. Lenders, the commander of another team, says much the same thing. "In commanding, you have to remember that you're much more mobile, because you've got those tank platoons. You advance more quickly," according to Lenders. The captain says that the manpower shortage is a disadvantage which increases vulnerability.

Logistical support is the biggest problem with the team approach. For instance, the support groups are still not well prepared to deal with the variety of vehicles and equipment. They still need to tinker a bit with the list of what goes into the spare parts package. Then troops in the field will not have to wait so long for repairs.

Not Very Gently

That it takes a long time to get "repairs" carried out is nothing new for the "victims." Just outside the village of Oos three wretchedly bandaged men are

waiting for help. Their eyes light up with hope when they make out a vehicle with the red cross emblem in the distance. The ambulance turns out to be full, however, and drives by without taking pity on them. The men's position becomes very embarrassing a bit later when the rumor circulates that the troops have to move on, because the enemy is too close on their heels. The sudden appearance of a smoke screen in the hills farther on is proof that the tank platoons are indeed retreating. Lieutenant M. M. M. Pallada of the 12th Medical Company is clearly having a fine time. "I don't even have to get them excited, they're doing it themselves," he shouts with pleasure.

The wounded are then quickly, but not very gently lashed on to the tank by their comrades. A pretty vulnerable position, but still better than the doubtful pleasure of being picked up by the enemy. Or of being laid against a churchyard wall to wait for further transport, like some colleagues in Wallersheim.

Step by Step

As the tanks drive off one by one at high speed, a post gets knocked down. For that matter, a number of other things have been knocked down too. According to General Van der Vlis, the damage has been kept within acceptable limits. Elsewhere in the field, damage commissioner Lieutenant Colonel P. F. Enzerink confirms that fully: "These guys know exactly what they're doing; the local people will be happy to have them come back again." Van der Vlis was also pleased with the results of the exercise. "My intention is for the units to follow the doctrine step by step. I don't think it's so bad if that takes a little more time," he comments. Major General J. Tiassens, commander 1st Division "7 December," said he was "extremely impressed" on his visit to Eifelslag III. More praise came from another high-ranking guest, Lieutenant General M. J. Wilminck, commander I Army Corps. His opinion of the "teething troubles" of the four team doctrine is a sober one: "If there were no problems, we wouldn't need to train. Everybody needs to learn. That's what it's all about."

12593
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ARMY'S MOBILIZATION SYSTEM ACHIEVES HIGH EFFICIENCY

The Hague LEGERKOERIER in Dutch Jan 87 pp 18-21

[Article by J. Janssen Lok: "The Dutch Mobilization System: The Army Shows Its Strength"]

[Text] "It is twelve o'clock, radio news service brought to you by the ANP. After this news transmission, there will be a report from the Ministry of Defense concerning the mobilization/call-up exercise Thunderclap. But first the news..." The radio speakers in hundreds of thousands of living rooms, offices, work places, and cars passed on the same message. In the last week of November, the Netherlands was under the spell of Thunderclap. Bustle at some Dutch Railways stations, lines on the A-28 between Meppel and Zwolle, and an abundance of publicity accompanied the largest mobilization exercise in years. A full brigade of the 1st Army Corps, the 43rd Armored Infantry Brigade, was brought up to battle strength within 24 hours. To make this possible, 1,882 soldiers on short-term and extended leave had to leave hearth and home in all haste to speed to their mobilization destination.

According to Colonel J. C. Kosters, head of the mobilization preparation division of the National Territorial Command in Gouda and the Army Staff's staff officer for mobilization affairs in The Hague, the exercise demonstrated that the Dutch mobilization system works excellently.

"The turn-out/notification percentage of all brigade units was very good. The 42nd Tank Battalion, which had to be fully mobilized, achieved 95 percent. The total percentage for the entire brigade was 96 percent of battle strength. Of the 1,881 men we called up, 45 did not respond for reasons unknown. The Royal Mounted Constabulary has been called in to investigate this."

Three Phases

In peacetime, three-quarters of the Royal ground forces can be mobilized. Even a good 60 percent of the 1st Army Corps, our land forces contribution to NATO, does not exist in a state of readiness. This need not lead to serious problems, according to Colonel Kosters: "We can afford this because we exploit the advantages of our small and developed country to the maximum. For the Netherlands is of small population, viewed geographically, and has an extensive and dense network of roads, a good public transport system,

excellent telephone and telex connections, and a high-density radio and television audience." How then does the Dutch mobilization system work? Colonel Kosters: "Our mobilization plan is set up such that a peacetime organization can be changed to a wartime organization in a rapid and efficient manner. The plan is divided into three phases, in order to be able to direct and control the mobilization. The three phases are approximately equal in the number of personnel, and each comprises some 50,000 men. In total, a good 150,000 men are involved in a mobilization. In principle, there are 24 hours between the starting times of the three phases. On the one hand, this interval is needed to avoid having successively called-up units running into each other in or near the mobilization complexes. On the other hand, this spacing gives the government time for a closer analysis of the international political and military situation. It might be that the war threat is averted simply by starting to mobilize the armed forces. In this manner, one makes very clear that one is seriously ready to go into action. The mobilization scheme thus is not fixed or rigid. It is even conceivable and possible the mobilization will be temporarily or permanently stopped after a certain phase, or that there will be a return to a peacetime situation."

Warning Phase

Before the first phase of mobilization--which mainly involves bringing the 1st Army Corps up to strength--begins, the government has another opportunity for crisis control: the warning phase. Here, the following measures for increasing readiness can be taken. Personnel on short-term leave are recalled to the ready units of which they continually remain members. This is a matter of approximately 5,500 men. The Minister of Defense can decide this himself. A second step can be sending part of the career personnel to the mobilization destination and activating the National Reserve Corps. The National Reserve is a corps of some 5,500 volunteers that fills an important role in securing the mobilization complexes, traffic junctions, train stations and other key positions.

Is the Dutch mobilization plan coupled to NATO's alarm system? Colonel Kosters: "There is, the 'NATO Formal Alert System', but given that the Netherlands is a sovereign state and self-determined there is no fixed connection to that system. Naturally, deliberations within NATO constitute an important factor in our national decision process."

In a real mobilization, just as was practiced in Thunderclap, large numbers of demobilized soldiers would be called up to travel to their mobilization destination. By public transportation, in uniform, with personal military equipment in their kit bags to the destination station given in their orders. From that station, the called-up soldiers are transported to a mobilization center.

"Such a mobilization center can be anything," explains Colonel Kosters. "A community center, a hall complex, an empty factory hall or whatever. But the unit only remains there for a short time, not longer than two meals. Next, such a unit has to collect its material from the mobilization complex itself. As a rule, that is not very far from the mobilization center. As

soon as a unit is completely loaded and everyone has his personal weapon with ammunition, then it is transferred to the regional commandant. He takes charge of movement to the area of operations or the waiting area. It is important that a unit remain [Editor's note: words missing] in a mobilization complex for as short a time as possible. First, because otherwise other units will be hindered; second, of course, because the mobilization complexes are vulnerable to possible sudden air attacks."

Not all the materiel for the mobilization units is in the mobilization complexes. A lot of things are being used in training units. In a mobilization, however, the training centers are closed. The 'delayed materiel' thus has to be delivered to the mobilization complexes or units for which it is destined. For example, training tanks at the Cavalry Training Center in Amersfoort undergo a radical operation (training turrets off, battle turrets on) and then go to a mobilization destination. Once every 3 years, this procedure is practiced in the Crossing exercise. The last Crossing was held at the beginning of last year, and--apart from much smaller material--Landrovers, 4-ton trucks, M-109A2 artillery pieces, and Leopard IV tanks were involved.

Preparation for a mobilization demands a horrible amount of work, in which the computers of Central Personnel's Information Service play an important role. The more than 150,000 servicemen on extended leave are classified with the aid of this central personnel administration. In the process, an effort is made to keep as many men as possible with each other who served together in a given unit.

Team Relationship

Colonel Kosters: "The team relationship is extremely important to a unit. That was demonstrated at the last Thunderclap exercise by the squadrons of the mobilizable 42nd Tank Battalion. The squadrons that still had the same composition as during their ready time performed excellently in an examination of the abilities that they still possessed. On the other hand, in the newly formed Delta squadron, where none of the men knew each other, they had quite a bit of trouble getting used to each other for the first few hours. Since the team relationship is so important, we have the RIM [Directly Reporting Mobilizable] system in the Netherlands: After the end of the short-term leave period, the units can be made RIM. In principle, the RIM 'daughter' unit is filled from a ready 'mother' unit. Take an armored infantry battalion as an example. At the end of the short-term period, the drafted personnel from the mother unit are transferred to the mobilizable daughter unit. A core of career personnel, who come from specific peacetime functions (for example, a training unit) and who, moreover, have all had recent experience in a similar ready function, is added to this. Since the companies report at certain intervals because of the draft system, the companies are also discharged to the RIM daughter at certain intervals. After the initial 4 months of training, the ready time follows. At the end of the short-term leave period, the personnel of, for example, the Alpha company of the ready battalion change over to the Alpha company of the RIM daughter battalion. Thus, the old personnel of that RIM company become free and go, for example,

to the Mobile Columns Corps or other units. This because it is not possible to fill all mobilizable units following the RIM system, since the mobilizable strength is greater than the ready strength. In this way, enlisted men and corporals remain in the mobilization system until they are 35, sergeants until they are 40, and reserve officers until they are 45. The units that do not have RIM status--and so do not have any firm team relationships--are brought up to and kept at the desired level with, among other things, review exercises," says Colonel Kosters.

Good Results

The Dutch mobilization system seems to work well during the Thunderclap and Crossing exercises. Especially at the last Thunderclap, the largest in history, the results were good. Colonel Kosters: "The ready and short-term-leave units were ready for action within 8 hours, that is Tuesday afternoon, 25 November, around 1 or 2 p.m. The battle squadrons of the RIM tank battalion were ready around midnight, while the staff supply squadron was ready at 5 a.m. Wednesday. A real mobilization would have gone even quicker, since the peacetime registration would be left out. While loading the units, in the process of which hundreds of tons of live ammunition were distributed, not a single accident or safety incident occurred."

The army has been mobilized three times in the history of the Netherlands: In 1870, 1914, and in 1939. All three times, the mobilization went quickly and nearly without problems. With regular exercises in the Thunderclap/Crossing series, it seems that a possible fourth mobilization could go according to plan. The risk that there is not enough time for such a mobilization in face of a sudden surprise attack seems small. The mobilization planners expect that rising international tensions will give a sufficient warning period.

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NEW FOLDING BRIDGE ENTERS SERVICE WITH 1ST CORPS ENGINEERS

The Hague LEGERKOERIER in Dutch Jan 87 pp 28-31

[Article by Ellen Eggink under the "Unit of the Month" rubric: "105th Folding Bridge Company. 'Speed Through Simplicity'"]

[Text] He says with a grin: "They think we're just a gang of construction workers." Major K. Jonk, commander 105th Folding Bridge Company, draws with pleasure on his pipe and notes with satisfaction that they do not mince words in his company. That sometimes strikes other army personnel as crude. "You change too. You get cruder. But, well, we understand each other, and that's what it's all about."

As of 1 January the 105th Pontoon Sheet Bridge Company no longer exists. With the introduction of the "ribbon bridge," the unit has been given a new name: Folding Bridge Company. It is not the first time this unit has changed its name with the introduction of new equipment. Before 1962 it was known as the Pontoon Deck Layer Bridge Company. Major Jonk's gang is the only active-duty bridge company in I Army Corps and falls under the 101st Engineers Combat Group.

A folding bridge platoon is practising on the IJssel River. In the miserable weather that seems to go with engineers exercises, they are pushing the bridge sections against one another. They work practically in silence. The only sound is the monotonous drone of the pusher boats. No hammer is used on the folding bridge. There is only one place where human hands make use of a tool. Because otherwise they cannot get at it. "Laying a folding bridge is a very different experience. Before, it was like an anthill. People running every which way, doing this, doing that. Now it's rare to see somebody running," says Major Jonk. He adds that his company has no reason to complain about the army's interest in this new method of bridge building.

The date of I Army Corps' conversion to the new bridge system depended on the arrival of the Netherlands vehicles and pusher boats used with the folding bridge. The bridge sections were manufactured in the United States and have been in Stroe, ready for use, for several years.

The DAF firm developed the YGZ-2300 as part of the Royal Army's project to completely replace all its heavy wheeled vehicles. The advantage of the truck

is that it can carry both the bridge sections and the pusher boats. The boats have to meet special demands in terms of pushing power and maneuverability. "On every exercise in northern Germany we come up against the Weser River. The speed of the stream can be as high as 2.5 meters per second," Major Jonk says, explaining the decision not to purchase the American pusher boats. The development of the pusher boats was carried out by the Maritime Research Institute Netherlands (MARIN) and specialists from the Royal Navy. Damen Shipyards in Gorkum built the boats. The material arrived in summer 1986. First at the Engineers Training Center, then at the 105th.

Simple

Speed through simplicity is the folding bridge's magic formula. The company commander clearly enjoys the effect he achieves when he says how fast the folding bridge is in comparison with its predecessor. "A pontoon sheet bridge of 100-150 meters would take us about 6 hours. Now--when everybody has learned his job--it'll be just over 1 hour. Compared to the pontoon sheet bridge, this bridge makes it possible for the tactical commander to wait longer during combat before deciding where the bridge should go. With the pontoon sheet bridge he had to make that decision a good day in advance. The chance that the location chosen will be the optimal one in the given combat conditions is greater with the folding bridge. Furthermore, the tactical commander naturally wants to get as many vehicles as possible across the bridge in as short a time as possible, because the concentration of vehicles makes him vulnerable. A bridge that can be laid quickly here and then again there is a big advantage for him."

"I do have to add that the speed of construction depends very much on the accessibility of the river bank. I think the folding bridge is a bridge for today, a natural part of mobile combat. The pontoon sheet bridge was simply obsolete, not least in a technical sense. I think that with the introduction of this new bridge we've caught up again," Major Jonk says. Even so, the speed with which the bridge can be laid sometimes has to be tempered. The folding bridge is made of aluminum and therefore is more vulnerable than its predecessor. "It's worth taking a little longer in order to be careful," says the company commander. The question that immediately comes to the mind of a tactical commander is "How much longer?" to which Major Jonk replies, "Well, say, 10 minutes."

Private/Folding Bridge

With the introduction of the new bridge system, the 105th Folding Bridge Company has been reinforced. Whereas a pontoon sheet bridge platoon consisted of 35 men and 17 vehicles, a folding bridge platoon has 52 men and 24 vehicles. In wartime the company has an additional 100 men. The reason for the personnel increase lies in the Folding Bridge Company's new mission. From now on, it will build bridges itself. The Pontoon Sheet Bridge Company was responsible only for maintaining and transporting the bridge. An engineers field company would lay it. Only in special circumstances, such as the bridge at Cuijk during the Nijmegen 4-day Volkssmarsch, would the 105th itself, with its cooks, maintenance people, and drivers, lay the bridge. When the Folding Bridge Company became operational a new phenomenon appeared: the

private/folding bridge, who has trained on the bridge for 2 months at the Engineers Training Center. Even the drivers--most of whom are conscripts--will go to the Training Center before being sent to the 105th, just as the boatmen will. "Clearly, the fact that we'll be laying the bridge ourselves will relieve the other engineers units," Major Jonk says.

Double Work

In February the last pontoon sheet bridge platoon will be eliminated. However, it has been retrained on the folding bridge. As of 1 January 1988 [sic], the 155th (reserve) Folding Bridge Company has been filled out with personnel from the 105th. The double work has caused the company many headaches. The administrative and supply people have had to keep two sets of books. The maintenance people have two sets of vehicles, but not two sets of hands. Major Jonk finds the lack of space a particular problem. "Now I've got two bridges with all the equipment that goes with them. I simply don't know where I'm supposed to put it. Soon, when the last pontoon sheet bridge platoon is eliminated, I'll be rid of it, but right now I still don't know exactly where to turn it in."

The Folding Bridge Company has 270 meters of bridge, 90 meters plus six boats for each platoon. It is possible to lay a total of six 50-meter bridges, counting in the 10-meter end pontoons. If it has to, the company can provide a fleet for ferrying, but the disadvantage of that is the small capacity. With a bridge that can be laid within half an hour, the ferryboat system is rather out of date anyway.

Blockages

The truck is at the edge of the IJssel with its rear wheels in the water. The pontoon slides away and folds open in the water. The boatmen in the pusher boats approach cautiously in order to catch the pontoon and push it against another section of the bridge. After that they hold their position to keep the bridge in place. This method of "anchoring" the bridge helps speed up construction. Upstream and down lie patrol boats from the Ministry of Public Works. The Public Works rivermaster is helping out with this exercise, which must not harm river traffic. He guides shipping to prevent any dangerous situations.

For the months of September through December the 105th Folding Bridge Company asked Public Works to block rivers 15-20 times. "They weren't very enthusiastic about that," grins Major Jonk. "They have their own operating and quiet hour regulations, and, too, they do need two boats for us. We were able to calm them a bit when we told them that with the folding bridge we only need 1-hour blockages. With the pontoon sheet bridge, it would be 2 hours."

Jealous

A lot of regulations go along with a company exercise. In this regard the company commander is sometimes a bit jealous of his colleagues in the infantry, who, as he puts it, only have to give the command "Forward, march." Notice of the exercise has to be given to Public Works for the (partial)

blockage of the waterway, but in addition the Royal Constabulary has to be "ordered up" to escort the trucks.

The size of the trucks (4 meters high and 3.5 meters wide) means that every time they leave the Prinses Margriet Caserne in Wezep, they represent an outsize load which must be escorted by the Royal Constabulary. Thus, the 105th sends out its escort requests in bulk, because a platoon exercise will put 22 trucks plus four Royal Constabulary motorcycles on the road. If Major Jonk had his way, he would make room in the caserne for a few constables to be attached to him permanently.

By now the bridge sections are back on the trucks. Today's exercise is almost over. Staff Sergeant J. M. Michielsen is not unhappy with the platoon's performance. "In the caserne we taught them what the various handles on the trucks are for, yesterday we went out to actually practice on the folding bridge. Things are going well. By the end of the week we want to be able to lay a bridge in an hour. We'll make it, laying this bridge is really easy. But the whole bridge laying operation can go wrong if you forget one bolt. We saw that yesterday, for instance. A bolt on one pontoon did not get released, which meant that it didn't open. That cost us 10 minutes. The great advantage of this bridge is that working with it is physically much easier than with the pontoon sheet bridge."

Caught Fingers

Private Martien van der Steen, who works at an advertising agency in everyday life, nods in agreement. All that running about on the iron bridge is still fresh in his memory. Not long ago one of the guys got his fingers caught wretchedly while laying a pontoon sheet bridge. When asked how it happens that a platoon that has just been working with the new bridge for 2 days can be doing so well and can work so quietly, he says: "We work out signals with one another, and in the caserne we often talk over what we did during the day. The atmosphere in our platoon is great. Also, I'm happy I didn't end up in the infantry. The neat thing about this unit is that you really do something here. You feel useful. Especially when you get to lay a couple of bridges for civilian activities like the Stopera in Amsterdam or the 4-day Volksmarsch."

Working out signals is not an unnecessary luxury. Going out on the IJssel, you find that the pusher boat cabin does little to keep out the noise of the boat's 250 horsepower engine. You can hardly make out shouts from outside. According to Sergeant/Boatman P. Kuyper, the sides of the cabin are going to be insulated for sound. The career soldier says of the boat: "It'll certainly do the job. It steers a bit slower than the old boat. It has one disadvantage. This boat has an alarm system that, if you don't respond within a minute, it shuts off the engine. The boat decides for itself. I find that a problem. With the old boat, all we had was the oil pressure alarm, and I could decide for myself whether to make for the river bank or keep going. For instance, if you're ferrying a Leopard, you can't just stop, because you immediately start drifting." Private/Boatman Van der Kwast says that the hydraulic rudder is taking a lot of getting used to, because he cannot steer as much by feel as with the old boat. But Sergeant Kuyper, who used to be a

sea fisherman, is not completely happy with the new pusher boat either. He says the boat is a bit too "automatic." "There's no romance to it anymore," he says. Major Jonk has already heard all this criticism from the real seamen in his company. "When he saw the pusher boat for the first time, one of the boatmen said, 'I've got a box like that at home too. We keep the cookies in it.'"

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INFLUENCE OF 'ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE' NOW EXTENDS TO ARMY

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 6 Feb 87 p 7

[Article by Willi Steul, Ankara: "Khomeini Also Wants To Triumph on the Bosphorus--Islam Causes a Lot of Trouble to the Secular Government in Turkey"]

[Text] "Down with the ban on veils!" After Friday prayers on 17 January, about 5,000 people started out on a march to the Governor's Palace in Istanbul, protesting vociferously. En route from the Beyazit Mosque, the crowd shouted in unison: "Long live Muslim Turkey!" On their shoulders they carried Necmettin Erbakan, Turkey's best known fundamentalist politician and former chairman of the National Salvation Party (NEP), which was banned after the military coup in September 1980.

"Who must be obeyed?" shouted the crowd, "Evren or Allah?" The answer was obvious as far as the demonstrators were concerned. Compared with the Almighty, the Turkish head of state, former General Evren, will always come off second best. After all, the respected preacher Yeni Camii, too, had stated with the full authority of his office: "The constitution contradicts the Koran."

Ataturk's Heritage Questioned

Is Turkey on the way to a "state of God"? Will the mullahs have all the power in Anatolia, as they now have in Iran? My friend Mustafa Kemal, a young university lecturer in economics, gets worked up discussing the matter. It is not for nothing that he bears the name of Ataturk, the founder of the republic. The foundation, the idea of the modern Turkish republic, is being called into question, he says. "Just look at them! People like you and me are fleeing from Iran these days. Are we to exchange secularism for theocracy?"

A leftist and a harsh Marxist critic of the military and its intervention in September 1980, Mustafa Kemal is very positive about the head of state, Kenan Evren, who in a whole series of speeches in October and November began to warn against the increasing Islamic renaissance. He talked about young people being subjected to "brainwashing." President Evren, former general, a convinced Kemalist, and personally a devout Muslim, also refers to the judgment of the Council of State which, in its capacity of supreme administrative court, at the end of the year certified that the universities were entitled to deny access to lectures and other events at the universities to students wearing head scarf and veil.

Since the time of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, father of the republic, after World War I, the judgment stated, the secular structure of the state has been a principle of the constitution, and since veil and head scarf (and also a certain type of beard among men) have become demonstrative signs of support for an Islamic state, university presidents are entitled to deny access to Islamic activists for this reason.

In a personal talk with the university presidents, President Evren asked them to do so. Immediately there were demonstrations--the first unauthorized ones, incidentally, since the military had staged a military coup against the civilian government in September 1980. A strongly denied but persistent report has it that the top generals in a letter requested the president to take action against the increasing Islamic renaissance.

The denials were strong because the generals had written letters once before --signed by a chief of the General Staff named Evren, in 1979, when he thought that the existence of the republic was threatened by terrorism and called on the civilian politicians to be united and take action.

There were also some letters from the generals in 1980. Until, of all things, a demonstration by radical Muslim fundamentalists, became the last straw. When tens of thousands of religious fanatics headed by Necmettin Erbakan demanded an Islamic state, the army marched a few days thereafter.

Bureaucrats, officers, party politicians--all of them then played down the Islamic renaissance in Turkey until the army leadership, evidently quite at a loss realized that it was not immune either. In December the heads of the components of the armed forces engaged in consultations. According to President Evren, 813 cadets in the military high schools were members of Muslim sects, and 96 were dismissed in an initial action.

But not only in the army are the mullahs advancing. In 1984 a total of 46,400 students graduated from the Imam Hatip high schools, where instruction in the Muslim religion is a principal subject. That is almost 10 percent of Turkish high school graduates. In Istanbul and Ankara there is talk of "Middle Ages" and "infiltration by Iranian agents." The Turkish middle classes and most intellectuals are at a loss vis-a-vis a movement from which they thought Turkey was immune. Now, according to a poll, 7 percent of Turks are in favor of the establishment of an Islamic state a la Khomeini. Is Islam triumphing over Kemalism?

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, no doubt one of the greatest men of this century, forced Turkey to make reforms in the twenties, saving it from the ruins of the collapsing Ottoman Empire as a European type of national state. To build new things, he smashed old ones, banning the veil and the fez and strictly separating state and church along European lines.

Yet Kemalism, never an ideology but rather a principle of organization, of course was never able to replace Islam, and therefore the present amazement of almost the entire leading elite in Turkey at the Islamic renaissance appears naive. The Turks' cultural roots indubitably are Muslim.

Roots Into the Ottoman Empire

What is significant is that the sects of the Naksbendi or Suleymancar, which today provide the primary support of the Islamic renaissance, already put in an appearance as "resistance organizations" in the Ottoman Empire. According to the former social democratic Prime Minister Ecevit, "the military coup, the smashing of the developed political parties, left a power vacuum into which the Muslim fundamentalists are now advancing."

No doubt this is part of an attempt at explaining the Turkish Islamic renaissance. Even a number of former Marxist "prethinkers" today support Islamic fundamentalism, which in no way takes a back seat to the abjured "religion" as far as extremism and a seemingly conclusive concept of the world are concerned.

To this is, in fact, added the exercise of influence from abroad. The Tehran "Voice of Iran" over its shortwave transmitter calls for a "holy war" against the godless regime, and the "Turkish Khomeini," as President Evren calls Cemalettin Kaplan (who lives in Cologne), with the financial support of his Iranian exemplar distributes cassettes of rebellious speeches produced in Germany with the most up to date video technology. These are smuggled into Turkey.

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ARTICLE SURVEYS CHERNOBYL'S CESIUM 'TRAIL'

Stockholm NY TEKNIK in Swedish 8 Jan 87 pp 12-14

[Article by Kerstin Osterberg]

[Excerpt] "Sweden has become a large experimental field."

A scientist said that last spring when the radioactive winds from Chernobyl swept in over us.

Now the radioactive material--primarily cesium 134 and 137--is part of our environment.

What is happening in the soil? How does cesium get into plants? When will the level start to decline?

NY TEKNIK has surveyed the trail of cesium from the mountains to the coast in the hardest hit areas in Sweden.

Research into this has just begun. Therefore there are no really definite answers.

The experiment will continue for many years to come.

Mountain Plants Absorb a Lot

Reindeer are the animals that have been most heavily affected by cesium in Sweden. They consume the largest quantities not on mountain pastures but via reindeer moss in the forests in the course of winter grazing.

But mountain plants and grasses also absorb a lot of cesium. This is due to the poor and thin layer of soil which is low in minerals but rich in organic material (decomposed plant and animal material).

It has a hard time binding cesium. The cesium lies loose in the layer of soil and is easily absorbed by plant roots, returning to the soil when the plants wither.

A small amount of the cesium gradually moves down toward the substrata, the mineral strata, and is held there.

Reindeer research is extensive. The researchers' most optimistic estimate of the cesium level in these animals is that the most affected animals could have a level of 10,000 Bq/kg--10 years from now. If no other steps are taken, that is.

No Potassium in Mountain Lakes

The clear water of mountain lakes contains almost no nutritive salts. There is no potassium that could block some of the cesium absorption by fish.

There are two food chains in these lakes, one fast and one slow. In the fast chain, which involves algae, plankton, small animals and fish, the level declines the higher up the chain the cesium comes.

In the slow chain, from preyed-upon to predatory fish, the opposite occurs. The predators contain the highest levels.

In the fast chain the amounts have already decreased substantially. The biological half life is short: several days for algae. The levels will continue to decline unless the lakes receive a new injection of cesium when the snow melts in the spring.

In the slow chain (see forest lakes) there is a big risk that the levels will increase in the summer.

But the scientists disagree. Some say that cesium levels have already reached their peak and that levels in fish are starting to decline. Others say that mountain lakes will be deeply affected for another 10 years or even longer.

Large Amounts in Peat Bogs

Large amounts of cesium have been found in the upper layer of peat bogs. The dwarf mulberries that grow there will have a high cesium content for a long time to come. For the purposes of peat mining the scientists advise peeling off the upper cesium-containing layer.

Future Very Uncertain in Forests

In thin and potassium-deficient forest soil, cesium moves around in the food chains. A quiet cesium "rain" is still falling from conifers in the form of cesium-containing needles and free cesium ions.

The future is extremely uncertain. Scientists believe that the levels in lingonberries and blueberries will decline this summer. But there is a small risk that levels in some areas with very poor soil could increase instead. Additions of cesium do not just come from above. During its passage down

through the soil cesium eventually ends up in a position where it is easier for plant roots to absorb it.

Fungi appear to be in the worst position. They are cesium lovers and absorb all the Chernobyl cesium they can. Their levels will probably continue to rise. But there are big differences between species. Ordinary mycorrhiza fungi such as sand boletus, kremla and milk caps already had very high levels last summer. Others that break down the top layer of soil consisting of half-rotted plant material, such as the parasol mushroom, have not yet absorbed any Chernobyl cesium.

Research will continue. Not until summer will scientists know what the cesium levels in plants and animals look like.

Little Potassium in Forest Lakes

Forest lakes are often deficient in nutrients and brown in color, indicating that the bottom consists of organic material. The potassium content is very low. If the lake is also large and shallow with a long water replacement period it has all the prerequisites for a very high level of cesium.

Not much happens during the winter. The fish eat almost nothing and the cesium content is undisturbed.

In the summer there could be a sharp increase. This is shown by the estimates scientists have made concerning pike. The future looks dark for these lakes. Old experiments show that the level might not be down to 25 percent of the maximum level for another 10 years.

The perch in the picture [not included] would still contain 7,500 Bq/kg at that time.

High Levels in Poor Soil

The cesium levels in field crops are expected to decline substantially by this summer. This is mainly due to the fact that the soil is not left alone. It is fertilized, limed and plowed and this disturbs the cesium circulation in the plants.

In poor soil with a low pH value, a low potassium content and a lot of organic material, cesium absorption will continue to be high. In some cultivated fields and banks on drained lakes and swamps, scientists found that cesium levels have taken off. These must receive special treatment to reduce the level of cesium this summer.

When the fallout came, large areas of Sweden were covered with snow. But this is what happened to plants that had come up:

The cesium attached itself to leaves and penetrated into the plant through cell walls. This occurred very slowly and only a small percentage managed

to penetrate. The rest fell off; the "residential half life" depends on rain and wind, but generally it is between 14 days and 1 month.

The plants confused cesium with potassium and shifted it around as needed. Most seemed to end up in the stems (this was true of grain) and only a small amount was found in the kernels.

This summer and thereafter plants will only be able to absorb cesium the other way--through the roots. The largest amount will be absorbed by mineral-rich vegetables like lettuce and spinach that are harvested at a very early stage.

Fertile Soil Does Best

Rich, fertile, well-fertilized flatlands with a good layer of clay will do best. Here the cesium is bound to mineral atoms, primarily silicon atoms.

The cesium content of milk, meat and grain could still increase temporarily. This will happen if cesium-contaminated soil is included in the harvest or if animals consume dirt while grazing. In a heavy downpour, dirt is splashed up on plants.

Levels Rising in Baltic Sea

Here we find the same types of food chains that we see in lakes. Fast and slow. Green and rock algae in the Baltic Sea quickly absorbed very large amounts of cesium. The levels dropped just as quickly.

Now the fish are being enriched with cesium and the levels are still rising. But the scientists assure us that no ocean fish will have a higher level than 300 Bq/kg. One reason is the high potassium content of the ocean surface. Even if the fish absorb most of the potassium through their gills and the cesium through their food, a lot of potassium will block a large part of the cesium ocean fish absorb.

But the picture is contradictory. The perch near Gavle had levels of over 300 Bq/kg back in the fall. Baltic herring near Angermansalven contained 200 Bq/kg. Scientists believe that the curve for these species will change in the spring.

The levels in cod continue to rise. From 20-40 Bq now they will probably reach 100 Bq by summer. It is not certain if that will be the maximum level.

Scientists Only Guessing

The cesium levels in the Swedish environment will decline this summer. At any rate in crops grown on rich, well-fertilized cultivated fields.

However the situation is very uncertain with regard to mountains, forests and lakes. In the hardest hit areas the cesium levels could even increase.

That is how one can sum up Swedish scientists' assessment of the situation. It is more guesswork than prediction. The situation is new and the old models do not always correspond to reality.

From Uppsala-Gavle along the coast of Norrland to Sundsvall-Harnosand-Umea in a broad stretch northwest up over Medelpad-Angermanland-Vasterbotten up to the mountains on the border between Jamtland and Lapland.

That is where the most cesium 134 and 137 fell on Sweden in the spring of 1986. It fell on the most vulnerable and poorest soil in the most unstable ecosystems. It fell at one time in enormous quantities, not spread out over many years like the fallout from the nuclear bomb tests of the 1960's.

And the cesium levels in the environment are much higher; in the hardest hit places they are 50 times higher than the levels from the fallout from all the nuclear bomb tests combined.

Fitting Pieces Together

We already know how the fallout affects reindeer. But what else happens in the environment? How does cesium move in food chains? When will the levels diminish?

The answers are not obvious. The scientists are fitting the pieces together using current measurement data and yesterday's knowledge and models, which do not always correspond to reality.

At Defense Research Institute [FOA] 125, the FOA laboratory in Stockholm, they are studying the movement of cesium in the soil. And there it is behaving just as it did in the 1960's, one can see that from the soil samples that have been collected all over the country.

"The 1986 cesium lies at a depth of around 1 millimeter today. At that rate the cesium will end up 2-3 cm down in the soil in 30 years and cesium from the 1960's can be found there," said Lars Bjurman of FOA.

Cesium moves very slowly in soil and never reaches ground water level before activity has deteriorated. In other respects it behaves like its mineral relative, potassium, an important nutritive salt in the soil. If potassium is not present cesium will replace it in plants, animals and human beings.

Cesium is easily trapped by other minerals in the soil. In clay soil it adheres to silicon atoms and remains there.

In poor nutrient-deficient soil that contains few minerals but a lot of organic material (rotted animal and plant debris) cesium is very loose and easily moves into plants.

Circulates

On mountains with their poor thin soil cover and dense root mats of shrubs and plants, there is little to keep cesium in place. The exception involves some areas rich in limestone and meadows with a lot of nutrients. Here a lot of cesium circulates between plants and soil and the levels in the vegetation will remain at about the same level for several more years.

Reindeer moss contains levels of up to 70,000 Bq/kg. The present standard for human food is 300 Bq/kg. Reindeer moss is the staple food for reindeer during the winter (in forest areas) and it determines the level in the reindeer—if no other steps are taken. The reindeer's biological half life is 12-30 days. That of reindeer moss is 5-15 years. Norwegian scientists usually figure in terms of ecological half life, which in the case of reindeer would be the same as that of reindeer moss.

Thus the reindeer that were estimated to contain 60,000 Bq/kg in the spring will have reduced this level to 30,000 Bq within 10 years. These are the most seriously affected reindeer in Sweden, in Vilhelmina in Lapland.

This matches the most pessimistic forecasts made by Swedish reindeer researcher Gustaf Ahman. His optimistic version is 10,000 Bq in the same time period.

Faxalven

Radioecological research is being aimed primarily at the areas where economic interests are involved: the reindeer industry, fishing, hunting and agriculture.

A big project in the area of fishing is the charting of the circulation of cesium in the streams around the upper reaches of Faxalven in northern Jamtland starting in the spring. The National Food Administration takes samples regularly from selected lakes and the level shown for the mountain lake in the illustration [not included] is the result of a cooperative effort by the county board in Ostersund and the Conservation Directorate in Trondheim. The Norwegian mountains have been hit very hard by cesium fallout (see map [not included]).

The lake water itself has never had a high cesium content: 10-30 Bq/l at the highest point, below 10 Bq today. But animals and plants took in quite a lot even so. There is no potassium that can block the cesium.

If fish have a short food chain, like salmon trout and char, they quickly reach high levels. Both eat animal life on the bottom but char are pushed aside by salmon trout if they share the same lake. Then the char turn directly to plant and animal plankton instead.

Many fish experts have predicted a very bleak future for the fish in mountain lakes.

Professor Ulf Grimas, who has long been involved in research into radioactive substances in lakes and oceans, is more optimistic. He thought he detected a slight tendency toward reduction last fall and explained this in terms of the short food chains. But if melting snow this spring brings with it a lot of cesium from the ground, the food chain levels could rise again.

Regulated lakes pose a special problem, in the opinion of Ulf Grimas. An Arctic shrimp, *mysis relicta*, is often introduced to restore life to shore areas that sometimes resemble deserts. The shrimp feed on material in the sediment on the bottom but occasionally they rise to the surface, where they are eaten by fish. All the cesium eventually ends up in the sediment. Therefore the shrimp can effectively increase the cesium levels in fish and these levels could continue to rise this summer, in the view of Ulf Grimas.

Sticks to Needles

It is not quite certain that blueberries will contain less cesium in 1987 than they did in 1986. At worst the levels could be even higher. If so, this is the reason:

Conifers are good air filters and they trap air pollution quite effectively. They did this with the Chernobyl emissions too. For example the needles on the pines in Vindeln in Vasterbotten contained 5,000 Bq of cesium per kilogram after the accident. Now the levels are down to 1-3,000 Bq and all along some cesium has continued to leak from the needles and drift down to the ground. The cesium also follows the needles themselves when they drop off the trees.

Pines change their needles over a 3-year period. During this lengthy time period the poor and somewhat acid forest soil will be continuously resupplied with cesium from above.

And as it moves down into the soil cesium could become more easily available to the roots of some plants in a few years than it was when the fallout occurred.

This point was made by Ake Eriksson, senior consultant at the Radioecology Institute of the Agricultural College in Uppsala, who has studied the absorption of radioactive substances by plants for many years.

"But many factors work together," he said. "If the spring is a dry one there will be less cesium absorption, because the roots in the top layer of soil will not be active."

This is even more true with regard to fungi. Health inspectors in country districts and people at the National Food Administration have been able to keep track of the rising levels in mushrooms and they think the levels in some species will continue to rise this summer.

Mushrooms have an enormous capacity when it comes to cesium absorption. West German studies show that they absorb an average of 0.7 milligrams of ordinary

(stable, nonradioactive) cesium per kilogram, which is a very large amount. Thus they also assimilated a lot of cesium 134 and 137.

But there are big differences between various kinds of fungi. Sand boletus, kremla, milk caps and chanterelles had high levels back in the summer of 1986. Table mushrooms, mountain ink caps and parasol mushrooms contained hardly any cesium. The small amounts that were found came from nuclear bomb tests.

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